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PREFACE.

THE following

biographical sketches of aome
of the principal characters in Central Asian
affairs were written with the object of t h o w -

i n g a, little more light than we already possess
upon a, subject to which we too often permit

I
1

i

1

surselves to show indifference. They are based
upon such information as can be gleaned from
dl authentic books of travel, histories, official
documents, &c. &o. Where the description
is more meagre than might be desired, the
reader will, perhaps, remember that one of
t h e chief ,reasons for the scarcity of infora
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PREFACE.

mation concerning the careers of native rulers
and chieftains is the policy which has been
persisted in, for years, by the Indian Government of discouraging, and throwing impedimenta in the way of, exploration by Englishmen.

Of late, too, there has been less energy shown
than formerly in giving commissions to native
explorers.
I t is unnecessary to say anything more by
way of introductioll to what follows. The
portraits speak, it is hoped, for themselves. I
have endeavoured, to the best of my ability,
t o regard t h e m from an impartial point of view,
and to consider their meTits without reference
t o the p a r t they have played in the development of t h e rivalry between England and
Russia. In some cases I may appear to have
awarded t o o much praise, in others too little.
I have sought t o try them by a high standard,
b u t I have not, in a weak desire to exaggerate
the figure of any of my ,subjects, strained my
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test beyond what seemed legitimate bounds.
I leave these portraits, with diffidence, in the
hands of the reader, hoping that they may be
found to possess soms interest and t o convey
a little instruction, yet not wholly free from
the doubt that my clients might, could they
be permitted to speak to us, represent themselves in a, somewhat M e r e n t light to that
in which they appear to me. But I may say
that I have striven to bring them individually
before the English reader in as clear a manner
as the state of our knowledge will admit.

ERRATUM.

p. 112, line 20, for Yalcoob Khan, read Yakoob Beg.
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ASIAN
DOST MAHOMED.
WHENon the yuins of the conquests of Nadir
Shah there arose, in the region lying between
the Persian border on the one side, and the
territory of Delhi on the other, an autonomous state, generally called Afghanistan, the
family of the Sudosyes attained supreme power
therein partly through the peculiar reputation
it had acquired in the eyes of the Afghans, and
partly through the pre-emineat ability of its
chief Ahmed Shah. Ahmed, who, as a general,
emulated Nadir Shah, and, as an administrator,
probably surpassed him, was the founder of
what has been termed the Durani monarchy.
His power descended unimpaired to his son
Timour ; but in the following generation not
only did the vigour of the ruler become re-
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laxed, but the union, which had been hastily
patched up in a country which it was only possible in those days for a great soldier to keep
welded in one, also began to grow less firm and
substantial. The civil wars between the sons,
of Timour were an invitation to all the ambitious and intriguing brains in the country to
combine for tho purpose of making the most of
the prevailing confusion for the furtherance of
personal designs. The invitation was generally
accepted, and by one family it was turned t o
excellent account. It is of the greatest membor
of that family that it is our purpose, in this
opening sketEb of those individuals who have
influenced the progress of events in Central.
Asia, to speak here in some detail.
Descended from a line of ancestry which
scarcely yielded in importance among the Abdeli Afghans to that possessed by the Durani
Shahs, of the Sudosys family, Dost Mahorned,
Baruckaye, son of Poyadah Khan, the leading
nobleman at the Court of Timour, was one
who, in any country and under drnost ally
conditions, would have won his way to fame.
The special circumstances of the hour were
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beyond doubt most favourable to the attainment of the ambition he had formed a t an
early period in his career ; but even had the
Sudosye dynasty remained supreme, and the
Barucksyes content with their subordinate
position, Dost Mahomed would have been certain to have shown more than ordinary excellence and ability. The post of Vizier had come
to be considered hereditary in his family, ancl
although his youth was against him, there can
be no doubt that he would in course of time
have risen to that office.
When Shah Zemaun imprisoned and slew
P o ~ n d a h ,the Sarfraz* Khan of the Clays of
Timour, the approach of the close of the authority of the Xudosyes was signalled. Not only
did that act of treachery, committed upon the
peyson of a man to whom that ruler owed most
of his authority, alienate much of the popular
sympathy, but it also roused the leaders of the
great Barucksye clan to more vigorous action.
The sons of Poyndah vowed that t h y would

*

Sarfraz Khm means the Noble Lord."
((
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avenge their fatheT9sdeath, and on Futteh Ali,
as the eldest, devolved the ~rincipalpart in tho
task that had been self imposed.
Dost Mahomed was the twentieth of the sons
of Poyndah. His mother was of Persian descent and a Shiah. She was consequently regarded with but little favour by the other wives
of that chief ; but notwithstanding her o~igin,
she was the most favoured by her husband,
whom she accompanied during sev~ralcampaigns. She was also the soldiers' friend. Dost
Mahomed shared in the privations which fell
to the lot of the Barucksyes after the death of
Poyndah, but, as he was a mere child, very
little is known of his life at this period. At
one time we are told that Futteh Ali set apart
a certain sum of money to provide for his proper
education. The Dost was then about eight
years of age. In 1800, when Putteh Ali was
successfully supporting the cause of Mahmoud
Shah, he made his first appearance in public
life at the early age of twelve years. At first
it was in the capacity of water-bearer, and later
on as pipe-bearer, to his brother Futteh. These
offices constituted him a sort of body page to
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his able brother, and they served to raise a
bond of sympathy between them, rasely to be
].let with between brothers in Afghan history.
Prom this early age the Dost attached himself
in a peculiar sense to the fortunes of his eldest
brother, and Futteh Ali imposed implicit trust
in the sagacity of the promising youth of whose
fidelity he felt so well assured. Mohun La1
says that '' he never went t o sleep until Futteh
was gone to his bed. He stood before him all
the day with his hands closed, a token of respect among tho Afghans. I t mas not an unusud occurrence that when Futteh Khan was
in his sleeping-room, Dost Mahomed stood
watching his safety."
I n the petty strifes which ensued between
the three Sudosye brothers Dost Mahorned
played a part only less considerable than that
taken by Butteh. On several occasions it was
due to the gallantry and skill of this youth,
then only a boy of fourteen years of age, that
the power of the Barucksyes was not overthrown and the race extirpated. As he advanced in years, the part he played in affairs
became larger. It was held t o bo as necessary

6
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to know what the Dost would do under certain
circumstances as to ascertain what Butteh himself intended. His reputation was enhanced by
two decided victories, towards which his skill
I

,

t

Ii
I'
II

L
1

greatly contributed, over Shuja-ul-Mulk and
his generals."
That Dost Mahomed was far from possessing
any scruples as to the methods to be employed
for the attainment of supreme power may be
seen from the facts that he murdered several
leading men after a fashion not less remarkable
for its treachery than its ferocity. His inurder
of his elder brother's secretary was a striking
instance of the character of t h e mall and of
Afghan customs, which still remain unchanged.
After this, Dost Mahomed rose to higher posts
in the service of t,he State, but he was still
content to be his brother's cup-bearer. A war
was at this period iu. progress with a rebellious
governor of Cashmere, the11 an Afghan 'province, and while its fortunes were doubtful, it
afforded the occasion for the following remark-

* Mohun La1 gives the credit for these exclusively to
the Dost. To Futteh Ali probably belongs the chief
praise.
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able speech from Dost Mahorned, who could not
have been more than twenty-one years of age :<'Itappears to me that the victory gained
-last year, the annihilation of the seditious
chiefs, the confinement of Shahzadah Abbae,
the repossession of Cabul, and the elevation of
our King Shah Mahmoucl t o the throne of his
forefathers, by the use of the sword, and by
the wisdom of the members of our family, have
been a sufficient source of gratification to those
who are attached to our fortunes ancl to His
majesty Shah Mahmoud. Not only this, but
t h e citizens, fearless of the attacks of the lawless followers of the late rebel Seyyicl Ashraf
of Kohistan, sleep comfortably ; reform and
improvement have been successfully introcluced
into the agitated affairs of government. May our
King Shah Mahmoud ancl my noble brother the
present Vizier, as well as the rest of the chiefs,
including myself, enjoy the fruit of our hardearned authority I But I regret to say that the
luxurious habits of the King, &c., bicl fair to
cause that the present condition of the country
be not a lasting one. One cause for every one
of the above-mentioned individuals falling into

8
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luxurious indolence appears t o be that they
forget the seditious ;onduct of Ata Mahomed
Khan, governor of the rich valley of Cashmere,
zuithout the possession of which region no king
of AJqhanistan has Been, or ever will be, able t o
c
lthe royal dignity.
maintain a lmge m y h
- " Notwithstanding the peace and pleasure
which every one seems to enjoy, and that t o
imitate them there is an open field for me also,
yet the rules of sound and far-sighted diplomacy, which are always wandering in my heart
and brain, have not allowed me t o rest a moment, and I shall never be easy until some
mature steps are taken to punish the hostile
obstinacy of Ata Mahomed Khan, the Governor
of Cashmere, who turned the Government
agent, as well as that of my noble brother the
Vizier, with disgrace, out of the valley, and
refused to pay the stipulated sum of tribute.
It is not possible to defray the general expenses of the movements of an army under 'my
noble brother the Vizier to check the restless
spirits of the discontented chiefs unless the
country of Cashmere be ceded to us."
This speech led t o the despatch of a large
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expedition against Cashmere, which was completely successful; but the vigilance of Runjeet
Singli, and internal dissensions, prevented the
reward of this vigorous action being permanent. The Afghan leaders withdrew from
Cashmere, but only to find that their line of
retreat had been intercepted by a Sikh army
stationed at Attock. After a stubborn resistance, and the performance of almost incredible
acts of valour by the Dost, the Afghans were
routed and obliged to flee to Peshawur. Nor
was safety to be found in that place. The
shadow of civil disturbance was ag- in settling
d o m over Cabul, and the Vizier an:] his brather were obliged to return to the capital for
the purpose of maintaining their position. The
expedition into Cashmere which had' promised
to secure that revenue-producing province,
the necessity of which was insisted upon in
the speech just quoted, really resulted in the
triumph of the Sikhs, who derived all the
benefit to be obtained from the reverse suffered by the Afghans. Had there been no
dyiiastic question in course of settlement,
Futteh A.E would probably have returned with

10
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fresh troops, but the war which now broke out
between Shuja and Mahmoud effectually destroyed dl chance of such a course being
taken.
Shortly after this occurrence the state of
affairs at Herat called the attention of Mahmoud and his Vizier to that province, where
the Persians mere carrying on intrigues with
the object of re-establishing their authority
there. Futteh Ali and Dost Mahomed marched
westwards at the head of a large army. In
the campaign that ensued a severe battle was
fought at Kussan, where Futteh Ali was
wounded. The result was doubtful, as both
armies rest~medtheir former positions. Futteh
Ali then intrigued to supplant Feroz, the ruler
of Herat and a brother of Mahmoud, and he
did not scruple to employ the meanest artifices
for the attainment of his purpose. Unfortunately, both t'he Barucksye chiefs sullied their
triumph by gross excesses. The Afghans can
forgive the blackest treachery, and they evince
n o extraordinary indignation towards deeds of
blood; but they are less disposed to colldone
acts which shock the national sense of honour.
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Dost Mahomed was the greatest offender of
all. By as much as he excelled all his comrades in valour and military skill, by not less
did he surpass them in greed for spoil and the
other I-ecompenses of savage battle. Having
broken into Herat, having surprised and slain
the guards a t the gat,es, and having seized the
person of Perez, he began to plunder all connected with the palace. Not content with this,
he offered an inexpiable outrage Lo the sister
of Kamran, who had married her cousill Prince
Malilr Kasim. The band which fastened her
trousers was fringed wit11 precious stones, alsd
on her refusing to hand it over, he cut the
band and took bit away. What monder that
Kamran on hearing of this, as he did speedily,
for his sister sent the profaned robe to him,
should swear that he would avenge the insult
on the person of Putteh Ali and the Dost? The
keen eye of the Vizier detected the political
blunder involved in the rash act of his young
brother, and not only did he publicly repudiate
a11 participation in it, but he took steps for the
arrest ancl punishment of the culprit. These,
it is not surprising to find, the latier evaded,

12
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making his escape to his other brother, Mahomed Azirn, the Governor of Cashmere.
But the revenge of Kamran did not slumber
because its chief object had fled. The power
of the Barucksyes was dependent upon the supremacy of Futteh Ali, and the greatest blow
that could b e dealt the individual was to smite
the family b y sweeping the Vizier from power.
Rnlnran came to Herat bent on the errand of
avenging his sister's shame, a t the same time
that he asserted his own position i n the realm.
I u that camp which mas still the scene of t h e
rivalry of opposite parties in the State, it mas
not difficult for the King's son to gather round
him a strong paTty pledged to work out his
own ends. To all appeal*anceKamran was t h e
dear friend of Futteh dli, but behind his back
he was plotting, .not less successfully t h a n
secretly, his destruction. Futteh Ali mas surprised and thrown into prison, where he was czt
once deprived of sight. Ksmran then sot out
for C a b d mith his illustrious prisoner. T h e
blinding of Futteh AJi mas the signal f o r t h e
outbreak of a fresh civil mar. Dost Mahomed
returlled with money and with troops from
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Cashmere. Shah Shuja set hiinself up for a
third time as ruler. Mahmoud lost his head,
and made frantic but vain appeals to Putteh to
induce his brothers to come to terms. The
appeals mere unavailing. The nobla man was
to be moved as little by promises as he had
ahown himself t o be by threats. He said
"since he had lost his sight he had lost all his
influence over men." H e was forthwith murdered by order of Mahmoud and Kamran, with
every circumstance of oruelty that a malignant
and disappointed hatred could suggest.
I n the moanwhile Mahmoud's party was
losing ground throughout the conntry. Dost
Mahomed had made himself master of Peshawur, and was in full march for Cabd, which he
expected to take partly by force and partly by
fraud. He succeeded in his object as well as
he expected. The Bala Hissar was captured
after a siege of a few days by mining one of the
gates of the upper cihadel. This success was
followed up by the disbandment of the army
of Mahmoud, who fled with his son Kamran to
Eerat. The Barucksye brothers, who all came
forward to claim a share in tho spoil won solely

14
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by the ability of Dost Mahorned, then parcelled
out the country between them, and Ghizni was
allotted as the share of the Dost. Altlhough
he possessed one of the keys of the country,
he was not content with either his share o r
his relative position towards the rest. The intrigues of Dost Mahomed for the attainment
of supreme power became the chief cause of
disturbance in the state. He availed himself of
every opportunity that offered for the extension
of his influence, and he did not scruple to make
the most of the disputes which arose between
his brothers, as well as of the expiring efforts
of the $udosye dynasty for the recovery of
its rights.
Mohun Lal, in his " Life of Dost Mahomed,"
appears to take an inexplicable pleasure in repeating all the details-which rest only upon
rumour-of various acts of atrocity which mnst
be held to sully the fame of a man whom we
would gladly accept as a true hero." These

* I n considering Asiatic character allowance must be
mdde for national customs. This is in no case more
necessary than in that of the Afghan tribes. An Afghan
might he a hero, and yet commit deeds which would
make an Englishman a criminal.
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need not be specified; but taken into general
consideration, they serve t o shorn that this man
had no scruples of conscience. No human
weakness or sympathy stood between him and
the. realisation of a design. One instance may,
however, be given of the way in which Dost
Mahomed strove to advance his personal interests at this time. His elder brother, Mnhomed Bairn, had marched into Pisheen for ihe
purpose of levying tribute from t'he Mirs of
Ecinde, and he had specified four lacs of rupees
as the sum he expected to receive from them.
Dost Mahomed, who accompanied him with a
considerable band of followers, notified to the
Minister of Scinde that, if he were sent one lac,
he would desert his brother and thus compel
him to abandon his enterprise. His offer was
accepted, Dost Mahomsd retired t o Candahar
with his ill-gotten treasure, and Mahomed Azirn
was compelled to leave the coffers of the Mirg
of Scinde untouched.
After thia Dost Mahomed withdrew to Peshawur, and for a short time he officiated as
Governor of Eohat. H e was soon on terms
again with Mahomed Azim, but there was dis-

16
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trust between the brothers, as could scarcely
have been otherwise, and Dost Mahomed received permission to go mheresoever he liked.
H e availed himself of this permission, and
withdrew to Ghizni, of which he made himself
master by a stratagem. If the means which.
he employed were of a questionable character,
he always appears, the end once attained, to
have endeavoured to turn it to the best account
for the interests of the people. Master of
Ghizni, he " restored confidence and peace
among the inhabitants." Bll Mahomed Azim's
efforts t o recover that town proved abortive.
But Dost Mahomed, far from being coutent
with tlie possession of Ghizni, was intent
upon playing for a larger stake. During these
years the Sikh danger had been a growing
one, and Mahomed Azim, baffled in an attempt
to defend the Peshawur valley against Runjeet
Singh, returned to Cabul t o die of disappointment and disease brought on by exposure.
The death of Mahomed Azim was the signal
for fresh disturbances in the state; but it is
unnecessary to follow these in any detail. They
resulted, however, in the establishment of the
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Dost's authority ia Cabul itself. He then acquired Balabaglz and Jellalabad. This had
scarcely been done when his attention was
called to the south, where the Sudosye Shujeul-Mulk was threatening Candahar with a large
force. H e hastened by forced marches to the
assistance of his brothers, who were hard
pressed in that city, and, having drawn up his
force ia front of the enemy, attacked without
giving time to his friends, some of mholn were
meditating treachery, to desert. The result
justified both his foresight and his eneygy.
His arms were completely victorious, and
Shuja-ul-Mulk was again driven to take refuge
within English territory. I n this battle ABbczr
Khan greatly distinguished himself, and indeed,
in a sense, the victory may be said to have
been due to his valour.
On his return to Cabul Dost was proclaimed
Ameer, thus being the first Barucksye to assume
5~ supreme title. The Sudosyes had always
claimed and used the royal style of Shall, but
v h e n they mere expelled the kingdom i;ho confusion which followed, in conseque~lceof tl~e.
disagreement between the Barucksyes, pre-

2
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vented anyone aspiring to the chief place
of all. The death of Mahomed Aaim and $he
Dost's victory at Candahar smoothed the way
for st Barucksye t o assume the title of Ameer,
of special significance in the eyes of all the
followers of the Eaithful. His great want was
money, and he spared no effort t o obtain as
large a sum as he could from his subjects. H e
even resorted to plundering foreign merchants
in order to procure what he required. A gloomy
picture is drawn of the state of Cabul during
these early days of the administration of Dost
Mahomed; and whether the man o r the conditions of the hour were to blame, it is clear *thatat
this time he was not a benefactor to his people.
He marked the commencement of his reign by
t h e issue of a new coinage, bearing upon it t h e
stamp Dost Mahomed, Ghazi-conqueror over
t h e infidel before they were vanquished.
All these measures were sanctioned and defended on the ground that they were taken for
t h e prosecution of a war against the Sikh infidels ; and Dost Nahomed moved his army
forward to Dacca, whence he addressed appeals
t o t h e fanaticism of the border tribes. H e
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%hen marched through the Xhyber, and took
up a position in the Peshaww valley. His
(brother, Sultan Mahomed, however, deserted
him, and the Sikh army, reinforced by Runjeet
.Sin$ in person, took up a strong position in
his front. B u t although the fanaticism of the
Afghans had been raised to a high pitch, there
was little fighting; and. the opposing camps
became the scene of plots and counter-plots,
which were but an insignificant achievement as
the result of the first campaign of one who had
assumed t h e proud title of Ghazi. To some extent, however, he vindicated his reputation by
the successful campaign of 1835, when his sons
defeated H u r r e e Singh in a battle at Jumrood,
in which the Sikh general was killed. The
credit for this victory was given a t the time
t o Akbar Khan, but there appears to be little
doubt that it should have been awarded to the
Dost's eldest son, Maul, who, thirty years later,
was for a short space de facto Ameer of Cabul.
Notwithstanding that the Ameer committed
many deeds which were probably not less impolitic than they were certainly cruel, there is
no question, as clearly shown by the result,
2 *
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that he must have been a wise and prudent
ruler. H e encouraged trade as it had not been
encouraged in Afghanistan for many years before ; and if he was harsh in his dealings with
the chiefs of the clans, and the members of his
own family, it was dou.btless because he knew
that if be were not, the same law would be meted
out to him as had been to his predecessors.
Sir Alexander Burnes has left the following
ciescription of tho reputation whicl~Dost Mahomed had acquired, and i t would be difficult
to imagine that it could be said with t r u t h
of any of the other chiefs who have made themselves supreme in Afghanistan :" The reputation of Dost Mahomed is made
lrnown t o a traveller long before he enters his
country, and no one better merits the high
character which he has obtained.
Tho
justice of this chief affords a constant $heme
of praise to all classes ; the peasant rejoices at
the absence of tyranny, tihe citizen at the szfety
of bis house and the strict municipal r e & u l a t I i o
regarding weights and measures ; the merchant
at the equity of the decisions and the protection of his property; and the soldiers at the
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regular manner in which their arrears are discharged. A man in power call have no higher
praise. Dost Mahomed Khan has not attained
his fortieth year ; his mother was a Persian,
and he has been trained up with people of that
nation, which has sharpened S s understanding
and given him advantages over all his brothers.
I-Ie is doubtless the most powerful chief in
Afghanistan, and may yet raise himself by his
abilities to a much higher rank in his native
country."
The writer who has already been several times
referred to, Mohun Lal, who appeaTs to me to
have allowed his judgment as a historian to be
warped by his desire to say what he thought
would be most agreeable to his English pntrons,
gives the following description of this ruler
about the same period ; and it may be interesting to place it side by side with the one just
quoted. I n some respects the English writer is
the more impartial ; yet even unwillingly as it is
given, Mohun Lal's tribute is a flattering one :" I n the person, in the manners, and in the
public proceedings of the Ameer there is manifest the existence of everything imaginable
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most suitable to support his own view. H e is
calm, prudent, and wise in cabinet, and an able
commander in the field. I n treachery, cruelty,
murder, and falsehood he is equally notorious.
H e is n o t at all a popular ruler," but he is t h e
first man in Afghanistan who knows how to
keep his authority undisturbed, and to deal
effectually with the vagabond Afghans. He is
certainly very much liked in regard to o n e
thing, namely, this : any man seeking for justice may stop him on the road by holding his.
hand and garment, and may abuse him for not,
relieving his grievances. Whatever odium may
attach t o the Ameer of Cabul, it is an unquestionable fact that he is the only person fit to
rule Cabul."
Much more might be quoted to the s i m e
effect, but enough has been said, perlia,ps, t o
show that, if the test of the result attained be
applied, Dost Mahomed was even at this time
a very successful ruler.
Alone among the Afghan chiefs be had collected round him the semblance of an army.

* This assertion is certainly a rqsh one.
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His cavalry was computed a t twelve thousand
strong, his infantry st four thousand men, and
he had an artillery train of from fifty to sixty
field pieces, besides a large number of camel
swivels. This considerable force was more or
less trained, and divided into regiments. They
ware paid regularly, and by that means were
more firmly attached t o the person of their
prince. Nor did he commit the blunder of attempting to create a militmy machine framed
upon the model of the British army. He left
the national customs intact, and trusted alone
to the warlike spirit of the Afghan people, being
fully content to secure tho maximuna of faithful
service with the minimum of interference with
indiviclual rights and liberties. By these means
he created an armed force, well adapted for warfare in a mountainous region, and one which, if it
could not cope with a regular army, was at least
as formidable after it had ostensibly been dispersed as when it was drawn up in regular array.
It was at this time, when Dost Nal~orned~s
reputation had been heightened by the success at
Jumrood, and the repulse of the attempt of Shah
Shuja against Candahar, that the English Go-

24

CENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

vernrnent first came into contact with him as
ruler of Cabul. The demonstrations made by Persia against Herat, the thinly concealed activity of
the Russian agent at Teheran, and the operations t h a t were in progress on the steppe from
Orenburg-a11 these had served to stir t h e
Indian authorities up to a great pitch of activity. It was held to be certain that Russia
was on the eve of making a host'ile move in t h e
direction of the Indus, and it must be remembered that, although much haa taken place in
the interval, and avast extent of territory been
annexed by Russia, the prinie object before her
agents then was exactly what it can only be a t
tlie present, via. the possession of Herat. It
would be rash, therefore, for anyone to declare,
because forty years have not sufficed to obtain
for Russia the prize she coveted, that t h e
action of our authorities in 1838 was nnjustifiable. As a matter of fact, the result
may be said t o have afforded the fullest
vinclication of the policy adopted; for it was
our energy in 1838 and the following yeara which
closed t h e Persian door to Russia, and compelled her to take a long and circuitous route
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in order to reach the outworks of Hindostan.
When those first Afghan wars of Keane, Pollock, and Nott are remembered, this much in
their favour should not be left out of sight.
The mission of ,Sir Alexallcler Burnes to
Cabul in 1837 was intended to cou~iteract
these evil influences by placing the relations
with that state upon a surer basis ; but in the
meanwhile that embassy had been really deprived of its value by the resolution that had
been come to, to champion the f d e n Sudosye
dynasty in the person of Shuja-ul-Mulk, the peusioner of Loodiana. Dost Mahomed expected
that the first proof that would be afforded of
British sympathy towards himself would be the
restoration of the Peshawur valley, and when
he found that such a restitution formed no
part of our plans he mas greatly disappointed
and chagrined. He had also no direct interest
in the Herat question at this time, and in
letters writiten .to the Shah he expressed his
willingness to become a Persian vassal. I n fact,
if words in the East were ever anything more
than au idle compliment, he actually called
himself a dependant of the Shah. The mis-
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sion of the Russian agent, Captain Vickovitch,
further complicated matters, and at last Sir A.
Burnes withdrew, leaving the impression o n
the Ameer's mind that the English would
afford him no assistance .in the realisation of
his p e t designs. His brothers at Candahar h a d
entered into the closest connection with t h e
Persian Government, and had accepted mithout
hesitation the part which had been sketched
out for them. Dost Mahomed, who was a t
first fay from being unwilling to declare a
hearty alliance with England, was compelled to
come round to the same view; and had not the
Rasso-Persian plot been thwarted by the protracted defence of I-Ierst, i t is probable that his
alliance with tho Shah, and his acceptance of
tho overtures brought by Vickovitch would have
borne fruit in practical facts.
The withdrawal of Burnes was the immediate precursor of a declaration of mar against
Cabul. The reply to the intrigues of Persia
and Russia was the concentration of the army
of the Indus a t Ferozepore. Negotiations then
ensued between ourselves, Runjeet Singh, and
Shuja-ul-Mulk for the restoration of the last to
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the throne of Cabul; and the Tripartite Treaty
was drawn up and signed. On the 1st of October 1838 the celebrated Simla manifesto was
issued, and the state of the relations between
British India and Cabul passed from one of
peace to one of open hostility. I n that manifesto, which mas both a proclamation to the
Afghans, and a defence of the Government
policy manufactured for home use, a large
number of subjects was dealt with ; but among
others mas, it is instructive to note, c c the integrity of Hsrat."
It is unnecessary to do more than very briefly
recapit~xlatethe leading features of a war which
has already been so often described. The army
of the Indus marched through the Bolan, and
entered Candahar without resistance. Two
months later Ghizni was taken by storm.
S o great was the effect of this reverse upon
Dost Mahomed that he lost all faith in his
cause. His army disbanded, and he himself,
leaving his artillery behind, fled to Bamian.
Hard pressed in his flight by Outram, the
Ameer did not stop for any length of time
until he reached JKhulm, mhere he was well re-
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ceivsd b y the Dsbeg chieftains. But even then
it mas not proposed to make any permanent
halt there. Some of the Ameer's followers
recommended his taking refuge in Persia ;
others, i n Bokhara. While his envoys were
engaged in exploring the road to Maimene, and
in paving the way for a journey to Bokhnra,
the Dost went from Khulm to Kundus, where
he entered into close relations with Mourad
Beg, the Usbeg chief of that state. The reply
salt by Nasrullah, the Ameer of Bokhara, mas
couched in friendly terms, but Dost Mahomed
hesitated to accept the invitation of one who
mas a national enemy. But the road vid Maimene mas reported to be impassable, and the
danger of being ctlptured by Kamran, the bitter
foe of the Barucksyes, afforded an additioilsll
reason for accepting the offer of Nasrullah.
When provisions began to grow scarce inKhulm,
Dost Mahomed, accompanied by his sons and
a considerable retinue, set out for the Oxus
and Bokhara.
Of Dost Mahorned's residence at ~ o k h a r a
little need here be said. For a few days he
was f&ted as became a royal guest, but then
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either the inconvenience of entertaining so
large a, number of strangers, or some ulterior
plan of forming the Afghans into a military
colony, produced a change in the conduct of
Nasrullah. Several of the Afghans, and notably
Alcbas, endeavoured to leave the country.
Collisions occurred between these and the
Bokharan troops; and altogether the Afghan
refugees were a source of considerable aanoyance to the ruler of Bokhara. Dost Mahomed
mas at last confined to his house, and treated
in all respects as a prisoner. It became his
most ardent desire to effect his escape from the
hands of a tyrannical ruler who might a t any
moment be seized with a whim to o r d a his
execution. At! a favourable moment Dost Mahomed escaped from Bokhara t o Shahr-i-Sebz,
whence he made his way to Khulm. H e was
well received by the Usbeg chiefs of Bfghan
Turkestan, a.nd he a t once set about making
preparations for a fresh effort to recover his
throne.*

* An interesting description of his life at Bolrha~awill.
be found in,,Mohuu LaI's book. It must be ticken czc71ir
grano salis.
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Dost Mahomed found little difficulty in raising
s considerable force of Usbegs out of the petty
s t a t e s beyond the Hindoo Koosh. His chief
supporter in this campaign was Afzul, but
his troops were for the most part Usbegs,
a n d it was arranged that if the adventure
sbould prove successful, an Usbeg chief was
to become his Vizier. His army advanced
boldly enough t o the attack of our outposts in
t h e Sighan valley, but at Bajgah-the scene of
several encounters before and since-his cavalry
u n d e r Afzul was worsted. I n face of his superior numbers, our little force concentrated at
Bamian, and Colonel Dennie with a small body
of fresh troops from Cabul arrived to inspire
n e w courage int'o the half-wavering ranks of
our sepoys. It was pre-eminently one of those
occasiolls mhen boldness is prudence ; and
Dennie was equal to the occasion. The large
a r m y of Dost Mahomed was attacked by the
s m a l l English force, and driven in confusion
f r o m the field. Had Colonel Dennie waited to
receive the attack of the vastly superior numb e r s of his assailants, he would in all probability have been defeated; but by taking the
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initiative, he foiled the designs of his antagonist. The principal result of this decided
success was that the Usbegs deserted Dost
Mahorned. For a short time it seemed as if he
had found sure friends and a safe place of
retreat, but the first breath of disaster showed
those beliefs to be delusions. Dost Mahomed
became an outcast and a fugitive.
Travelling through the valleys, and along the
declivities of the Hindoo Koosh, the Ameer
made his way to the Kohistan, where the
blunders of English policy had converted friends
into enemies. O w success at Tootundurrahwhere Edward Conolly, one of a noble band of
brothers, was killed-and the failure at Joolgah,
mere only the preliminaries to the final collision
at Purwandurrah, where Dost Mahomed made
a gallant oharge at the head of his horsemen,
routing the 2nd Cavalry, which refused to
follow its officers. The hour which, as Kaye
says, should have been one of triumph was one
of humiliation, and this gallant action threw
over the fall of Dost Mahomed a, gleam of
romance and chivalry. Seeing that his success
was sure to prove transitory, and that his o m
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followers were doubtful in their fidelity, he
resolved t o throw himself on t h e generosity of
the English. Riding throughout the night of
the day which had beheld the first victory he
hacl obtained in the war, he reached Cabul on
t h e 3rd of November, and surrendered to Sir
William Macnaghten in person. A few days
afterwards he was sent to Calcutta, while his
family remained at Loodiana.
Lord Auckland settled on him a pension a t
the rate of three lacs a year, and he. was
allowed perfect liberty in his movements. H e
was, no doubt, greatly struck with what he sam
there, and said that had he known the power of
the English he would not have thought of
acting in opposition to their views. Alter the
conclusion of the second campaign in Afghanistan in 1842 it was decided to permit his return
to his country, and he thus began a second term
of authority in Afghanistan. On this occasion he
llnd the great advantage over the former in that
the withdrawal of our army from the country
signified a withdrawal of policy as well, leaving
him free to deal with the internal condition of
his state without any apprehension of external
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pressure. But although he was loud in his expression of friendship towards England, that
did not prevent him entering into some kind of
understanding with the Maharajah Shere Sin&
for joint action against her. This may have had
something t o do with his conduct during the
second Punjab war, when an Afghall contingent fought on the side of the Sikhs; but with
that exception his relations with the Brii;ish Government after 1842 were those of friendship.
The restoration of Dost Mahomed mas followed by years of grndua'l recovery 011 the part
of Afghanistan, and as the country recovered,
so did the Ameer's authority extend throughout
the realm. I n some of his reforms he was
much obstructed by his son Akbal*, who had
tasted the sweets of power during his father's
absence, and was loth t o sink into a secondary
position. His death, however, in 1849, removed
this element of danger and simplified Dost
Mahomed's task.
After the close of the P ~ m j a bwar, and the
annexation of that province by England, Dost
Mabomed turned his attention more exclus~vely
to the extension of his empire over Hcrat, and
3
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t o the north of the Hindoo Koosh. I n 1850 he
wrested Balkh from his former supporters, tlze
Usbegs, and afterwards subdued Khulm, Kundus, and Badakshan. In 1855 the connection between England and Cabul had been drawn more
nearly together by the signature of "a treaty of
amity," and in 1857 the bond was made still
closer by the conclusion of a second treaty for
the specific purpose of driving the Persialls
out of Herat, which they had seized from one
of those weak rulers who, after the death of
Yar Mahomed, managed to obtain temporary
authority in that city. On his death-bed, in
1863, when he is supposed to have been about
eighty years of age, he had the great satisfaction of entering Herat in triumph, and of incorporating that town with the rest of his
kingdom. The dissensions which had been
produced by the desire to obtain possession of
that much-coveted place had been one of the
chief causes for disturbance in the etate. EIis
final triumph there was the consummation of a
life which had been devoted t o the task of
restoring Afghanistan to something of its ex-

acf
of

am

DOST MABOMED.

n 1850 he
ortsrs, the
ulm, E u n nection ber a w n more
a treaty of
made still
ti treaty f o r
he Persians
ed from one
he death of
a temporary
.eath-bed, in
e been a b o u t
;reat satisf ac,h, and o-f inrest of his
~ c hhad been
possession of
:en one of the
etate. =is
Lrnation of e
10 the t a s k of
bing of its exBe gave Oabul,

35

during his long reign, a fresh lease of pros.
~ e r i t y ;he survived the Sikh power, which a t
one time threatened to absorb his etate; he
lived to become good friends with England, his
former foe; and he left to his son and heir a
kingdom which, if not as extensive as that of
Ahmed Shah, was at least a splendid territog.
I t is difficult to arrive at a decided opinion
concerning the exact character of the man whose
long career, extending over a period of more
than sixty years, has hers been sketched out.
Mohun Lal's biography, in which he styles his
subject a hero and paints him a villain, doe8
not certainly simplify the task. The miter
whose opinion should have been the most vduable is consequently of little value to us, and
we must form an opinion for ourselves from the
ascertained facts which make up the hiatory of
the period. The more closely Dost Mahorned's
career is studied from the earliest time, when
he served as page to his brother Futteh, the
more evident does it appoar that he was
actuated throughout by one idea. The youngest
of the Barucksyes, he was in a sense the most
ambitious, for whereas his brothers aspired only
3 *
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to the Viziership under a Sudosye king, or atthe most to independent governomhips in a
Barucksye confederacy, he alwalys aimed a t
first ousting the Sudosyes from the realm, and
then making his own authority supreme and
unquestioned therein. I n this, after many
failures, disappointments, and disasters, he succeeded. His triumph came in the evening of
life, but apparently it was enjoyed none the less.
The Sudosye dynasty became a tradition, t h e
Barucksye brothers disappea~edone by oneleaving him alone to represent a family ancl a n
idea-the intrigues of the Persian mere beaten
back, the apprehe~lsions of England were
allayed-all was changed save the person who
had a t one time been the plaything of fortune,
and a t another the victim of circumstance. E e
had conquered his enemies, or been conquered
by them. He had always met them boldly, and
in tho end he triumphed over them all by surviving them. H e achieved a still greater triumph
by surviving the political conditions which a t
one time threatened his ruin. Never has a n
Asiatic chief succeeded, and probably never
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policy appear to be the policy of England. Yet
he succeeded a t the least in doing this. I t mas
his policy which triumphed in 1842. Its visdom was ratified by succeas under tlie walls of
Herat in 1863. I t was the continuatioll of the
same policy which was adopted from that year
until 1869, and it remained in force, very
slightly modified, dowu to the year 1875. Not
only did Dost Mahomed make himself supreme
in Afghanistan, and establish a fresh dynasty,
not only did he secure all the objects at which
he origillelly aimed, but he also obtained the
triumph of his own policy, which was to keep
his coulitry independent by inducing his neighbours to regard it with indifference. Whatover
attraction the mushroom Barucksyes " may
have in the eyes of the observers is due exclusively Do tho genius of Dost Mahomed. I t vas
he who gave life to a cause that would but for
him have probably remained in the background.
This is really only his secondary title to consideration and praise; his first and principal
being his steadfast and never-swerving adherence to a programme which he had sketched
out during the earlier days of his public career.

k
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Alone among Asiatics of prominent mark h e
had sufficient confidence in himself and his
cause to adhere to his views, when to all seeming that adherence would cost him his throne,.
his power, his life. This is his true claim t~
be considered a great man. Alone among
Asiatics, of his age at all events, he had convictions, and he endeavoured to act up to them.
H e had consequently a great advantage over all
his rivals, for in everything he clid he had a
great motive, whereas they for the most part
were influenced by littlenesses beneath coatempt. Pages might be filled in discussing the
character of this great man, but his chief merit
consisted in tho simple fact that he saw farther
ahead than his contemporaries. His ability
and tact, nay, his very plausibility, served
to render the acceptance of his views the less
distasteful; but however their acceptance may
have been brought about, they were accepted,
and it was the policy of Dost Mahomed which
mas held to be, for a quarter of a century, undiluted wigdom in thie country. Others obtained the credit, but he was the fountain-head
whence it sprang. As a general, Dost Maho-
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med was probably inferior to bot,h Nadir and
Ahmed, but the difficulties which hampered his
progress were much more serious than those
that beset the career of the Turcoman or the
Durani. As a ruler he probably surpassed
them. With many of the qualities of Baber,
Dost Mahomed might at another period have
left a deeper track in history ; but no Englishman can afford to ignore a life which was at
once varied and rich with profitable experiences.
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THE LATE AKHOND OP SWAT.

INthe moilntainous region which lies to the
north of the Peshawur valley, and beyond the
country of the Momunds, are the districts of
Swat and Bajour. Tho hillmen who inhabit
them are known far and wide for their fanaticism and their courage. Seldom, incleed, has
it happeascl that the explorer has been able to
obtain admission mithin their borders, and they
have continued to live on after their own primitive fashion, deaf to the entreaties of the Afghan
rulers, and indifferent to the threats of either
Sikhs or English. It mas among these tribes,
ruled by chiefs whose claims to exercise authority were admitted in a more or less loose
manner, that the latest instance occurred of a
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priest, whose reputation had been created and
spread by the supposed sanctity of his life, ncquiring into his hands an exclusive spiritual
power which over-rode whatever secular authority the native chiefs possessed. I t is true that
the career of the late Akhond of Swat is only
that of the most successful of those religious
fanatics of the Indian frontier who have turned
their fanaticism to practical acconnt by making
it the means for attaining worldly influence and
power. But none the less, considering the
part he played ill frontier politics during almost
thirty years, is his history well wort11 the study
of the politician and the historical student. At
the least it will show how easy is the passage,
among the superstitious and fanatical hilhnen
of the lands beyond the Punjab, from a hermit's
cell to a chieftain's castle.
Abdul Ghafur, such was the late Akhond's
name, is supposed to have been born in the
first years of the present century, or in the
last of the eighteenth, but of the exact date
there is no record. Before his first ret;irement
from the world in 1823, he had, however,
studied under the instruction of several learned
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priests, but had never been able to master t h e
intricacies of the Koran sufficiently to hope f o r
any exceptional distinction as a " mollah." H i s
f a t h e r was an inhabitant of a small village in
t h e Xwat territory, and until he had reached t h e
age of sixteen Abdul's ole experience had
been that of tending his father's flocks 011 t h e
hills and in the fertile valleys of that district.
The boy, naturally ambitious and extremel~r
acquisitive by disposition, was unable to brook
t h e irksomeness and solitude of h s existence.
I-Ie fled to Peshawur, then in the hands of t h e
Sikhs, and passed some years there and at
other places in the study of the doctrines of
his religion. But, in 1823, he came to t h e decision that he must adopt some other method
of acquiring that power for whichhe so eagerly
longed. He retired accorclingly to the lonely
island of Beyka, which, created by one action of
t h e river Indus, has been long since destroyed
by another, and there during twelve years he
sojourned in perfect seclusion, broken only by
%heperiodical visits of devotees, who, attracted a t
first by curiosity, came again and again, through
a belief in his semi-divine attributes, and spread
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throughout the Punjab, then groaning under
the rule of the Sikh heretics, the fame of the
hermit of Beyka.
The reputation of his sanctity reached the ears
of Dost Mahomed, nt that time established as
ruler in Cabul and the adjoining districts ; and
when that prince came t o the resolution, in 1835,
to declaye a war against the Sikhs, he not unnaturally decided to enlist the sympathy and
aid of the recluse in his cause. Dangerous
as was the enterprise upon which he was about
to embark, considering the power and ability of
Runjeet Singh, Dost Mallomed had reasonable
hopes of being able to drive the Sikhs out of
the Peshawur plain and beyond the Indus, and
his first step was to invite Abdul Ghafur to
quit his retreat and participate in the campaign
that was about to commence for tho cause of
that religion of which he had proved himself t o
be so enthusiastic a follower. With the summons of the Afghan chief Abdul willingly complied, for he saw that the moment had arrived
in his career when he was either to obtain the,
object for which he had so long striven or to
sink back into the insignificance from which, by
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resolution of no ordinary kind, he had temporarily emancipated himself. Of the result of
this combination of secular force and religious
fervour, suffice it here t o say that neither o n e
nor the other availed to turn the scale a g a i n s t
the " big battalions " of the Sikhs. I n t h e w a r
of 1836 Dost Mahorned's powor was g r e a t l y
crippled, and for offensive measures east of t h e
Rhyber that power altogether disappeailed. .
But Abdul Ghafur's determination was proof
against even such a serious rebuff as this, a n d
he resolved to separate his fortunes in a c e r t a i n
sense from those of Cabnl, and to seek a f r e s h
field for his influence in the mountainous t r a c t s
stretching north of the Khyber towards C h i t r a l
and Cashmere. To his natal hills, therefore,
returned the once ignorant boy, now developed
into a personage of no mean authority t h r o u g h
his own abilikies. His chosen followers, f e w in
number, were formidable by reason of t h e i r
energy, their fanaticism, and their implicit credence in the supernatnral powers of their leader.
W i t h this small nucleus of skilled and f a i t h f u l
administrators, he, who originally came in s o m e
sense as a fugitive, grad~zallyacquired s u p r e m e
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control over the place of sanctuary t o which
the pursuing Sikhs had driven him. The exact
form of rule observed among the Swatees has
never been made very clear, but, whatever it
was, that of Abdul Ghafur, now becoming
lrilown as t-he Akhond, or priest-magistrate,
soon supplanted it both in Swat and Bajour.
Long before the Byear 1850 the Akhond, into
whose neighbourhood we were brought ill that
year by the annexation of the Punjab, had
become a power for good or for evil along the
Indian frontier. He had a,ccolnplished his
heart's desire of wide-spread notoriety a t the
same time that he had spread his secular authority over no inconsiderable extent of country.
H e had dispensed with the alliance of Dost
Mahorned, and he had set the power of the
Sikhs at, defiance. B u t in 1850 the presence of
the English power within striking distance of his
own almost inaccessible stronghold compellecl
the adoption of a more circumspect attitude, and
although in ollo of the first important border
difficulties in which we were engaged he gave
shelter t o refugees hostile t o us from our territory, he never on any occasion declared a
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'' jehad " against us. The years 1850-53 mere
marked by great activity on the part of t.he
Swatees, Otman Khels, and other tribes within
our borders, and it was generally supposed that
the Akhond was the moving spirit iu the league
that was formed against us. He certainly gave
shelter and made grants of land to refugees
from British territory.
During the ten years after 1853 he preserved
a stricter neutrality, confining himself to the
extension of his spiritual influence; and even
a t the worst stage of the Mutiny he is said t o
have given the advice not to enter into hostilities with us t o those who sought his opinion.
In this he did but copy the example set to all
of Patkan race by Dost Mahomed. Six years
after the Mutiny, the expedition sent against
the Sittana colonists in Umbeyla roused him
into fresh activity, and a league of c t almost
all the tribes from the Indus to Cabul" was
formed against us. There is great difference
of opinion as to the exact part played by the
A.khomcl in this war, the fiercest of all our
frontier campaigns ; but there is no doubt that
he did actually join the tribes we were engaged
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with. Sir Neville Chamberlain mentions in his
official despatches the arrival of the Akhond,
and the measures which he took in concert with
the Moulvie Abdullali, the leader of the Sittana
fanatics. So great was the effect of this dacided act on the part of the Akhond that it was
found necessary to raise the strength of the
English force to nine thousand men. After the
two severe defeats at Laloo and Urnbeyla, and
the destruction of the village of Mulka, the
Akhond fled back to Swat. Major James, the
politlical officer accompanying the expedition,
believed that he had only joined the Sittana
rebels because he feared that if be did not, his
influence would suffer to the advantage of that
of the Hi~idooMoulvie. It was his name, however, which had made the rising so formidable ;
but the complete auccess attained by the English expedition read him a lesson which he never
forgot.
It is impossible to say what part the Akhond,
wlio h ~ gained
d
during the last fifteen years of
his life a power both within and without our
frontier not to be despised by us, played in the
various border disturbances. He may have
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been their prime instigator or their persistent
disapprover. He undoubtedly was the oracle
to which the hillmen had recourse with as
much superstitious veneration as was manifested of old towards that of Delphi. Of what
nature his responses were we know not, and
it is very doubtful if now we ever shall h o w .
He is represented as having discouraged Sllere
Ali in his proposals for joint action against this
country, and to have also refused his approval
to the Jowakis in their hostility towards ourselves in 1877. If these assertions could be
proved to be authentic, it would be natural to
assume that a perception of the power.of our
rule had qualified his old religious and political antipathies. But, after all, these assertions may have been the mero voice of idle
rumour, and the real convictions of the atmbitious Akhond may have been of s far different
complexion. During the last few years t h e
question was further complicated, and certainly
in our favour, by the jealousy felt by Shere Ali
for the independent ruler of Swat. Bajour and
Xwat are fertils valleys, and their strategical
importance is very great. Shere Ali claimed
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them as part of tbe Afghan- rnonarclly, and,
although he was willing on various occasions
t o propitiatle the Akhoad, he never relished
the existence of an independent Power within
his own dominions. These two rulers to s
slight extent neutralised each other. They
never concludecl an alliance either against us
or anybody else. I n the main they played at
cross purposes and pulled in different directiona, and we profited by their disunion.
The spiritual authority of the Akhond often
brouglit his pretensions into collision with tho
administrative regulations of our Government ;
for his influence was perhapa greatest among
our subjects the Yusufsai. The decrees of
excommunication which he fulminated against
his rivals, and they were far from being few,
were generally respected in the Punjab, and his
opinion of the unlawfulness of bestowing funeral rites-jwzezn-on
those who served an
infidel government such as ours, was the cause
of the retirement from our native service of
many who would otherwise have remained with
us. The authority of the Akhond was, therefore,
in many ways, inconvenient to our officials. Of

4
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the domestic life of Abdul Qhafur little is.
known. In the early years of his career h e
preached and practised the virtues of celibacy,
but with his installation as ruler in Swat he
cast them aside, together with other prejudices
of his period of asceticism. He left a large
family, many of whom have arrivcd at mature
age, and, doubtless, desired t o perpetuate their
father's rule. Only a very short time ago,.
when an old man bordering on eight7, he
married a young girl of eighteen, and it is,
possibly, only our lack of information which
would make us mention this as his last marriage
ceremony. For a time, some of his personal
authority descended to his son, but the most
recent intelligence from Swat tends to show
that the native chiefs are reacquiring exclusive
power in that valley.
The death of the Akhond occurred in the
beginning of the year 1878, at a time when t h e
crisis on the Punjab frontier was becoming
acute. His disappearance from the troubled
scene in which hs had so long played a foremost part turned undoubtedly t o the advantage of this country; but regarding the life of
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Abdul Ghafur from the standpoint of his fellowcountrymen and co-religionists, it is impossible for us to withhold from him a very high
degree of admiration. Whether at heart a foe
or a friend to mngland-which, perhaps, will
ever be a piloblem-he always, it must be admitted, had the courage of his convictions, both
in adversity and in prosperity; and his personal
intrepidity mas not less remarkable than that
stoicism and pomer of endurance which earned
for him so wide a reputation among the Mahomedans of the Punjab and the neighbouring
regions. Just as his career was but an irnitation of that of the great Afghan saint, Darwezah, so may he himself serve as the ideal for
some future Pope in the lands that fringe the
British dominions in India. The present state
of Asian politics, and the actual condition of
the Mahomedan religion, alike favour the pretensions of those fanatics, who, partly by craft
and partly out of downright earnestness in
their sentiments, obtain an ascendancy among
their co-religionists. Of such Abdul Ghafur
was the most recent, end in some respects he
was also the most remarkable.
4 *
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SHERE ALI.

TEE genius of Dost Mahomed was to a great
I

oxtent inherited by the majority of his sons.
Alcbar Khan, our opponent in 1842 ; Hydei-
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Gholnm, for many years the heir-apparent;
Af zul, a successful soldier, and ultimately Ameer ;
Azim, not less successful in warfare, and, for a.
brief space, also de facto Ameer ; Ameen,
Alchram, both slain in battle, and Shereef,wore all in their way remarkable, both as types
of the Afghan character and for their personal
qualities. But none of these brothers inherited so much of their father's genius as
Shere Ali, the late ruler of Afghanistan. B o t h
as n soldier and as an administrator he approached most nearly to the greatest of the
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Barucksyes. Like his fatlier, he was above the
influence of adverse fortune. IIe never appeared more noble than when crushed by defeat.
But the fortitude which he evinced in the face
of disaster deserted him in his days of prosperity. The temper of his mind mas as keen
and polished as could be imagined, but he
lacked that serenity which had made Dost Mahomed as fopmidable a's s n octogenarian as he
had been in the days of his fiery youth. Essentially Sliere Ali's cliaracter was deficient in ballast. He was great in his conception, but weak
in his execution of a design. E e could nerve
himself to bear stoically the greatest yeverse of
fortune; but he could not achieve the same
victory when fortune had showered favonYs
upon him and he was nursed in the lap of
prosperity. His biography, rightly regarded,
is of scarcely less interest than that of his
father; and its teiiour is the more importslit in
proportion as the Afghan question has increased
in significance duriiig the last twenty years.
Xhere Ali was born in, or about, tlie year
1820. I-Iis mother, a lady of noble birth, mas
the same who had borne to Dost Maholned

,
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Akbar and Hyder Gholam. Of the better
known of that rulep's sons Shere Ali was consequently the fifth. Of his early life little has
been preserved save that as a young man he
accompanied his fatlier during his enforced residence in India from 1840 to 1842, and it is supposed that it was his companionship during that
period which endeared him SO much to his sire.
It is not necessary, however, to discover in
t h e selection of Shere Ali as his successor any
peculiar farouritism on the part of Dost Mahomed. By all the rules of Afghaii custom he
became on the deatlz of his elder brot'hers,
Akbar and Hyder Gholam, the proper heir. His
claims were superior to the children of the
former, and his other and older brothers,
Afzul and Azim, were the offspring of an
inferior wife. We know from contemporary
reports that scenes of disturbance in the various
cities where his sons officiated as governors
marked the closing years of Dost Mahorned,
and that tho final triumph of that prince under
tho walls of Herat but shortly preceded his
death, when anarchy fell upon the rea.lm. The
nomination of Shere Ali as heir apparent upon
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t h e death of Hyder Gholam had warned the
other sons that the disappearance of the Dost
would be tlie fit occa,sion for the revelation of
their individual pretensions ; and when the
conclusive triumph of his reign was followed
by the termination of the life of the aged
Ameer, they a6 once made their preparations
for disputing the inheritance with that younger
son whom many of them despised quite as much
as they hated.
Dost Mahomed died a t Herat on the 9th of
June 1863 ; and a few days afterwards Shere
Ali was proclaimed Ameer of Afghanistan and
it,s dependencies. Those of his brethren then
a t Herat were compelled to acknowledge him
as their lawful ruler, and to again swear
,oaths of fidelity to him upon the Koran; and
when he had taken this precaution, l e a ~ i n ghis
third son, Yakoob Khan, behind as Governor
of Herat, he hastened by forced marches to the
eastern parts of his dominions." Nor was his

* Much of the description of Shere Ali's wars with his
brothers is taken from my " England and Russiain Central
Asia."
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promptitude unnecessary. His full brother
Ameen Khan, a t that time governor of Candahar, was the first to appear in arms against him,
and this example of fraternal jealousy found i n
a, short time imitators in both Afzul and Azim.
The year passed off, liomever, without any hostilities on a large scale, and in December our
Government officially recognised Shere Ali.
During the winter of 1863-64 preparations were
being made in silence for the war that was to
commence with the first appearance of spring.
On the one side Shere Ali strove to put down
opposition by a bold front, and to add to t h e
strength of his position by obtaining the sympathy and practical aid of our Government. I n
this latter object he was not very successful.
On the other side, Ameen IChan at Candahar,
Afzul a t Balkll, and Azim in Khurum, mere a l l
preparing for the contest with not less energy,
and thus Shere Ali found himself threatened
on three sides by powerful foes. The campaign commenced in April 1864 with a simultaneous advance against Azim in the south-east
and Afzul in the north. The former of these
was speedily overthrown by Shere Ali's general,
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Mahomed Rafik, and compelled to flee into British territory. In the northern campaign,
fought out in the passes of the Hindoo Koosh
round Bamian, the result was less conclusive.
A drawn battle took place at Bnjgah, in which
Mahomed Ali Khan, the eldest son and heir of
Shere Ali, greatly distinguished himself. Both
sides then showed themselves anxious for an accommodation, Shere Ali because he dreaded tho
price of victory, Afzul because discouraged by
the defeat of Azim. .A truce was arranged
mithont much cli£Eculty, and the two armies,
lately drawn up in hostile array, cntered Balkh
in company. For a brief space things wore
a peaceful aspect, but Abderrahinan, A f z u l ' ~
son, was detected in some act of treachery.
This underhand plotting afforded Shere Ali an
excuse for adopting harshor measures in dealing with his rivals. Afzul was arrested and
imprisoned, and Abderrahman escapecl across
the Oxus into Bokhara. Whatever blame may
have attached to Shere Ali for this summary
proceeding, there is no doubt that his triumph
was almost complete at the close of his first
campaign. With Azim and Abderrahman fugi-
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tives, and Afzul a captive in his power, Shere
Ali seemed t o have crushecl all resistance t o his
authority as soon as it had shown its head.
Disaffection appeared to be triumphant i11 the
south alone, where Ameen Khan held independent court at Candahay. Futteh Mahorned, a
son of Alcbar, mas raised to the governorship
of Balkh, while the Ameer in person returned
t o Cabul for the purpose of dealing with his
last lival. But by this time the: year was draming t o a close, and military operations had t o be
suspended until the melting of the snow. I n t h e
meanwhile Ameen Khan had been joined b y his
brother Shereef, and Jellaluddin, his nephew,
the sou oE Akbar. I n the north, too, Abderrahman, at the heacl of an army raised in Bokhara, was again prepariiig to take the field.
I n t h e commencement of the year 1865 Shere
Ali's position again seemed serious, but still he
might reasonably expcct to triumph over all
his difficulties by promptitude and audacity.
The army of Ameen Khan appeared i n the
field several weeks before that of Abderrahman
#could move, and ere Sherc Ali left Cabul it
had attempted t o seize the fortress of Khelat-i-
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Ghiljie by a coup de main. The resolution of
the garrison foiled the attempt, and the Candahar forces retired as Sherc Ali's army advanced
towards them. A t Kujhbaz, near the town
just mentioned, the rival armies halted in face
of each other, and prepared for the struggle
which was to decide this part of the campaign.
O n the Candahar side the three confederates
already mentioned aild Surwar Khan, the eldest
son of Azim, held command. On the Cabul side
were Shere Ali himsclf, his eldest son Mahomed
Ali Khan, and his best general, Mallorned Rafik.
The battle commenced early in the moruing of
the Gth of June, and during the earlier portion
of the day Shere Ali's army seemed to be
getting the worst of it. A t the crisis of the
engagement he rode up t o his eldest son, and
tauuted him with want of courage. The story
goes that, deeply st,uiig at this accusation, Mahomed Ali led a desperate charge into the
thickest of the battle, and finding himself face
to face wihh Ameen Khan, fought with him,
until they slew each other. To his eldest son's
b r a ~ e s y Shere Ali owed a victory when on
the point of being defeated, and the death
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of Ameen extracted all real danger from t h e
side of Candahar. Within a week that city surrendered and became the base fro111 which most
of Sliere Ali's subsequent operations were carried on. The chief importance of this success
consisted in its restoring communications with
Yakoob Khan, who, during all these disturbances, had maintained his father's authority in
Rerat. For the moment it seernod a s if dl
Sbere Ali's troubles were about to cease, foY
his arms had up to this point been uniformly
successful, and in all directions. So assured did
his triumph appear that the Ameer withdrew
to Candahar t o indulge in the luxury of grief
for the loss of his eldest and favourite son.
To Ibrahim Khan, his second son, but o n
the death of Mahomed Ali the presumptive
heir, h e entrusted the northern campaign,
which was to be carried on in the vicinity of
Cabul itself. About six weeks after the battle
of Kujhbaz, Abderrahmau crossed the Oxus a t
the head of an Afghan army, and was a t once
joined by the forces which had been entrusted
with the defence of Balkh. Shore Ali's governor, Putteh Mahomed, fled through Barnian

I

I

\

1

to C a b ~
teruber
sides, e
daily dl
Shere 1
the defc
whom :
and of
Ameer
and thc
Cabul.
and the
and f or1
Anleer.
The J
had yet
moveme
number!
passecl I
tion. 11
chief COI
render,
army,of
was g i
was inst

SHFRZ ALL

danger from the
reek that city sure from which most
berations were carIce of this success
amunications with
all these d i s t u ~ b ,ther's authority in
t seemed as if all
bout t o cease, f o r
int been uniformly
ns. So assured did
le A m e e r withdrew
,he l u x u r y of grief
1 favourite son.
,econd son, but; 011
.i t h e presumptive
o r t h e r n campaign,
1 in the v;cinity of
eks a f t e r the b a t t l e
crossed the O x u s at
ly, and was at once
had been entrusted
1.
Shere Mi's go.ed through B a m i a n

61

to Cabul. During tho months of August, September, and October, inaction prevailed on all
sides, save that the army of Abderrahman mag
daily drawing closer to Cabul. A t this lnolnellt
Shere Ali's cause received a serious blow by
the defection of his general, Mahomed Rafik,
mhom Ibrabim Khan had wantonly insulted,
and of his own brother, Shereef, mhom the
Ameer had pardoned for his previous defection
and then despatched wit11 reinforcements to
Cabul. Azim had also joined Abderrahman,
and the hostile camp again presented a united
and formidable appearance to the embarrassed
Anieer.
The year 1865 closed ominously, but no blow
had yet been struck. Courage and rapidity of
movement can always do much against greater
numbers, but the unfortunate Shere Ali still
passed his time in Candahar in idle lamentation. I n Februa~y,Bairn, who had assumed the
chief command, summoned Ibrahim Khan to surrender, and, after some paltry skirmishing, the
army of Shere Ali melted away, and the capital
was given up. On the 2nd of March, Azim
was installed as temporary ruler, while Ibra-
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him wended his way with the evil ticlings t o
his father at Candahar. With the occupation
of Cabul, the second stage of this bitter contest may be said to have closed. Shere Ali,
victorious a t Kujhbaz, lost a11 the fruits of that
battle by his subsequent lethargy ; and then,
by employing the incapable Ibrahim, had done
much towards ruining his cause.
The news of the fall of his capital roused him
from his torpor like the sound of battle t o a
war-horse. The black cloud which had partially
obscured his reason for nine months, was dispelled by this unexpected disaster. Great
efforts were made in Candabar and the southern
portion of the state to raise and to equip
another army; and he received from Yakoob
Khan at Herat large reinforcements of brave
troops. With such energy did Shere Ali devote himself to his task, that in the middle
of April he felt in readiness to advance t o
the relief of Ghizni, which still held out for
him. His army was computed to number some
fifteen thousand men, of whom a large proportion was cavalry, and he had also twenty-five
guns more or less effective. Ghizni was entered
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in triumph on May-day, and once more the oppoilents were reduced to what appeared to be
an equality. After a few days' rest in this fortress, Shere Ali marched north against the confederate enca,rnpment at Shaikhabad. On the
10th a general action commenced, wherein the
impetuosity of Shere Ali proved unavailing
against the tactical skill of h i m . Ghiani at once
opened its gates to the conqueror, and Shere
Ali fled to Nanni with a few hundred followers.
His defeat had been colllplete. All his artillery, stores, equipage, and most of his troops
had fallen into the hands of the victor ; and he
was left alone and as a fugitive to oppose the
resistance of half-a-dozen conquering princes.
Yet he did not despair. His adversity was
God's will, but human energy and determination would still suffice to retrieve what had
been lost through misfortune. With the fall
of Ghizni Afzul recovered his liberty, ancl he, a s
as the elder brother of Axim, was installed ap,
ruler. Then there ensued a lull in the contest.
Apathy ~haracte~isedthe movements of the
victors after Shaikhabad just as it had characterised those of Shere Ali after Kujhbaa, only in
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this case with less excuse. Afzul Khan reigned
in Cabul, Ghizni, and the northern khanates ;
Shere Ali in Candahctr, Ferrah, and Herat.
There were two de ,fncto rulers, and the State
was divided into two almost equal parts. But
at this moment the conlederates began t o be
disunited, and Bfzul, who had become a confirmed deba~lchee,was speedily supplanted in
Balkh by Baiz Mahorned, another of the Barucksye brothers.
Shere Ali remained at Candahar endeavouring to arm the levies which his own energy had
gathered around him. All his overtures t o
procure assistance from us in arms or in money
mcre rejected, and he had slowly to construct
~
his own artillery, and t o collect muskets f o the
recovery of his realm. In the meanwhile his
enemies were playing into his hands. Azim
had developed into n blood-thirsty tyrant, Afz~zl
into a drunkard, Abderrahman into a dissatisfied intriguer. During the reign of terror at
Gabul, Azim, in s fit of passion, caused
Mahomed Rafik t o be arrested and murdered.
This act of treachery alienated much of the
popular sympathy from the side of the con-
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federates, and public opinion began a t last
to veer round to the side of Shere Ali. The
year 1866 passed away in preparations for the
contest, but early in January 1867 Faiz Mahomed, now the ally of Shere Ali, forced the
Bamisn pass, and advanced on Cabul. A diversion in his rear compelled him to return, and the
imminent danger from this quarter disappeared.
I n the meanwhile more important events were
in progress in the south. The armies of Shere
Ali and Azim had encountered under the walls
of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, and for a second time the
fortune of war decided against the former.
Khelat-i-Ghiljie and Candahar fell into the
hands of Azim, and Shere Ali was expelled
from all his possessions except those in the far
west.
The recognition of Afzul by our Goverameat as Ameer of Cabul and Gandahar,
must be considered to have been the inost
important result 6f this victory. Azim was
appointed governor of Candahw, and prepmations were made for the invasion of Herat
and the final overthrow of Shere Ali's power.
At this period a brief gleam of sunshine
5
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appeared to the distressed Ameer in t h e
staunchness of Faiz Mahomed, who won a
battle at Bajgah in the neighbourhood of Bamian. An interview took placo in the mountains betweell Shere Ali and Faiz Mahomed,
and a league was formed between them for the
recovery oE Cabul. About this time Shere Ali,
in disgust with our neutrality, made overtures
to Russia and to Persia, which, however, came
t o nothing.
Late in the autumn, when all hope of foreign aid had to be abandoned, the army of
Shere Ali and Faiz Mahomed set out for Cabul.
It had not proceeded far before Abderrahman
caught the division of the Balkh chieftain in
the defiles near Eila Alladad, and routed it.
I n the battle Faiz Mahomed was slain. This
event occurred in September, and early in the
following month Afzul died. His able brother
Azirn succeeded him, and was recognised even
by his nephew and rival Abderrahman. The
Indian Government deputed a Valcil to reside
at his court, and he could fairly claim the title
of Sovereign of Cabul by right of possession.
His triumph was complete on all sides, for even

SEERE ALI.

the
roll a.
d Bamoun.omed,
3 r the
re Bli,
:rtures
, came
of formy of
Cabul.
;ahman
itain in
lted it.
, This
g in the
brother
sd even
n. The
3 reside
the title
;session.
for even

j

67

Balkh, after the death of Faiz Mahorned, had
been occupied by Abderrahman. Surwer Rhail,
Azim's son, was appointed governor of Can&her, alld h i m himself remained in Cabul. Par
6hree years fortune had been uniformly aclverse
to shire Ali, in co~zncil chamber anh on the
field of battle. She was now, a t last, when all
things were at their blackest, about to veer.
roulzd to his side with he13 usual inconstancy.
Up Lo this stage in the mar Shere Ali had:
fought his own battles, and in contrast with
his brother Azim's or his nel~liew's military
capacitJy his skill had appeared to small advautagc. In the campaigns we have described he
had been done well swved by his son Mahomed
Ali and his general Mahomed Rafik, and with
the death of the former and the defection of
the latter all the burthen of maintaining the
strife fell on his own shoulders. He had been
uotoriously ill served by Ibrahim Khan. But
now, when it seemed a;ll hope must be absndonecl, he found a supporter and a champion in
Yakoob Khan, his thircl son, then a youth of
nineteen. Up to tliie moment the part the latter
had talcen in affairs had been only of secondary
5 *
v
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importance. H e had performed the useful but
somewhat inglorious office of sergeant-major
t o the army, drilling and despatching to the
front the raw levies of Ferrah and Herat. Now
he was to assume a more prominent rdls. Abderrahman has been styled the Hotspur of the
confederacy, but if that comparison be just, it
is far more appropriate to call Yakoob Khan
the Prince Harry of the rightful cause. I n the
,spring of 1868 Yakoob Khan set out from
Herat to attack Candahar, and, without much
loss of time, defeated Burwar Khan at the
battle of the Helmund and drove him out of
the city. He then advanced on the fortress
of Ghizni, which opened its gates.
While these events were in progress Abderrahman was bringing up reinforcements from
Balkh, whichYakoob Khan, however, intercepted
by forced marches, and defeated with considerable loss. Seizing the opportunity caused by
the withdrawal of Yalcoob Khan, h i m relieved
tho garrison of the citadel of Ghizni, which
still held out for him. But with tho defeat of
Abderrahman victory was assured to $here Ali;
and Azim, unable to retard the victorious pro-
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gress of the combined armies of Shere Ali and
Yakoob Khan, evacuated the town of Cabul. I n
Balkh, however, the uncle and nephew plotted
during the ensuing winter how to regain t.heir
lost position. In the depth of winter along
the snowy heights of the Hindoo Koosh the
struggle was yet to rage for some months, but
the end was no longer far off. A conclusive battle
took place at Tinah Khan, near Ghizni, when
both Abderrahman and Azim suffered defeat at
the hands of Yakoob Khan. Shere Ali was at
last triumphant, and on the 26th of January
1869 he held public Durbar in his regained
capit;al. I n hia deepest distress he had found a
heaven-sent champion in his third son, and to the
abilities of that youth was it solely owing that
the tide of war had been rolled backward from
Heret. Azim meanwhile was flying through
Seistan, but died of the privations he had undergone on his road to Teheran. Abderrahman
fled to Balkh, mhencs he was expelled by Ibrahim in the spring of 1869. He found refuge and
hospitality among the Russians at Samarcand,
vhere he still resides in the receipt of a large
pension from the Government of Tashkent.
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With the close of tho civil war in Cabul it became necessary for this country to define afresh
its relations mith a Sovereign who, acknowledged in 1863 as Ameer, had been partially
repudiated in 1867, and who in 1869 was again
supreme, Lord Lawrence, shortly before the
victory of Tinah Khan, had entered into direct
negotiations with him and had sent him the present of twenty thousalld pounds with s promse
of one hundred thousand pounds more. This
gift arrived most opportunely after the exhaustion of the struggle, and undoubtedly did to
some extent allay the irritability our previous
vacillation had raised within him. Shere Ali
then commenced the reorganization of his dominions, and appointed Ibrahim Khan, who had
not greatly distinguishecl himself in the war,
to tho governorship of I-Ierat. Yakoob Khan, to
vhose abilities Shere Ali hacl been so greatJy indebt'ed, was placed over the enstera portioll of
Afghanistan, includiiig Cabul. Having thus
set his house in order, Shere Ali made the preparatJioiis necessary for a brief absence from
his country. From Cabul he proceccled through
the Xhyber to Jumroocl and Peshawur, and
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thence to Rawul Pindee ; and visited the Earl
of Mayo, encamped at Umballa to receive him.
The Durbar held there was s most gorgeous
ceremonial, and Shere Ali, impressed by many
things during his journey through the Punjab,
was certainly surprised and flattered by the reception ho found awaiting him at his destination.
To an ordinary Oriental the pomp and glitter
of that show would have atoned for muclz that
was unreal and for doubtful expressions of
friendship and alliance ; but Shere Ali was not
an orclinary Oriental. The wonders of Weatem
science and the imposing majesty of our
strength were indeed strange things to the ruler
of an ignoraiit people and an impoverished state ;
but Shere Ali came not to be astonished or even
t o be fhted, so 1nuch as to be assisted, subsidised,
and guaranteed. Now, to do aay one of these
things in the way 111 which the afghan ruler
desired we were not prepared. He had been
flattered suffioiently, so we thought, in being
treated as an independent prince, on a footing
superior even to Scindiah or the Niaam. H e
was also granted a further present of money and
a fresh supply of arms. But we did not in any
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single particular comply with the precise demands which he made upon us. During his
brief sojourn the conti~iualwhirl of entertainment and display prevoiited anything more
than an occasional manifestation of disappointment at the barrenness of t,he result, but
to liis mountain home he carried back the
conviction, to be brooded over in secret, that
nothing valuable could be extracted from this
country without the performance of some service on his part, or the s u r r e ~ i d eof
~ sollie
dearly-prized privilege.
I n the years following 1869 the impression
seems more and more to have forced itself upon
him that in relying on us he would be trusting
to a broken reed. Yet from our point of view
we had acted well towards him. We had been
consistent with all our declarations. We had recognised with each turn of fortune thai son of
Dost Maliomed who chanced to be uppermost,
and not until fortune had conclusively s h o r n
that of the brothers Shere Ali mas to be the
s~~ccessful
one did we make up our minds
that he mas the most eligible candidate. What
wonder, then, that Shere Ali should be far
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from enthusiastic in support of our views, and
rather sceptical of the value to him of that
friendship with which we were so condescending
as to honour him ? We had trimmed throughout
all those years of anarchical misrule, and even at
the Umballa Durbar we were still aiming at a
double goal. Until we concluded a treaty with
him, bestowing some unequivocal mark of our
support, and from which it would not be possible for u s to go back, what guarantee had he
that we mould not show ourselves indifferent to
his fato if misfortune were again to fall upou
him ? The Umballa Durbar was the formal
confirmation of our recognition of him as da
facto ruler of Afghanistan. That was all;
Shere Ali was in no wise strengthened against
either Abderrahman or any other rival. What
he wanted would have made him safe against
dolnestio as well as foreign foes-a further supply of arms, a regular allowance, and, above
all, some proof of British support to flaunt in
the face of inimical intriguers in the bazaars
of Persia and the Khanates. By a non-compliance with these demands we failed to secure
his hearty goodwill. The meagre aid-for
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in his eyes it was meagre-he received from
us in money encouraged him to commence improvements in his civil and military systems,
a s to some of which it is doubtful if they over
went further than the incipient steps. It was
not sufficient to enable him to complete them.
The feeling generated in 1869 became
stronger as time rolled on, and in many
ways Shere Ali showed either caprice o r illhumour. The Seistan frontier question afforded
him an opportuaity for venting his grievances because our arbitrator* was too impartial in adjudicating upon the rival claims of
Persian and Afghan. The intervention of our
Government in 1814 in f avow of his son Y akoob Khan, whom, by a breach of faith, too
common in Afghan history to call for much
notice, he had imprisoned in the Bala Hissar,
was another grie~anceto be stored up in the
treasure-house of his memory, until all his
wrongs should amount to a bill of indictment
that would justify him in repudiating the British alliance, and in casting in his lot with the

* The present Major-General Sir
C.13., E.C.S.I.

Frederic Goldsmid,
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&eat Northern Power. His overtures to us in
1873 for what mould amount to a defensive and
offensive alliance against Russia, which were rejected ; our proposals to him in January 1877,
which were tantamount t o his placing his kingdom at our disposal as an advanced post, whence
the career of Russia in Central Asia might be
the better arrested t,o the mutual advantage of
the two states of India and Afghanistan, which
had no practical result-both
these events
tended to further inflame the mind of a ruler
who was nothing if he was not passionate and
suspicious. The occupation of Q~zettallby British troops proved to tho milld of Shere Ali that
he mnst either retrace his steps, and adopt a
more friendly policy towards the British Government, or proceed to greater lengths than ever,
and leave no doubt as to his hostility. For more
than twelve months he remained doubtful which
course to pursue ; but the prospect of a war
between England and Russia over the Eastern
Question, and the arrival of a Russian embassy
a t his capital, decided him. The reception of the
mission of General Stoletoff led to the despatch
of the embassy of Sir Neville Chamberlain,
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and the refusal t o admit the English representative into the country was tlie inevitable precursor of war. During the progress of the
campaign of 18'78 Shere Ali reinailled at Cabul,
until the defeat of his troops a t the Peiwar
warned him that his line of defence had been
pierced. I n a letter dated the 13th of December 18'78, and addressed to the officers of the
British Government, Ize announced his departure from Cabul with the intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg, there to place his
version of the question before a Congress. I n a
singularly boastful firman, dated the 22nd of
December 18'78, and addressed to Omar Iclian,
the Governor of Herat, Shere Ali announced
several victories on the part of his troops,
whose zeal brought on a day like that of the
Day of Judgment." Although Shere Ali had
' evidently supposed that he would be admitted
without any difficulty within Russian territory,
unexpected objections appear to have been
raised, and during several weeks he resided at
Takhtapul. He was suddenly takep ill there,
and removed to Mazar-i-Shereef, where he
died on the 21st of February 1879.

'

Of S
thing IT
shrewd
he reco,
against
the S ~ L E
adopted
f orbidd:
hours o
watchm
cities fo
at all hc
of his 5
into dii
with th
solla1 pl
througl:
have bt
provemi
great re
This WE

pstymen
failure :
bitrary
assesse(

N PORTRAITS.

the EngIisTi represeatnmas the inevitable preg the progress of the
Ali remained at Cabul,
1 troops a t the Peimar
.e of defence had beon
;ed the 13th of Decem1 to the officers of the
le announced his dch the intention of prourg, there to place his
~eforea Congress. In a
Ian, dateci t h e 22nd of
[dressed t o Onlar Khan,
t, Shere Ali annoullced
he part of his troops,
i a day like that of the
lthough Shere Ali had
lie would be admitted
rithin Russinu territory,
appear t o have beeu
ral veeks h e resided a t
ddenly taken ill there,
kr-i-shereef, where lie
rumy 1879.
I

SEERE ALI.

$7

Of Shere Ali's internal administra t' on somcthing must be said. Keen in observation and
sllremd in j ~ldgingthe practical vi~lucqofthings,
he recognisecl that one of his surest safeguards
against popular clisturbance mould bc to adopt
the same preventive means as he had secn mere
adopted by us. He accordingly issued an edict,
forbidding any arms to be carried between the
h o u ~ sof 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. ; and he appointed
watchmen in Cabul and somo of the other large
cities for the preservation of life and property
a t all hours. He also sought to c u b the power
of his Sirdars by enabling the people to enter
into direct communication wit11 himself, and
with this view he revived the right of personal petition. He also created a postal service
throughout his state, and this is reported to
have been the most successful of a11 his improvements. I n another way he attempted a
great reform, doomed, however, to speedy failure.
This was tho subst,itution of cash payments for
payments in land or kind. The cause of this
failure may mith reason be attributed to the ai*bitrary manner in which tho money value was
assessed. He also alleviated the punishments
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previously in force, and sought to strengthen
his rule b y exhibiting general moderation, and
b y conciliating more especially the mass of
t h e peopls whom most of the previous rulers
had negle~t~ed.I n two respects he attempted
changes in the native customs that were of less
importance but weye eminently characteristic 01
t h e man. He requested that all should wear
English-made clothes, and he set the example
himself; but he absolutely commanded all the
shoemakers of Cabul to get rid of their old
goods and in the future to make nothing else
than boots of a European pattern. I n dealing
with his army he mas not less influenced by his
experience of English customs than in those
civil matters soma of which have been mentioned. H e divided liis troops into regiments,
of which there were fifty-seven of infantry and
sixteen of cavalry. Of the former, fifty were
said to be properly armed, and each was computed to muster about six hundred and fifty
bayonets. A cavalry regiment consisted of
four hundred men. The Afghan regular army
created by Xhere Ali numbered, thorefore,
thirty-seven thousand foot and six thousancl
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four hundred horse. I n addition to these, there
were about eight thousand irregnlar cavalry,
three thousand five hundred jezailjies, or irregular infantry, and a local militia of unascertained strength. The artillery comprised about
one hundred pieces in service and one hundred
and fifty in store. He established gun factories
and powder magazines in the chief cities. Such
was the army which Shere Ali created in the
years subsequent to the Umballa Durbar. The
recent campaigns show that Shere Ali was not
justified in reposing confidence in the machine
which he had so carefully created. His military
reforms and attempts to organise a, standing
army were mistakes when regarded from the
point of view of Afghan cuijtoms and the national character. Though giving him a momentary sense of strength, they sapped the founda.
tions on which the power of an A.fghan ruler
must always rest.
Of the personal character of this ruler it is
difficult to give for an English reader a sketch
which, while it shall be accurate, is not open to
the charge of being exaggerated. 13ut if it be just
to take human nature as tho same all the world
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over, and to apply to an Afghan chieftain t h e
same test that is employed in considering the
career of a European king, it may be truthfully said that as a sovereign Shere Ali had
experienced depths of misfortune equal t o those
sounded by Frederick the Great. With not less
determination aria fortitude than was exhibited
by t h a t great monarch, he made defeat a n d
disaster the stepping-stones to victory and
prosperity. Even after the rout a t Shaikhabad,
when everything seemed utterly lost, he assembled his remaining followers around him, and
bade such as despaired of his cause go over t o
his enemies. Por himself he was Ameer of
Afghanistan, and so long as life remained t o
him he would fight for the recovery of his
rightful inheritance. The military skill of Yakoob Khan and the gallantry of the levies of
Herat were the visible causes of the turn in t h e
fortunes of the war ; but behind them, moulding
them into shape to produce great results, were
the indomitable courage and energy of this
never-despairing king. When victory finally
came he appears t o have used it with moderation. The long path which he had trodden
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through adversity and misfortulle had taught
him the necessity for controlling that ungovernable temper which had led him into acts of
tyranny, bringing down upon him the hostility
of his subjects. One of the most ti*ustworthy
authorities on the subject, the late Mr. John
Wyllie, describes his appearance at the time
when i t was uncertain whether peace had finally
settled dowu over Afghanistan or whether only
an armed truce hacl produced a lull, in t h e .
following words :" I n his air there is all the dignity which,
royal birth, coupled with a long experience of
misfortune, seldom fails to confer; and the.habitual melancholy of his passion-ravaged
couatenance is eloquent with the tale of that
domestic grief whic11 four years ago shook his
reason with an almost irreparable throe. But
tho dominant feature is the eye, and its expression sternness-the practised sternness of one
never lrnown t o spare any adversary that might
be wisely struck."
Other authorities have taken exception to
this description on the ground that the chief
characteristic of the face wa,s cruelty rather
*

6
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than sternness, and that in the eyes there was
an expression of cunning mixed with timidity.
Mr. Wyllie's version rests on a sounder and
more probable basis in itself, and tallies more
closely with a11 that is lcnown of Shere U i .
His career proves him to have been neithel- a
monster of iniquity nor a paragon of virtue.
I n the first year of his reign he indulged in the
fmpulses of l i s violent temper, ancl in the next
6ve years he paid the penalty for the indulgence.
During the last eight he appeared keen and calculating rather than high-minded and impulsive.
He never showed doubt on the point that the
best may to force the hand of the B'itish
Government was to simulate an affection for
R,ussia, and he acted according to his belief.
I n endeavouring to steer clear of any definite
arrangement with either this country or with
Russia, he compromised his good name among
us, and it is possible that he went further than
he was really disposed to do in his negotiations
with Russian agents. During his later years
he undoubtedly strove to formulate some plan
of common action mitli the hill tribes on the
Punjab frontier, and it would almost seem as
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if, finding all other means abortive, he had instigated them to acts of hostility against this
country. The vague promises of aid which he
certainly gaye some of the clans in 1877 were
magnified by the voice of rumour into a distinct
engagement, and may have been instrumental
in bringing about the troubles with the
Jowaki Afreedees. But whatever Shere Ali's
inconsistencies may have been, he could never
wholly forget his father's advice that the true
interests, both of his o m country and his particular dynasty, were to maintain friendly
relations with the English.
T h e reasons which gradually led him from a
policy of doubtful friendship into one of open
hostility towards this country have been specified. They acted unfavourably on his character.
His suspicious nature became more developed,
and had he lived long enough he might have become in one respect an Asiatic Louis XI. But if
we regard his career impartially, and forget bhat
he became the foe of this country after h a ~ n g
sworn to be its friend, it must be admitted that
he possessed great abilities. He was certainly
no unworthy son and successor of the illustrious
6 *
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Dost Mahomed, and under more f avourable cil-cumatancea might have done much towards
perpetuating the Barucksye dynasty as the
heir of the Durani monarchy. If he was not
in the highest sense of the word a great man,
he was certainly a remarkable one, and as sol.
dier, general, administrator, and prince, must
be classed among the foremost of his contern.
poraries in the East.
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GENERAL KAUFMANN.

To describe General Kaufmann's career in any
detail mould be to write tho history of Russia's
progress in Central Asia during the last twelve
yews, the most eventful period in the whole
course of her activity in that continent. Pew
details have come to light conceriling the early
l5fe of this general. His name is to be found
some &€teenyears ago in close attendance upon
the Czar, of whom he was a favourite aide-decamp; and he undoubtedly owed to his winning
manners much of his subsequent advancement
in the service. But the gay young officer was
neither overburdened with the good things of
this world, nor was he of so unambitious a
temperament as to desire to pass away his life

.
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in idleness at St. Petersburg or Wilna. He.
was known t o be willing to accept any post,
offering emolument and holding out a reasonable prospect of obtaining a military reputation.
I n 1867 the chance offered itself, and the influence of his friends, added to the attachment
of the Czar, obtained for him the reversion to
the newly created dignity of Governor-General
of Turkestarz.
The annexation of the northern portioil of
Khokand in 1865 had led the St. Petersburg
authorities to seriously consider their new position in Central Asia, and a commission, known
as tho Steppe Commission, was appointed to
inquire into the subject. I t s deliberations led
to the formation of a Governor-Generalship of
Tnrkestan, with its capital at Tashkent, where,
notwithstanding the increase in the extent of
the dependent territory, it still remains. It
mas as the seconcl of these governor-generals
that General Kaufmann went to Tashkent in
November 1867. His selection for the high
post to which he mas advanced occasioned some
surprise. It also raised considerable envy in the
breasts of those who had served in Asia. It is
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txue that at that t.ime Twkestan was regarded
more in the light of a place of exile than as a
land to be coveted. Only the needy or the
desperate were desirous of proceeding thither ;
but there mere not wanting a, few ambitious
men who saw au opening in Central Asia for
their talents or their eliterpriso. To these it
was a great disappoiutment that an unknom
staff officer should be, as it were, passed over
their heads to an office for which it could not
be claimed that he possessed the necessary qua-,
lifications. The prize was in their eyes a real
one. It represented the just realisation of all
their efforts. Ranfmaan had never been in
Central Asie. To him it was a, terra iacognita.
His military experience mas also very limited;
and to place a t his discretion operations of
war with unknown peoples and conducted on
principles different from those to which he had
been accustomed, was in their eyes to commit
tlie most egregious of blunders. Ullsnited for
the work with which he would be entrusted,
Kaufmann was in the eyes of the regular Central Asian officer held to be undeserving of the
prize which they believed he would not appre-
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ciate. As events turned, out Kaufrnann surpassed the most sanguine expectations, and is
now admittedly the champion of the Chauvinist party among Central Asian authorities
ia Russia.
General Kaufmann's personal character was
not such apparently as would redecill the
shortcomings of his attainments and his experience. His temperament was prone to
over-confidence, and his vanity was excessive.
With almost unlimited power placed in his
hands and beyond the oontrol of the central
authorities, Kaufrnann felt that he might carve
out both an empire forL his master and a reputation for himself without placing any other
fetter on his inclination thail the extent of
his resources. He could also indulge his personal vanity by the maintenance of a ceremonious etiquette and external state that moulcl
not have been possible under any other circumstances. This desire for display earned him the
title of Yarim Padishah, or half-king. It founcl
at the same time expression and relief in the
severe etiquette with. which he fenced himself
around, and still more publicly in the salutes
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which Bo required as the recognitioll of his
presence, and in the escorts which he attached
to the persons of his wife and family.
These little weaknesses had t h e greatcr importance, because they induced him to devote
much of the time that shoulcl.have been passed in
tho transaction of public business to the formal
or ceremonial side of his office, and much of
the aclministrative labour had, coasecluently, to
be performed by subordinates. A general laxity
soon became perceptible in the public service.
D a ~ k e rassertions were freely made, and it is
geacrally believed that there has been much
peculation prevalent in his administrative bureaux. However that may have been, there is
some confirmation of the charge in the fact
tlzat t h e opinions of two cominissions of inquil-y that were appointed have never been
made public. General Tchemaieff, whose name
is collnected with some of the most brilliant
Russian exploits in Central Asia, but whose
opinion is not clear of the suspicion of being
influenced by jealousy of General Kaufmann,
has been particnlarly active in the levelling of
charges against the Tashkent administration.
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Kaufmann has at least the defence that he
is not worse than his class. I t would be a
matter of great difficulty to find a single
bureau in Russia, free fro111 the taint of patriotism bcing blind where personal profit is
conceyned.
It was unavoidable that a man of the lavish
disposition of Kaufmann, and filled with a very
eager desire to win military laurels, should,
when entrusted with the charge of an estate
heavily encumbered and greatly impoverished,
fail to adapt his ends to the means he possessed. So long as he could indulge the freak
of the moment or cailry out the design immediately before him, he reclred nothing of
the cost or the consequence. As an administrator it cannot, therefore, be contended that
General Kaufmali~ihas achieved a brilliant success. Under the most favourable supposition,
his labours have produced but partial results.
Year after year the expendituro has gone on
increasing at a rapid rate. The Central Asian
provinces are a burden to tlie imperial exchequer, and the burden, with each fresh acquisition, has become heavier instead of lighter.

TI

sic
a1
in

GENERAL IFBUFMANN.

ce that he
vould be a
a single
hint of patl profit is
L

the lavish
with a very
els, should,
f an estate
poverished,
ma he pos;e the fi-eak
design imnothing of
an administended that
irillia,nt sucsupposition,
rtial results.
as gone on
mtral Asian
~erialexcheesB acquisiof lighter.

91

The province of Kulclja mas the one possession which proved in any may remunerative,
and the Chinese have succeeded in reacquiring that fertile region. The military and the
civil expenditure exceed the revenue by a
greater sum than ever they did before, and
the Government is compelled to resort to what
can only be termed cooking the accounts to
make the balance-sheet assume anything like a
respectable appearance. For a very consiclerable portion of that deficit Kaufmann's extravagance has been directly accountable; but graver
blame must be held to attach to the laxity
of the supervision he exercised over his subordinates. His indifference to matters of cletail
led him very often t o neglect opportunities that
more practical and experienced officers would
have been prompt to seize, and this was especially noticeable in matters connected mith
trade. It is true that the opportunity is now
afforded General Eaufmann to repair during his
second, the blunciers which, in this respect,
marked his first, term of power. But it is not
likely that he will avail himself of tho opportunity. The conqueror of Khiva will no doubt
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hold it to be beneath him to investigate such
paltry items as the expenditure connected with
the administrative departments of Turkestan.
It is not as an auditor-gene~althat Kaufmann
has consented to return to Tashkent.
It is much more unaccountable to find that
Kaufmann did so little for the advancement of
trade during his tenure of power, for Russia's
programme of conquest has always been a
double one ; extension of trade having scarcely
been second to the absorption of fresh territory. There have been several Societies
started at his instigation, but they have one
and all ended in failure; and under his
auspices Russia's trade in Central Asia has
made the very slowest progress. The imp~llse
of late given to the production of cotton
has been due to some as yet unexplained revival of energy 011 the part of the native populations. But when it is remembered that f o ~
twelre years Russia has had the complete control of the trade of all the countries north of
the Hindoo Koosh, and that she alone has possessed the ability to carry on commercial
intercourse therein, it is astonishing to find
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how little has been done for its promotion. The Russian finances have sufferecl
through the apathy of the ruling powers, and
the State has not benefited by the impetus
to trade which was expected to be one of the
results of the Russian campaigns in Central
Asia. General Kaufmann personally must be
held mainly responsible for this lack of progress, for tliere can be little doubt that, although the wealth of the Khanates was in the
first place exaggerated, the original expectations of a great Central Asian trade were
not 'without substantial justification. Had
General Eaufmann devoted himself to the task
that he should a t once havebundei.taken, he
would probably have obtained some very tangible result while he would have conferred s
mope permanent benefit on his country than
he has by the nulnerous wars which his ambition produced. He did not avail himself
of his opportunity ; and if the Russian rule in
Central Asia were to be extinguished tomorrow, General Kaufmann's administration
would not leave any memorial behind to distinguish it from any of the barbarisms that
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have risen periodically to imperial power in
Central and Western Asia.
When General Kaufmann arrived a t Tashkent in November 186'7, Russia, had only just
planted her foot within the doorway of the
Khanates. The governor-generalship of Turkestan had been established by an imperial ukase
four months before, and when Raufmann succeeded Romanoffsky Bokhara and Khokand still
maintained their independence, and Khiva was
indifferent to, if not actually defiant towards,
Russia. Historically speaking, the f d l of Tashkent in 1865 struck t.he death-knell of those
states; but the final blow had yet to be delivered.
From the first advance of General Peroffsky
into the Kirghiz steppes in 1841 down to Tchernaieff's triumph ai; Tashkent in 1865 it is easy
t o detect the main idea whi,ch pervaded the Russian policy. I t was nothing more or less than t o
take up aparamount position on the Syr Darya,
which would give Russia a supreme voice in the
arrangement of affairs in Turkestan. I t was
also generally thought in those days that t h e
trade of the future would follow the course of
that river. The very ease with which this
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consummation had been realised was provocative of a desire to proceecl. to a greater length
and to convert the Oxus also into a Russian
river. That has been already accomplished,
but the due result, it is now understood, cannot
be attained until Merv has been occupied ancl
the Turcomaus subjected.
I t is such considerations as these which lead
observers to infer that Russia will not recognise any permanent halting-place in her progress towards Southeru Asia short of the sea.
Towards obtaining that complete triumph liaufmann has already done much, ancl he very
possibly may yet have the good fortune to do
more. I n his first war he shattered the forces
of the Ameer of Bokhara. He concluded it
with the annexation of Samarcand and the
Zerafshan valley. I n 18'71, mithout a war, he
took the Valley of the Ili from the Tungan
despot who had established his authority
therein. I n 18'73 he triumphed over the longoffending Khiva, and as the result of that war
he brought the Russiau frontier down t o the
Oxus, and made it a Russian river. Two
years afterwards he overcame the most serious
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rising that has ever taken place against the
Russians, and he pacified the great state of
Khokand by annexing it, and making it the
Russian province of Ferghana. The man, who
more than any other wished and wishes to emulate the career of the great conqueror Baber,
testified his admiration by reviving the picturesque name of that monarch's first province.
If,therefore, General Kaufmann's personal
government does llot deserve any special praise
&en tested by the beneficent deeds performed
under it, it is at the least remarkable for the
events which were crowded so rapidly one after
the other into its brief space. The Russian
historian will think of Kaufmann, not as tho
weak and neglectful administrator who looked
chiefly to his own comfort and glory, but as the
general under whose auspices so many vic tories
were obtained. He will not, at least for many
a yea7 yet, inq~Grehow far General Kaufmann's
acts were marked by prudence and by foresight. He will rest satisfied with the knowledge that it was during his governor-generalship that the three Khanates of Bokhara, U i v a ,
and Khokand were humbled and either dis-
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membered or annexed iu their entirety; and
that it beheld Russians dominant on the Tian
Shan and supreme in the councils at Teheran,
at tlie same time that their influence was
stealthily approaching Afghanistan and the Indian frontier. The campaigns which resulted in
the seizure of Samarcand, of Khokand, and of
the Amou Darya district will be remembered in
Russian history for all time, and the remembrance will suffice to exclude consideration of
fhe point whether the exhibition of wisdom and
&ruestatesmanship, or of their reverse, marked
Kaufmann's tenure of power.
His policy towards Khiva and Bokhara, after
he had defeated them in war, is sure to come
in for a large share of praise, and even his intrigues with Shere Ali will be approved of on the
ground that they tended to embarrass England.
The patriotic Russian will probably go still farther and expiless his regret that the necessities
of the moment should have prevented his Government from openly and at all hazards
championing the cause of that Ameer. I t
would be a mistake to apply too exacting a
Gest to Kaufmann's administration of the Czar's
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dominions in Central Asia, although his return
to power will of necessity cause a modifioation
of the opinions which have been expressed
concerning his career on the supposition that
it had closed. His return to Tashkent gives
him fresh opportunities. Who can say whether
he will enhance or mar the reputation he has
already won ?
The large part played by him in the development of the Central Asian Question has been
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case
rather than to the ability of the man. His own
vanity prompted him to endeavour by all means
in his power to precipitate the advent of the
crisis between England and Russia, from which.
he hoped to derive great benefit. His overeagerness on this point proves him to have been
a weak man and one emphatically who did not
adjust his means to the end he had in view..
Just as he has filled a larger place in the past.
history of the question than his personil abilities or services would justify, so is it possible
that we may hear more of him in the future
because the time is ripening for the receipt of
the reward Russia considers her due for the
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labour of six generations in carrying on aggressive war beyond the Caspian and the Ural. I f
Kaufmann's warlike achievements Lave as yet
been less remarkable than those of Tchernaioff and Romanoffsky-and
they certainly
have been less than those of Peroffsky-it
is
quite cartail1 that his name will survive that
of any of his predecessors, both on account
of the length of his stay and also for the
conquests obtained under his guidance. It
would be absurd to compare Kaufmann with
either Olive or Warren Hastings ; but it may
be expected that in the course of a few gonerations this Russian general will bc regarded
by his fellow-countrymen not only as the principal founder of the Central Asian dependency,
but as holding in their history precisely the
same position that the founders of British supremacy in Indin hold in ours.
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THE LATE YAICOOB BEG.

MAIIOMED
YAIKOOB,
a Tajik of the state of Khohand, was born at Piskent, a small but flourishing village fifty miles south of Tashkent, in or
about the year 1820. The Tajiks of Khokand
are not, nor have they been for a great number
of years, the dominant race in that Khanate,
although they are supposed by some to be the
longer settled there than any of the other inhabitants of Khokand and Kashgar. They are
considered to be Iranic or Persian in origin, in
contradktinction to their present T~lrkishrulers.
The Tajiks have been driven by successive tides
of illvasionfrom the plains to take refuge in the
uplands of Khokand, and among the principal
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of their settlements is Piskent, the birthplace of
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the late Athalik Ghazi. They are to be found
also in most of the chief towns of this state;
but it is in the hill villages that they preserve
in the greatest degree the distinctive features
of their race. His father, Pnr Mahomed Mirza,
had been Kazi of Kurama, and had moved
from that place t o Piskent about the year
1618. There he married a lady of an influential family, and rose high in his worldly position. Yakoob Beg was the issue of this union,
and he owed much of his advancement in life
t o the Bheik Nizamuddin, his mother's brother.
His early years were passed at Piskent, where
for some time he underwent the training for a
mollah. The prospect of such s profession
proved distasteful to one of his active temperament, and he gave up the intention almost as
soon as it had been formed. The most important event at this stage of his life was the
marriage of his sister to Nur Mahomed Khan,
the Governor of Tashkent.
Mahomed Yakoob, following the custom of
the more active Tajik youths, entered the military service of Khokand at an early age, and
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in 1845 he mas appointed Mahram, or charnberlain, t o the new Khan, Khudayar. Shortly
afterwards he was made Pansad Bashi, or coinmander of five hundred. By the year 1850
he had so far advanced in rank that he
was entrusted with responsible posts on the
northern frontier, and was raised to the dignity of Koosh-bege-" lord of the family "which may bo rendered deputy governor or
vizier. In 1853 he had control of the garrison
of Ak Musjid (White Mosque), a fort on the
Syr Darya, when General Peroffsky appearel
before its walls with a large Russian force.
The summons to surronder was treated with
scorn, and the Russian batteries were speedily
constructod and in such a position as to
easily overcome the slight resistance that mucl
walls manned by a few devoted men could
offer. For twenty-five days the Russian fire
swept over the insignificant stronghold, and
during all those days the small garrison, encowaged by the example set them by their
leader in their desperate straits, held out.
Beveral assaults made by the Russisils before
the walls had been levelled with the ground
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were repulsed, and the Khokanclians had done
everything to save their honour and to inspire
a chivalrous enemy with respect for their courage. After a bombardment of newly four
weeks, the breach was a t last declared practicable by the Russian engineers, and the storming parties were then ordered to be held ready.
The garrison, recognising the impossibility of
defending the fort any longer, agreed to surrender, and sent a letter to General Peroffsky
to that effect. The general was, however, enraged at the obstinacy of the defence, and his
ambition and vanity urged him to rest content
with nothing less than a capture by storm.
The fever for crosses of St. Anne and of
St. George is an old disease among Russia11
officers, and General Peroffsky was one cjf
the most deeply amitten with the complaint.
The letter was torn up, and the messenger
sent back to the despairing garrison wit11
the reply, "We shall take the fort by assault." The fort was taken the next day, and
has ever since been knomn after the name of
its captor as Port Peroff~lcy, That general has
indeed perpetuated his name thereby in
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these regions, but when the whole story i s
told, it cannot be said to redound greatly t o
his credit.
The reputation that Mahomed Yakoob a,cquired by-this brave resistance to the Russians
stood him in good stead, for about the time
that the Khoja Wali Ehan attempted to wrest
Kashgar from the Chinese we Gnd him high in
command at Tashkent. This was in 18.57, and
soon afterwards he became commander-in-chief
of the army of Rhokand. It is not clear what
part he played in Wali's invasion of Kashgar,
but it is certainly justifiable to suppose that it
directed his attention to that quarter, and
made him inclined six years later to join in the
enterprise of Buzurg Khan, the elder brother
of Wali Khan. I n 1863 Buzurg Khan, who
had been living on the hospitality of Khokand, induced A i m Kuli, the regent of that
state, to acquiesce in his leaving Tashkent t o
attempt to regain the kingdom of his ancestors.
But permission to make the attempt summecl
up the aid he could obtain from Khokand.
This was the first occasion on which Buzurg
Khan had come to the front as the representa-

11j
I!

1

1/
/I

11I

i:

i

1I

I
I

,

!I

II

I

I1

I/

THE

hole story is
id greatly to
Yakoob acthe Russians
out the time
?ted t o wrest
. him high in
in 18.51, and
~nder-in-chief
3 t cleay what
I of Eaahgar,
ppose that it
quarter, and
to join in the
elder brother
5 Khan, who
dity of Kho:gent of that
Tashkent t o
his ancestors.
impt summed
m Khokand.
rhich Buzurg
e representa-

LATn

YAKOOB BEG.

105

tive of the Khojas, although his father, Jehanghir Khan had, in 1827, attained a momentary
success over the Chinese. Mahomed Yakoob,
then the Koosh-bege Yakoob, received permission to accompany him as lieutenant, and,
with only sixty-six followers, they undertook
the invasion of Kashgar, garrisoned by a,
large Chinese force. The position of the
Chinese in Kashgar had been rendered very
precarious by the rebellion of the Tungani
dong their line of communications, and disaffection to their rule, even in Kashgar, was
scarcely concealed. I n the more remote districts of the state the Kirglliz and other tribes
obtained some successes over the military sent
against them, and the invitation of one of
these chiefs had first induced Buzurg Khan
to enter Kashgar as a pretender to the
throne. Notwithstanding the disadvantages
under which they laboured, the Chinese were
successful in all the earlier engagements;
an attempt to seize Kashgar by a stratagem
was foiled; and for more than twelve months
the adventurers were unable to accomplish
anything of importance. The Andijanis, or
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merchant classes, however, veered round to
the cause of Buzurg Khan, and about the
same time that the Russian general Tchernnieff entered Tashkent in triumph, the Khoja
kings were once more reinstated as rulers in
Yarkand and Eashgar by the military skill of
the f nture Athalik Ghazi.
Buzurg Khan was not long seated on the
throne of his ancestors before he showed that
'he posscssed thcir hereditary vices and weaknesses. Re was licentious and cruel, in addition to being cowardly and irresolute. He
possessed no redeeming quality in the eyes
of the soldiery to compensate for his tyranny
towards his subjects. H e was essentially a ~ o i
fai~zbant, and his s~~ccessful
general was his
m n i ~ e clu palais. His lieutenant was quite
resolved to possess more of the external show
of power than was compatible with a subordinate position, and availing himself of the cxcesses of Buzurg, he deposed him before many
months had elapsed after their triumph. It
was said that this unfortunate prince was permitted to seek refuge in Wakhan or some
other neighbouring state, but of this fact we
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know nothing certain. It is quite possible that
the tale of his having fled to Tibet and thence
to Khokand was fabricated, and that the
Athalik Ghazi adopted a surer method in
deaIing with his rival. Towards the commencement of the year 1866, therefore, Yakoob found himself an independent prince,
in possession of the western portion of Kashgaria. His neighbours on the west and on the
south were either friendly or neutral, and on
the north the Russians, who might be considered inimical to him, had not yet brought
their frontier into dangerous proximity with
his own. I n Kuldja, and in the country lying
to the east of his possessions, were the Tungani -the Mahomedans who had revolted
against the Chinese, and who hacl established
a certain irregular government of their own
in Jungaria and in the cities of Aksn, Kucha,
Urumtsi, and Turfan. The Tungsni were not
prepared for the appearance of a new atate
founded by a 'victorious army and general on
their flank. They had, indeed, aspired to extend the form of freedom they had secured for
themselves to their fellow-countrymen further
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west, and were displeased and perhaps alarmed
when they found that Chinese ~uthoritywas
to be succeeded by a power which seemed to
possess military vigour.
Before narrating the history of Yakoob
Beg's relations with the Tungani, it must
be stat,ed that when the Chinese defence of
Eashgar collapsed, their troops were taken
into the pay of the new state, some of their
leading officers were re-appointed to their
former posts, and Koh Dalai, their military
chief, was entrusted with supreme control
over them. So far as numbers went, the
Ehitay troops in the service of Eashgar
formed a numerous contingent, and naturally disposed to regard a war with the
Tungani with peculiar favour. Being permitted to continue in the observance of their
religious rites, they were probably among the
most faithful soldiers at the disposal of Yakoob Beg against every foe except a Chinese
army. These troops served their new master
well, nor did they prove false to their trust
until after Yakoob's death, and the arrival
of the Chinese before the gates of Kashgar.
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They then, to a man, went over t o the Celestial~.
Yakoob Beg, as he was now called, endea.
vonred at first to arrive at an amicable understanding with the Tungani, but, whatever the
reason, with very partial success. Elis merchants demanded greater security in their
journeys beyond Aksu, and a large portion of
his army was eager to engage in hostilities.
War was at last declared, and in several campaigns Yakoob Beg and his two sons overthrew
the Tungan forces. Aksu was speedily concluered, and the whole country up to Turfan
gradually passed under the sway of Kashgar.
Before the year 1870 closed, the Tungan power
had disappeared from the conntry south of the
Tian Shan, its leaders and princes hadiibeen
swept away with an unsp$ring hand, and the
whole region round Turfan had been converted
into a desert. The Chinese had found a most
trenchant avenger in their own opponent; but
in that year it must be admitted that there was
no sign whatever that China would ever again
be able to turn her attention either t o Jungaria or to Kashgaria. The Russians were so
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alarmed a t the rapid consolidation of this Mahomedan state that they occupied ICuldje as a
precautionary measure. There can be little
doubt now that these opel~ationsagainst the
Tungani were very unwise, for not only did
Yakoob exhaust his own resources in subduing
them, but he also lessened the task the Chinese
had to accomplish when they attempted to reach
Kashgar, Under the actual circumstances the
Tungani disliked the Kashgarian rule quite as
much as they had the Chinese, and events
showed that in many cases they hastened t o
come to terms with the invader in 1877.
With the close of these campaigns the
external affairs of Kashgaria wore a more
peaceful aspect. A t the hands of the Ameer
of Bokhara Yakoob had received the title of
Athalik Ghazi, which means Champion Father.
H e was also generally known as the Badaulet,
or the Fortunate One. By restoring the Sunni
sect of Mahomedanism, he endeavoured to attract the sympathy of all true followers of the
Prophet t o his cause, and his acknowledgment
of the suzerainty of the Sultan was rewarded
i n 1873 by the title of Emir. His rule in
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Eastern Turkestan was formally recognised by
his neighbours, and was consolidated by such
diplomatic overtuyes as those specified and the
others which he made to the British Covernment. More serious matters, however, claimed
his attention. Before 1870 and their seizure of
Euldja, the Russians had perceived the eacouraging effect the creation of this new Mahornedan
state would have on the general desire throughout their own possessions to throw off the i~zcubus
of Russian domination; and although they took
possession of their slice of the territory of the
Tungani, they mere not satisfied in their own
minds that it was a complete set-off to and equivalent for the growing strength and reputation
of Yakoob Beg. They resolved to learn something more about this new state, and negotiations were set on foot with the view of coming to
an understanding with the Athalik Ghazi, who
they knew would not show much respect for the
treaties which had been concluded wit11 China.
As early as 1868 a Russian merchant had attempted to ent-er Kashgar, but he was obliged
to return with the loss of his merchandise.
The next year he renewed the attempt, and
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having obteined an interview with the ruler,
managed to produce a f avourable impression
upon him, Others came, but without achieving
permanent p o d , either for themselves or
for future traders. Before long, too, a cause
of dispute between the two Governments arose
in the
ill-treatment of a Russian merchant, and the Russian Government demanded
the restitution of the sum of money in which he
had been mulcted. After a very long delay the
Athalik Ghazi handed the money over, but in a
depreciated Chinese coin !
Although Russian officers had visited Kashgar, and Kashgarian envoys proceeded to
Tashkent, it was not until 1872, when Baron
Kaulbars negotiated the treaty of commerce
which bears his name, that any definite arrangement was arrived at between the two Goveruments. An ambassador was then despatched
to St. Petersburg, and Yakoob Khan's relations with Ru~lsiaseemed to hold forth a better
prospect for the future. He was either distrustful of the intentions of the Russians, or he
wae inspired with an intelligible ambition to
head EL great rising throughout Asia againet
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their authority, for his attitude again became
the reverse of cordial. H e assumed on all
occasiolls a very dignified demeanour in his interviews with Russian officers; his letters to
General Kaufmann were d r d t e d on the assumption of the writer's equality with that
officer's master, the White Czar; and with the
arrival of an English mission, in 1813, in his
country he became still more independent, if not
absolutely defiant. With a fine, but somev h a t dangerous irony, when his situation is
considered, he " desired permission from General Kaufmann t o send an embassy to St. Petersburg, t o congrat~~late
his brother, the Czar of
Russia, on the marriage of his daughter with a
Prince of England, the Emir's good friend and
ally."
Such a tone was not the best calculated to
conciliate Russian sentiment, nor would such
an attitude induce us to think very highly of the
prudence of Yekoob as a politician. His refusal
t o admit Russian consuls within his borders
mas founded on a far better reason, although
more than anything else it rendered the
Bussians less loth to proceed t o extremitie
8
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against him. I n 1875 they had eit,her so far
lost patience, or had become so impressed with
the necessity of checking his power, that preparations were made for the invasion of his
territory both from Khokand by the Terek
Pass and also from Naryn. A t this crisis fortune intervened on the side of Yakoob Beg,
and the serious and wide-spread rebellion in
Khokand required all the Russian resources to
repress it. Kashgar was saved ; but if Yakoob
Beg had been acting on a consistent policy of
opposition to ,Russia, the time she was hampered
by the Ehokandian war would have been
his opportunity for uniting in a league the
whole of Western Turkestan. He hesitated,
did nothing, witnessed the complete overthrow
of his native country, and beheld the only occasion on which he would have had any chance
in a Russian war pass away unseized. His
policy up to this point had been senseless and
unmeaning, unless he was prepared to follow
it up when the moment for action arrived.
B e was apparently unnerved by a sense of
the desperate peril of the enterprise to be
attempted. The greatest of men have not been
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free from a similar weakness, but under simi,.
lar circumstallces it has always passed off when
the man has been truly great. The reputation
,of Yakoob Beg was lowered by this abstention.
His subsequent conduct seemed to show that
he himself afterwards became convinced that
Russian friendship was preferable to Russian
enmity.
It was only, however, on the eve of the
Chinese invasion that he unreservedly abandoned hi~l attitude of independence. H e
received Colonel Prjevalsky in a flattering
manner, and treated the embassy of Captain
Kuropatkine with distinguished honour. 'His
envoy at Tashkent departing from the tradition of all previous envoys sent by his
master, sued for support against the Man.chu army that had carried all before it in the
country north of the Tian Shan. The change
came too late t o do any good. The Chinese
had been on friendly terms with Russia for
many years, and Yakoob Beg was, till quite recently, almost a declared enemy. The Russian
Government now left its two neighbours to
"ottle the question between themselves.
8 *
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I n his last campaign during the early part of
the year 18'7'7, the fortune of war turned wholly
against him. The Chinese expelled him from
his positions round Turfan, and routed him s
second time at Toksoun, where their tactics baffled his skill, and their numbers carried everything before them. Within a few weeks after his
defeat he died a t Korla, closing a career which
will always secure for him consideration and
respect. A visitor to Kashgar has described
his personal appearance as follows :-" He was
a short, thickish-built man, with a countenance
that seemed to have attained the most complete immobility of expression. Although on
a first glance his face was one that would not
claim your attention, a closer inspection showed
it to possess signs of great resolution and
firmness." He retained to the very last the
active habits that had so long distinguished
him ; in his dress he was simple, and his military training preserved him from those vices
that had been the ruin of all his predecessors
in Rashgar. Some of his journeys to the
eastern portion of his extensive dominions
would bear comparison for rapidity with the
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most famous performances of their kind; and
his iron will and prompt, if unsorupulous, resolution for maily years enabled him to triumph
over every obstacle. It is long, indeed, since
so energetic a ruler appeared among the
effete peoples of Asia. With yesources ridiculously insignificant, and quite inadequate to
enable him to cope with such powerful foes as
Russia and China, he preservcd his indepenclence for thil*teen years. He was spoken of
in the capitals of Europe with respect ancl admiration, and t.he hopes and fears of two mighty
countries were engrossed in the fate of his
efforts to establish a stable goverament. His
temporary success was insuficient t o enable
him t o withstand the shock of a collision with
an old empire like China, but he did all that
lay in his power to produce a different result,
and his failure is hardly to be ascribed to his
lack of ability. As administrator, soldier,
and prince, Yakoob Beg has left a name that
will, a t all events, provide our descendants at
some remote period with a subject for historical surmise as to what might have been if the
fates had been less untoward. He possessed, so
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far as can be judged, the same qualities thati
made Genghis, Timour, and Nadk the conquerors of Asia; but he lived in a changed
wbrld. He was a great man, born several centuries too late.
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KI-IODODAD KHAN.

THE present ruler of the country of Beloochistan, or, as he is better known, the Khan of
IChelat, has proved the sincerity of his friendship towards England by his acts during the
two recent campaigns in Afghanistan. It is
true that much. of his independence has disappeared in consequence of his conversion to
the British alliance ; but if such has been the
case his power among his people and the
great chiefs has become more vigorous then it
ever was before. Instead of his authority being
purely nominal, it is now reoognised from Mekran to Scinde, and even that troublesome chieftain the Jam of Las Bela has refrained fro111
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making any aggressive movement since Major
Sandeman took up his residence at Khelat.
I n order to make the career of Khododad
intelligible to the reader it is necessary to go
back t o our former wars in Afghanistan, when,
for a supposed breach of faith, the Khan of
that day was killed in defending his town
against the assault of an English army. The
name of that Khan was Mehrab. Not content
with this success, our authorities resolved that
an elder branch of the ruling family should be
installed in pomer. Nawaz Khan was the name
of the ruler we selected, but after a brief reign,
he was displaced by Nasseer Khan, son of
Mehrab. Although we had originally opposed
this prince, he seemed to bear no malice,
and adopted a decidedly amicable policy to
wards us. After the occupation of Scinde
this spirit of forgiveness or of prudence
showed itself in practical acts, particularly in
the Treaty of 1854, by the terms of which he
bound himself and his heirs to admit British
garrisons within his country whenever such
a step should be held to be necessary by the
Calcutta Government. .
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Nasseer Khan did not long survive this proclamation of his friendly sentiments towards
tho English Government. H e died suddenly,
and it was more than suspected that he was
got rid of by foul play. His chamberlain, Gul
Mahomed, who had been one of the most
trusted of the advisers of the previous ruler,
Mehrab Khan, and who had suffered greatly
a t the time of the storming of Khelat by the
British troops, mas belie,ved t o have taken an
active part in disposing of a ruler vho hacl
gone so far in friendly relations with his
country's natural enemies.
Gul Mahomed
was the leader of tlie anti-English party, and
as such bitterly opposecl to the Treaty of
1854. Two years after the signature of that
treaty Nasseer died under circumstances which
left little doubt that he had been murdered.
Gul Mahomed, of mliose appearance and character Mr. Masson gives the most unfavollrable
description, was the only man who would have
dared to take this extreme measure, and the
only one whose animosity towards the English
was su5ciently keen t o encourage him to incur
all the risk of putting himself, forward as
'
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their adversary. He told Mr. Masson that he
never saw or thought of an Englishman without blood coming to his eyes. This was the
man generally credited with being the murderer of Nasseer, and the minister under
whose auspices Khododad, the present Khan,
commenced his reign.
BIir Khododad Khan, youngest son of Mehrab, was born after his father's death in
1841. He was only fifteen years of age
when he succeeded his brother as Khan. Gul
Mahomed evidently expected that he would
be able to mould the character of this youth
to a fashion he approved of, and anticipated
little opposition to his plau for thwarting the
scheme lately formed for an Anglo-Belooch
alliance. The years which followed the signature of the Treaty of 1854 were apathetic ones
on our part. General Jacob's vigorous propositions were little heeded, and no advancs
of British troops took placo through the
Bolan. The petty chieftains of Beloochistm
and the intriguers of Khelat were thus left to
their own devices. They might quarrel between themselves, depose one ruler and create
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another, as much and as often as they chose.
The British Government concerned themselves
not therein, and regarded the whole affair with
indifference. But Gul Mahorned's power was
incommensurate with the scope of his designs.
The Sirdaw, whose position closely resembled
that of the Daimios of Japan before the late
reassertion of authority on the part of the
Mikado, paid but a grudging obedience to the
edicts of the Khan or his minister, and finally
set them a t defiance. Gul Mahomed had a
hard task to perform, and a t length it proved
too much for his strength. The force of circumstances was more than he coulcl resist.
This was the state of affairs in Khelat when
Khododad mounted the throne of his murdered
brother. On the one hand a dissatisfied people,
on the other a confederacy of turbulent chieftains; in the palace a party headed by an
ambitious and unscrupulous intriguer, in the
country no devotion tbw@rds the ruler, and
geheral discontent.at fobe tyranny, of the Sirdars.
Under these adverse circumstance~lwas Khododad, a mere boy, called upon to t k the
supreme place in the state. In the disunion

124

UENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

of the country the new Khan found an unexpected stability for himself. His importance was enhanced by the fact that the two
principal rival parties in the state were so
evenly balanced that the one which could employ his name with the greater show of right
was the one to which it seemed fortune would
finally incline. Gul Mahomed was the leader
of the one party, which, holding the " miri,"
or citadel, of Khelat, may be called the
Palace party; and Mir Khan, the powe~ful
Jam of Las Bela, the leader of tho other.
During the year 1867 several attempts were
made by the latter to seize the person of the
Khan, and it was only the arrival of Lieutenant Macaulay, of the Scinde Horse, which
prevented serious consequences accruing from
the excited state of the public mind. I n November 1857 Khododad, acting under the
advice of Major, the present Major-General
Sir Henry, Green, dismissed Gul Mahomed ;
and thus twelve months after this crafty and
ambitious minister had thought that the whole
game was in his hands, he found himself in disgrace and deprived of all powor. To Gul Ma-
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homed succeeded as Wazir Shahgassi Wali
Mahomed, who is still the most trusted of the
Khan's ministers.
But at this time the character of the young
Khan was still only partially formed. Capricious
in common with all Eastern potentates in his
likes and dislikes, he had not yet made up his
mind that his Tvisest policy would be to throw
himself heartily into the mms of the English.
He owed his elevation to a man whose antiBritish proclivities were notorious, and it is
not to be supposed that he could wholly escape
the contaminating influence of his example.
The Sirdars showed their indifference to his
authority by waging petty wars with each other.
Sarawan and Jhalawan revealed their mut,ual
hostility without equivocation, and the unfortunate ruler exhibited at once the weakness
and the irksomeness of a position of which he
was unable to fulfil the duties. I n 1860 the
Khan took the first active step towards making
his authority respected by Ieading an expedition against the chiefs on the borders of Mekran. The result was eminently satisfactory.
The disturbed districts were pacified, and many
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of the local Khans returned with the ruler to
Khelat. But the effect of this fit of resolution was nullified by an act of which it is impossible t o say anything save in terms of condemnation.
Khododad had been engaged in marriage to
the daughter of the leading Sirdar of Jllalawan, Taj Mahomed Zehai; but breaking off
from hi^ betrothal, which among the Brahooes
is a most serious engagement, he married in
1862 this chief's sister, and the widow of his
own brother. Not only did this give a great
shock to the national customs, but its effect was
aggravated by the circumstance that the lady
was the bitter foe of her brother. The powerful
baron at once plotted his revenge, and, being
joined by many others of his order, he headed
a revolution in 1863 for the purpose of deposing Khododad, and installing his cousin, Shere
dil Khan, in his place. The Khan was surprised in his camp near Qundava in Kachhi,
and compelled to flee into Scinde, where he
remained until the assassination of Shere dil
Khan by the captain of the body-guard in
May of the following year. The great Sirdar
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of Sarawan, Mollah Mahomed Raisani, then
stood forward as the champion of the cause
of Khododnd, who was soon reinstated in his
former position. The lull was not of long
duration, and a greater danger than any before
beset the Khan.
The Sirdars of Jhalawan and Barawan combined against him, and the two powerful magnates, whose names have been mentioned,
formed a plot, not only for his overthrow,
but also for his assassination. They were
not as successful as might have been expected. Mahomed Raisani escaped to Candahar, but his confederate, not so fortunate,
was taken prisoner, and died a t Khelat in
1867. The year 1865 continued to be full
of dangers to the newly returned Khan, for
scarcely had the rising just described been
repressed, than another and more carefully
organised rebellion broke out. The Jam of
Las Bela, who, as the husband of the Khan'a
sister, imagined that he had some chance of
obtaining supreme power, allied himaelf with
the chief of Wad& a place of some importance
between Khelat and Bela; and the Khan was

UENTRAJ',ASIAN PORTRAITS.

end such troops as he could
ooUect against these ambitious vassds. Fortune
smiled upon his arms. Their followers were
scattered, and they themselves were made prisoners, only to be pardoned and released by
their conqueror. The clemency of the ruler
found bnt an ill return, for three years afterwards the same Sirdam were again in open
rebellion, but the energy of the Khan foiled
their machinations.
I n the following year, however, the Khan
was hard pressed. A considerable force appeared before Khelat, and but for the tact of
the British Resident, Captain Hamison, who
arranged the difficulty, i t would probably
have gone hard with Khododed. A few
months afterrnards the Khan's troops were
completely victorious in art oncounter with tho
Jam's army, and that chief was glad to find
safety in flight. The credit of this decided
success was due t o tho Wartir Wali Mahomed,
mho led the Khan's troops in the field. Another
rising occurred in 18'71, and the same minister
took an active part in repressing it; but, unfortunately, the later portion of the campaign
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had to be entrusted to an incompetent officer,
and the rebels colltinuecl to cause disturbances
in Kachhi and round the Bolan. These repeated disorders, and the great danger which
they gave rise to for a11 those who tyaded between Scinde and Beloochistan, had reached
such a pass, the authority of the Khan being'
little more than nominal, that the Commissioner of Scinde, Sir William Meremether, on
the authority of the British Government,
intervened for the purpose of reconciling the
conflicting pretensions of Khan and 'Sirdars.
The result of the negotiations, mhich took
place at Jacobabad, should have been t o
satisfy the demands of the Sirdars, and to
consolidate the power and increase the authority of the Khan. But for some reason,
far from clear, Khododad mas not me11 content with the arrangement,, and did not hide
his dissatisfaction. His old civility to the
British Resident cooled, and hia trusted and
faithful Wazlir, Wali Mahorned, fell into disfavour. The latter mas obliged to flee for
safety to the British Residency; but, after
the Khan had been remonstrated with, the
9
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Wazir was reinstated in office if not in:
favour.
The anti-English party still retained considerable influence in the palace, Khododad's
mother and sister being its principal supporters. Although he had interviews with
Lord Northbrook at Sukhur in November
1872, and with the Scinde Commissioner a t
Shahpore in February of the following year,
it became clear that the Khan was more indifferent than had been supposed to the English alliance. He also conceived a personal
antipathy lor Major Emrison, and took into his
confidence inferior officials of bad character. A t
last things reached such s point that the British
oficer mas withdrawn, the allowance made t o
the Khan stopped, and the Waair Wali Mahomed
left the country to take refuge for a second
time within English territory, The ill humour
of the Khan did not confine itself to sentiment. It found expression in several raids
committed within the Scinde frontier; and in
1874 the border authorities tendered the advice
that a force should be sout to Ehelat to convinoe JKhododsd that we would not tolerate
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either apathy or a semi-hostile attitude on his
part. Lord Northbrook declined to sanction
this extreme measure. The Khan mas to be
left entirely to his own devices, and deprived
of the subsidy on which he had mainly depended; it being confidently anticipated that
in a short time he would have to come round
to his old line of policy.
I n 1815 he was compelled, by the necessities
of his position, to make overtures to us. His
chief Sirdars were on the eve of open rebellion, and without money the Khan could not
act vigorously against them. It was also said
that the Ameor of Afghanistan had ljhown
a disposition to profit by the severance of
friendly relations with the Indian Government
to advance the old claims of the Durania
over the Khan of Khelat. But whatever the
causes, Khododad is again found in friendly
aommunication with the Scinde authorities 'in
1876, and Major Sandeman's negoti t'lone rest~ltedin an arrangement which appears t o
have placed the relations betweeu England
and Khelat on a basis of permanent amity.
The military occupation of Quettah, the paoi9 "
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fication of the Bolan m d its vicinity, and
the installation of the Khan as one of the
feudatories of the Indian Empire, all mark the
events since 1876 as being of a character entirely different from those that occurred before
that year. They also conclusively prove that
the day has passed by when the idiosyncrasy
of the Khelat ruler was a matter of prime importance. He has taken his place in the ranks
of those native luminaries who surround the
throne of the Empress of India, and his principal diatinct;ion will probably consist in being
regarded as among the most faithful of the
native princes.
But it has not always been so, and this
slight sketch of his career may have served to
show that there have been times when he
thought that his true policy was one of hostility, and not of friendship, to this country. The
old dreams of ambition are abandoned; and
with the recognition of a practical necessity, the
figure of Khododad has lost much of its romantic
proportions. As an independent prince he vas
a pictuilesque personage enough. I n many respects he was not much above the level of an
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untamed savage, but the traditions which the
Brahoo warrior inherited sufficed to elevate him
to a higher pedestal. It should also be remembered that the time may come when he may be
anxious t o change his new-found sense of security for the old game of chance, in which, if
there was greater risk, there was certainly less
irksomeness. His Sirdars have evinced still
more satisfaction than he has at the new
arrangements-a
fact which is at the least
conducive to their stability; and with each
year's continued tranquillity the probability of
disturbance decreases. The personal character
of the Khan becomes a matter of less importi
ance, and while the Indian Empire can boast
of one great vassal the more, it is a circumstance of practical significance that the addition of his estates to our Empire hns made
us the immediate neighbour of the Persian
kingdom.
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THE political power of the ruler of Ehiva
having practically disappeared, and the hold
of Russia on the state being much more distinct in form than is the case with Bokhara, it
is both difficult and unnecessary to say much
concerning a ruler who, although representing
the oldest dynasty in Turkestan, possesses little
or no individuality. If it were permissible to
devote our attention to the past history of the
monarchs of Khwaresm, or if it entered into
the prorillce of this work to give a detailed
account of the last Russian war with Ehivn,
this sketch would, of course, expand to a, much
greater bulk than we contemplate, our object
,
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being simply to narrate in a fern words the
career of the present Khan.
Mallomed Rahim Bahadur Khan succeeded
his father as Khan of Khiva in tho year 1866.
I n Khiva, alone among Mahornedan countries,
the rights of primogeniture exist. They are a
relic of theiy Mongol ancestry. The present
ruler is the eleventh in lineal descent of the
same family, and, so far as can be ascertained,
he was born in or about the year 1849. On
corning to the throne he appears to have taken
the reina of power into his hands at once,
without submitting to the tutelage of any ambitious official. An English officer* who had
an interview with him describes him as looking
.about eight and twenty in 1875. He is taller
than the average of his subjects, CC being quite
-6ve feet ten in height and strongly built." On
the whole his personal appearance t e h in his
favour and is very pleasing. In fact he may
be said to have velny prepossessing manners,
and the traveller j1.t quoted says that the

" Major Burnaby in ('A Rido t o Ehive."
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Spanish expression mz6y sinpafico (very engaging) may be applied to him. And despite
the stories that used to be current in Russian
circles of his cruelty towards prisoners, there
is a collcurrence of evidence that not only was
he a good-natured man in private life, and
considerate in his dealings with his subjects,
but that he also treated both his personal and
national enemies with generosity.
As regards the latter, the testimony of the
Ruseian subjects who were detained in lUliva
should be conclusive. There were twenty-one
of these prisoners surrendered on the eve of
the Expedition in 1873. The narrative of their
enforced residence at Khiva proved highly interesting, from the fact that some of them had
been captives for several years. Most of them
had been captured by the Kirghiz on the Emba
steppe, and had been carried off to Khiva t o
be sold. There they ha'd been purchased by
the Khan for his own use, and he appears to
have employed them, for the most. part, as
gardeners in his pala,ce outside the walls of the
t o m . It is to this spot that he retires during
the months of June and July; and hero at that
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season of the year the Court is held in the
open air undey tlie shade of fruit-trees and of
vines. The gardens have been described as
laid out in perfect order, and mincing much
better taste than could be expected of a Central Asian ruler. This is, no doubt, to be
attributed to the example and labours of
these Russian prisoners, and it may
ably be snpposed that the Khivans, after their
departure, imitated their labours and strove to
keep the gardens in the state of efficiency
to which the Russian labourers had raisect
them.
At first the Russian prisoners were subjected
to the same treatment as the Persian slaves,
.which was none of the most lenient. Their
diet mas limited, and harsh usage was resorted
t o with the object of making them become
Mussulmans. But in a short time this came
to the ears of the Khan, and he at once put a
stop to it, declarhg that no one shoulct be
compelled t o change his religion. If the Russian slaves were to .be converted, they must be
so of their own free will. He also appears to
have taken measures for the alleviation of their

138

UENTRAL ASIAN POICTRAITS.

hardships, and on numerous occasions they
affirmed that he used to enter into goodhumoured conversation with them. These tributes Lo the personal kindliness of the Khan are
of particular value, as they were made a t a time
when it required great strength of mind on the
part of a Russian subject to say anything in
favour of the Khivan ruler, who, in official
despatches and newspapers, was held forth t o
public obloquy as a, monster of cruelty and
brutality.
The political career of the Ehan may be
.said to have commenced with those disturbances
caused by the Ilirghiz attempting to shake off
the authority of Russia. These risings culminatecl in the attacks on the chain of posts in
tlie Uralsk region in 1869, but within a few
months after the chief success of the insurgents the Russians were congratulating themselves that all the danger had passed away.
This was not due to their energy or to the
skill of their combinations ; but was accounted
for simply by the fact that the movement, lacking a head, had died out of its own accord.
I n these events Mahomecl Ehan had played but
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a minor part. Khiva, indeed, held towards the
Kirghiz of that clay much the same relation
that lklerv does at the present t o the Turcomans; but its Khan had extended to the
enemies of Russia only a benevolent sympathy, and not an active support. Before
this period the Khan hacl receivecl communications from General Kaufmann redpecting the
raids carried on by Erghiz, who, crossing the
$yr Darya, had onterea Russian territory.
The replies sent by the Khan's orders to
these representations were couched in a
haughty tone. The offenders were subjects
of Khivn, and consequently under his jurisdiction alone; but the mids continued. But
gradually the tone of his letters became more
ai*gumentative,and the dispute changed into a
frontier question. The appearance of the Russians on the eastern shore of the Caspian had
much t o do with this change, and the founclation of ~ a s n o v o d s kby Colonel Stoletoff was a
menace to Khiva, to which the Khan could not
show himself indifferent. Tho year 18'70 witnessed an outbreak on a still larger scale than
that which had occurred dulling the provioue
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year. The Khan took a more active share in
the war. It was his emissaries who stirred up
both Kirghiz and Turcomans to a joint effort
for the expulsion of the Russians ; and he sent
a small body of Khivan troops to their assistance.
A t first fortune smiled on theiy enterprise,
and the result was sufficiently encouraging to
show horn different the result of all these Central Asian wars might have been had the defenders of their country been possessed of
better weapons. In the vicinity of Mangishlak the Kirghiz were most energetic. A Russian detachment under the command of Colonel
Rukin was surprised and cut to pieces. The
officer in command shot himself" when he saw
there was no hope left, and a few of the soldiers were sent as prisoners to Khiva. The
Kirghiz followed up this success by attacking
several of the Russian posts on the Caspian.
The Nicolai station was burnt, some light-

* This act shows that the traditions of their Tartar
origin are still a vital force among the Russians. A
Manchu soldier woulcl probably have done the same,
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ships were destroyed, and a vigorous attack was
made on the fort at Novo-Alexaudrovsk. The
fort was on the point of surrendering to the
assailants when reinforcements arrived from
the Caucasus, and hhe Kirghizi were repulsed.*
Military demonstrations on a small scale served
to keep the f-rontier tranquil, and the friendly
Kirghiz more than neutralised those of a hostile disposition. The only question that remained to be treated was the chastisement
of Khiva.
Various projects had been formed and approved of for the invasion of Khiva and the
punishment of its Khan. I n 1870 the Czar had
given his formal consent to a plan submitted
by General Kaufmann for the despatch of an
expedition against Khiva ; but various circum~tancesprevented its being carried into effect.
Although deferred, the design was not abandoned; and the Ameer of Bokhara at tempted

. * Ton Eelwald asserts that the fort waEl taken and
destroyed, the garrison being put to the sword. Eis information was, however, incorrect.
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to mediate betmeen the disputants. His overtures mere not received in good part at Khive,
where it mas held that the dignity of the Khan
demanded that the negotiations should be
carried on mith the Governor-General himself.
The years 1871 and 1872 were passed in these
idle negotiations on the one hand, and in active
milital~ypreparations on the part of Russia on
the other. The Kh'an took alarm a t the steady
concentration of troops upon his borders, and
thinlcing that these hostile measures were due
solely to the ambitious desires of the authorities
et Tashkent., endeavoured to enter into negotiations with those at Orenburg and Tiflis. The
move mas an astute one, but it camo too
late. Tho m v a n expedition must be carried
ant. The Khanate, which was identified with
every Russian reverse in the past, must feel
tehe weight of Russia's hand. I n his distress
the Khan sent an envoy to India entreating
British assistance. He was told the wisest
thing his master could do would be to make
pefice with Russia, obey her demands, and give
no cause for further dissatisfaction." Considering what Kaufmann wanted, Mahomed
((
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Khan* may well hme exclaimed, on receiving
that message of cold comfort, " But how ? "
In the year 1873 everything was in readiness for an advance upon Khiva. The difficulty of the campaign was known to consist in
the task of getting there ; so the strategists of
Tashkent were busily engaged in selecting
march-routes, and in deciding on positiolls
for depbts. Their claims to the title of stmtegists would appear doubtful in the eyes of
generals a t Berlin, because when these details
had been carefully arrasged they were all
changed a t a moment's notice in order that
an officer? might qualify for a decoration. It
is unnecessary to follow the course of this campaign further than to say that in April 1878

* Controversial politics are excludecl from these pages
as much as possible ; but the historical student will
derive instruction from contrasting the policy followed
in 1872 with that adopted in 185940. In thosc ysars
English officer^, Abbott and Shakespeare, were the liberators of Russian slaves at Khivs. I n 1872 we could only
advise submission to Ruasian dictation.
t General Troitzky, e bungling officer, who nea~lymet
with disaster during tho Kholiandim war at Andijm,
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everything -gas in readiness for the march, and
on the 29th of Nay the Russian force arrived
on the right bank of the Oxus. In five days
General Kaufmann's division had crossed t h a t
river, jvhich divides Western Asia, into two
distinct regions, differing in polity and race,
and the destinies of which have been, and
should always be, smayed by different circumstances.
The preparations made by Mahomed Khan
appear to have been feeble in the extreme.
Solne slight attempt was made to defend the
crossing of the Oxus, but of so insignificant a
imture that a few hours' bombardment sufficecl to ovel-come it. He seems to have indulged the hope that the surrender of the
Rnssian prisoners rno~lldhave turned aside the
wrath of their Government. He wrote a t this
time, " If you want anything else, say so ; according to our ability we will fulfil it." The
advance of the Muscovite battalions was not t o
be stayed, and on the 10th of June Khiva fell
into the hands of the Russians. A treaty of
peace 7vns concluded with Mahomed Khan,
who threw himself upon the generosity of h i ~ i
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conquerors, and after remaining a few months
in oocupetion the Russian army withdrew.
The most important of the terms exacted
were-the
cession of the territory on the
right bank of the Oxus, the surrender to
Russia of the exclusive right to navigate the
river, and the abolition of slavery, in adciition to the imposition of a heavy war indemnity, and the disbandment of the whole of
the Khan's armed forces. These terms made
Khiva a vassal state. She is far more powerless in the hands of Russia than the Nizam
or any of the Mahratta states is in those of
England.
Since that year the Khan, who is of an easygoing disposition, has become more and more
subservient t o the Czar. He lives happily, it
is said, on his private income, and of late that
income has been steadily increasing. One of
his brothers is in a Russian cavalry regiment.
Many of his relations and former ministers are
to be met in the palaces of Moscow and St.
Petersburg, whither, in a few short years, the
present Khan may very possibly proceed to
join them. Every day makes it more and more
10
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probable that the Khans of Central Asia will
develop into Russian noblemen, and that men,
whose hands are now only beginning to drop
the reins of power, will disappear from the
scene on which they might have played so
bold a part, to take their place among those
descendants of ancient or forgotten heroes, of
whom Prince Tchinghia* is, if not the most
prominent, certainly tho most remarkable.
Among these Mahomed Rahim Khan, a descendant in another line of the greatest of
conquerors, will be, for the sake of historical
association, not the least noticeable.
--

-- - -

* This prince is the son of the last Khan of the Bukeief
Horde, who assisted the Russian Government very much
in their denlings mith the Hbghi~.
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'WHENRussia began to make her way from
$he almost impenetrable forests of the ancient
Scythia in search of more favoured provinces,
,she entered upon a. course of which the initial
:stage involved the overcoming of the natural
diffic~~lties
presented by the vast expanse of
steppe land which stretclied beyond her filontier. But sparse as was the herbage, and
limited as were the productions of " that'great
sea of moorland," as it has been called, there
wore scattered over i t in all directions myriads
of nomad tribes, mho, wandering as a rule without any further object in viem than the search
for pasturage, had sometimes, in past times, produced conquerors of the first order, and given
10
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kings and dynasties to the states of Central
Asia. With these G g h i z tribes Russia had,
at an early stage of her mission, established relations, which were far from being altogether
of an unfi*iendly character. But when the
Czars of Muscovy began to encroach beyond
the Urd, tronbles naturally ensued, for they
mere advancing into the camping-grounds of a
people whose passionate love of freedom had
impelled tbem to leave their origind and more
favoured abode for one less advantageous near
the Russian frontier. The relations of Russia
with the three Hordes of the Kirghiz cannot
be discussed here, although the theme would
be a most interesting one; for the Russians encountered, during the one hundred and
forty years that they were engaged in overpowering them, a more gallant resistance than
any they have since met with. It is our immediate object to sketch the career of one who
was the latest, if not the most remarkable, of
the robber chieftains of the steppe.
I n the year 1824 the Russian Government
had changed the principle upon which it had
hitherto gone in its dealings with the Kirghiz.
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Their country mas then divided into three districts, and over each a Sultan Regent was
appointed. But the Russian authorities bun,.
gled the arrangements most grievously. Their
regents were men of no mark, and the tribes
paid little attention to rulers who were nothing
more than Russian officers. The heart of the
people still went with their Khans, leaders
whose claims to authority had come down to
them from remote generations, and it only
required one of these to set himself up as an
independent chieftain to bring to his banner
hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of Kirghiz warriors. Some, indeed, of these Sultan
Regents were Khans themselves, but when this
was the case they were generally to be found
at the head of the revolts against Russian rule.
Several of these have obtained a permanent
place in history, and among them may bo mentioned the great chiefs Syrym and Kenisar.
But the subject of this memoir was neither
a Sultan Regent by rank nor a, Khan by
birth. He was essentially an adventurer who
rose to prominence by dint of daring. Izzet
Kutebar, the son of Kutebar the celebrated
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robber chief of an earlier day, was born about,
the commencement of the present century. He
assisted his father in several of his enterprises,
and when on his father's death he became the
most prominent man of his clan, he had already
won a considerable reputation among his fellow
tribesmen. In 1822his earliest exploit, the plundering of a large Bolrharan caravan, had marked
him out as one of moi*ethan ordinary audacity,
and in the years following, down to 1842, he
had showti remarkable daring in carrying on
raids within Russian territory, both upon the
Kirghiz settlements, Cossack posts, and Russian caravans. At the moment when the
English officei-s, Abbott and Shakespear,
were residing at Khiva, this chieftain mas a t
the zenith of his success as a leader of B marauding bancl. Neither tho energy nor the
rewards of the Russian authorities availed t o
circumvent the deeply laid schemes of this
astute partizan. In 1544, however, he appears
to have arrived at the conclusion that it would
be better to come to a pacific understanding
with the Russians, more especially as General
Peroffsky mas beginning t o show signs of that
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activity which in a few years carried Russian
arms to the Aral and the Jaxartes. Por a
short time he even played the part of informer
for the Russian officials, and gave them considerable information concerning the state of
affairs at Khiva. He ingratiated himself with
one of the Sultan Regents, who, believing in his
sincerity, obtained a golcl medal from St. Petersburg as a reward for his proffered
services.
Before, however, this medal arrived from
Europe, Izzet had thrown off the mask of
friendship which he had assumed, ancl again
figured as the terror of the steppe. Tho gold
medal was reserved for some more deserving
recipient."
Up to this point, I ~ z e tKutebar had been
simply i successful leader of robbers. ,He,

The facts are far from clear. Rcference i~ made to
this circumstance by Vambery and the Messrs. Michell.
Prof. Gregorieff, in his acrimonious criticism of the
formcr's History of Bokhara," curtly says that ('Vambery has no idea of what he is talking of when he speaks
of the gold medal given to Eutebrtrof." Certainly the
Sultan Regent, Bai Mahorned, obtained one f o him
~ from
the St. Petershurg authorities.
('
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bad been, as he has been called by one English writer, the Rob Roy of the Steppe. The
reputation which he had acquired by his SUCcesses in this character stood him in good
stead when he aspired to play a greater and a
nobler part. At the least it always brought
men to his standard. No young Kirghiz brave
mas loth to foIlow the Knight of the Steppeanother of the titles which have been bestowed
upon this chief-whether the enterprise in hand
were the pInndering of a caravan, the surprise
of a convoy, or a sudden attack upon one of the
numerous Russian blockhouses which dotted
tho Kirghiz steppe in all directions. From the
year 1847 until 1853, events progressed much
after this fashion. The Kirghiz leader was no
longer compelled to seek refuge each year in
remote Khiva, but found that he was perfectly
safe from the Russian attempts at pursuit in
the northern portion of the Ust Urt plateau.
In 3 853 the capture of the Khokandian fort of
Ak Musjid raised the reputatlion of Russia t o
a higher point than ever among the Kirghiz,
and many of them were not much distressed
at the blow which had been inflicted upon the
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Khokandian Government. But Izzet Kutebar
held aloof. He had not even cared to conceal
his hostility towards the Russians while Peroffsky's expedition was in progress. By his influence several of the Ilirghiz clalls had been
induced to decline to assist the Russian commander; and whon Ak Musjid had been taken
and a Khokandian relieving army defeated, it
was resolved that active measures should be
adopted for his chastisement. I n 1854 a force
was sent in pursuit of him, and for the first
and last time Izzet was surprised and taken
prisoner. This was, apparently, accomplished
i n an unfair manner, for the Russian commander had previously promised him a safeconduct to a conference. However, Izzet,
on the strength of that agreement, and after
making numerous promises of amendment, was
permitted to depart.
Instead of being overcome with the generosity of his enemy, Kutebar saw in the infringement of the understanding an additional
reason for resentment. He threw himself into
the arms of the Khan of Khiva and openly set
the Russians at defiance. He appealed to all
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of Kirghia race to join in the wal* against the
infidel. He issued proclamations, the ring of
which would have roused a frenzy throughout
the steppe that c o d at an earlier day have
only been appeased after severe fighting. His
war-cry went the round of the auls, and in each
Xbitka it could not fail to rouse feelings that
merc dormant rather than extinct. '' Steeds
and arms they have; have we not the like 3
Are me not a.s numerous as the sands of the
ocean ? Wheresoever ye turn-whether tomaTds
the east or the west, or towa~dsthe north o r
t h e ~011th-ye surely find Kirghiz. Wherefore, then, should me submit to a handful of
~ltraugers? "
His boldness met with its just recompense.
The first successes in the desultory war which
ensued were his. H e routed a mixed body of
Kirghiz and Cossacks sent against him. A larger
force mas despatched against him. He eluded
it, and carried on depredations in its rear. He
was on the shores of the Caspian one week;
the next he was on the steppe. At one time
he and his band escaped by retreating through
a sandy morass, over which the Russians
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could not march ; at another, when surrounded
by three cletachments, he passed through one
of the intervening spaces at night-time. When
the Russians thought they had the prize in
their hands, he slipped between their fingers,
and mas gone. There could, of course, be only
one end t o this warfare, but the process was
exhausting, and the officials of the Czai- grew
sick of the pursuit of one who seemed to be
intangible. The year 1855 closed, too, with a,
complete success for him. He swprisod on the
Temir river a small band of Cossacks and Kirghiz allies, all of mhom, with the exception of
one Cossack who escaped wounded, were
slain.
Although Kutebar himself always succeedod
in escaping, the Kirghiz sugered greatly. Ths.
great mass of his kinsmen had remained in-.
different to his appeals, and had given the.
Russians active assistance. During the years
1856 and 1857 his places of refuge were becoming fewer and fewer, his followers were
dwindling in numbers and growing fainter in
spirit. On the other hand, the Russim pursuit was as keen as ever. I n his last extres
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mities he had filled up the wells to retard the
Russian movements, but this desperate remedy
compelled him to seek other camping-places,
some of which were near the Russian line of
forts. I n one of them he was surprised, and
escaped only with a few followers. The Russians had recovered from the Crimean war,
and their tlvoops mere concentrating in greater
force on the Syr Darya. The heart had been
taken out of the Kirghiz. Their pomers of
resistance were insignificant, and even the
voice of Izzet Kutebar failed to bring any force
around him. It was at this stage that the
Governor-General of Orenburg, General Katenin, offered him honourable terms, which he
at once accepted, and in 1859 Izzet Kutebar
became a respected guest at St. Petersburg.
The life of this Kirghiz leader forms one
episode in that silent warfare which ha^ been
carried on witho~ztany intermission, during a
century ancl a half, between the Russians and
the nomads of the steppe. It clearly shows that
these people had aspirations much higher than
those with which they have been credited. It
was Russia mhich commenced the war, ossen-
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tially one of aggression. A position-inviting
attack-was taken up within the Kirghia zone,
':not for a day, not for a year, but for ever,"
as the Russian proclamations love to express
the Czar's ~ a t e r n a l affection for his new
peoples. It was in vain that the Kirghiz hurled
themselves against a barrier which was impenetrable to their puny efforts. They did not
fail wholly because they had no worthy leaders,
for they had several; but because they were
too disunited to combine. Of those leaclers,
Izzet Kutebar was the mall who, with means
quite insignificant, did most for the preservation of his independence. He was a, born
leader of men, and may be considerecl to have
had in him the makings of one of those great
soldiers of which the soil of Asia has in past
times been most prolific.
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ABDEBEAHMAN (BARUCKBYE).

LEADING
at present the life of an exila in Russian territory, banished from his country and
removed from the sphere of active politics,
Abderra1lman, or Abdul Rahman, Khan, the son
of Afzul the eldest of all the sons of Dost
Mahorned, is far too important an individual to
be excluded from the portrait gallery of Central
Asian celebrities. Eleven years have passed
away since he. succumbed to fate on the field
of Tinah Khan, but although he has sunk into
the obscurity of a Russian pensioner, his career
has very probably not yet reached its conclusion, and it is certain that the people of one
portion of Afghanistan still look t o him as their
natural leader, This is due partly to his great
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talents, and partly to the fact that when his
party was victorious he imitated neither the
indolence of his father nor the tyranny of his
uncle Azim.
Of his early life little or nothing is known.
He is said to have been born about the year
1830, and to have taken part in the second
campaign in the Punjab, when &bar crossed
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In 1863 the death of Dost Maholned mas the
signal for the outbreak of dist~urbances,which
in the following year developed theuselves ill
civil war. The first campaign between Shere
Mi, the rightful Ameer, and his elder brother
Afzul, closed with the discomfiture of the latter,
who was nothing loth to come to an understanding with his successful brother, A truce
was accordingly negotiated between them at
Balkh, and while Afz11.1swore fealty to Shere
Ali on the Koran, the latter took a similar
oath that Afzul's liberty should not be interfered with, This reconciliation lasted but a
short time, and it is said that this was due
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satisfied with the surrender of his father's pretensions. Be that as it may, the tranquillity of
the camp at Balk11 was very soon disturbed by
the arrest of Mzul and the flight of Abdemahman. While Shere Ali returned with his captive brother to Cabul in order to encounter the
rebels in other quarters of the state, Abderrahman fled for safety to Bokhara, where
he met with a kind reception. He remained
there until after Shere Ali had defeated Ameen
at Kujhbaz and driven Azim into English territory; but when he perceived Shere Ali, far
from following up his successes, to be sunk in a
state of apathy at Candahar, he crossed the
Oxus with an irregular force and easily established his authority in Balkh.
Abderrahman's success north of the Hindoo
Koosh did not snffice to rouse Shere Ali to a
sense of the dangers which surrounded him.
With Cabul as well as Candahar in his possession, he remained apparently of opinion that
the moment for re-establishing his authority in
the outlying portions of the state might be
deferred until a more convenient season. Abderrahman measured the situation more cor-

I

rectly. H e saw the fatal mistake the Ameer
was making in his delusion as to the stability
of his, own power, and he resolved to take
prompt measures for deriving the greatest possible benefit from tlie blunders of his rival.
H e struck hard and he struck quick. In
February 1866 he had been joined by Azim,
and was in the close neighbourhood of Cz~bul,
beld a t that time by Ibrahim, Shere Ali's second
son. On the 2nd of March the city surrendered,
and Azim was installed arJ temporary ruler.
This success was followed up by a decided
victory a t Shaikhabad, of which the immediate
consequences were the release of Afzul and
the capture of Ghizni. Afzul then became the
recognised Ameer a t Cabul, and his son was
looked upon as the Hotspur of the confederacy.
His right to this title was shown still more
conclusively a t the crowning victory of Ehelati-Ghiljie in the early part of 1867.
Neither Maul nor Azim was proof against
his unexpected good fortune. The former,
proclaimed Alneer in the Bala Hissar, and recognised as such by the Indian Government,
degenerated into a drunkard, and his death was

11

162

CENTRAL ASIAN POBTRAITB;

peoipitated, if it was not caused, by the excesses which he committed after his release
from confinement. Aaim, without copying the
indolent vices of his brother, had also become
a petty tyrant. Much of his brother's faults
be traced to his influence, and in the
distribution of the chief posts, he secured the
most important for himself and his son. Several of the leading men in the country were
cast into prison by his orders, and one of
the most notable was put to death. Matters
became atill worse after Afzul's death. There
was a critical molnent when it seemed as if Abderrahman would refuse to recognise his uncle a s
Ameer. By a violent exercise of his will, however, he suppressed his personal feelings and
took a formal oath of 'allegiance to his uncle.
But he quitted Cabul in disgust, and retired
to Afghan Turkestan, with the administration
of which province his uncle entrusted him.
While discontent with the authority of Aaim
was rendering the most able of Shere Ali's opponents less enthusiastic in his cause, the latter
unfortunate ruler was making another effort f o r
the recovery of his rights with the aid of fresh
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troops from Herat, and the then untried abilities of his younger son Yakoob. After his victory on the Helmund, and the flight of Bairn's
son from Candahar, it beoame necessary for
Azim to collect all the forces within reach, and
Abderrahlnan was accordingly requested to
hurry up with his troops from Balkh. Yakoob
Khan was, however, too quick for him. By
forced marches from Ghizni he reached Bamian
first, and there inflicted a severe defeat on
Abderrahman. I n the winter campaign of
3868, the latter was not more fortunate, being
signally defeated by Yakoob at Tinah Khan.
The civil war closed with that battle. Azim
and Abderrahman escaped by Washir to
Meshed, whence the latter travelled through
the steppe of the Teke Turcomans to Urgentch
C h i v a ) ." * From that place he went on to
Bokhara, whence he wrote to General Kauf mann, requesting permission to reside within
Rnssian territory. Abderrahman was accorded
((

* Another version i~lthat he fled to Ball&, an? thence ,
to Bokhara. Anim died on the road between Seistan and
Xeshed.
11

*
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a friendly reception, but all his requests for
assistance either in arms, men, or moral ssupport, for the purpose of making war afresh in
Afghanistan, were rejected. Instead of complying with these demands, the Russian Government allotted him a pension of twenty-five
thousand roubles a year, and Mr. Schuyler
has told us that for the last nine yeam he has
been living upon one-fifth of his allowance, If
so, he must have saved during that period
close upon two hundred thousand roubles, the
significance of this fact consisting in the circumstance that in 1872 he told General Kaufmann he could raise up an insurrection in
Afghanistan if half that sum were given to
him.
During the eleven years that he has now
spent in enforced exile, it is quite possible that
Abderrahman may have deteriorated in mental
vigour. Something of the sickness of despair
must h&e weakened hiEt resolution. Mr.
Schuyler's description of him conveys a very
.favourable impression of his force of character ;
.but then that was several yearEt ago and may be
no longer applicable. Assuming, however, that
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Abderrahman still retains his old energy,
there is little doubt that he has from the first
greatly exaggerated his influence with the
Bfghans. He was much in the habit of declaring that he had only to come forward t o
bring the whole population to his side, and
that Shere Ali's endeavours to prevent his name
being mentioned in Cabul did but make people
think the more about him. These random
assertions had very little foundation in fact. It,
is true that Abderrahman had done nothing like.
his father and uncle to alienate popular sentiment; but then he was comparatively an unknown man. His reputation as a ~oldier,which,
had at one time been considerable, had paled
before that of his cousin Yakoob. There is not,
the slightest reason for believing that the.
Afghan people, who have no great affection
for any of the Barucksye House, reserve.
any special regard for the son of Afzul. He,
practically speaking, vanished from their mind
after his defeat at Tinall Khan.
B u t if in the eyes of the Afghan people he
counts for little, it is different in the special
province which was entrusted during many
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years to his charge. I n Turkestan, from Balkh
ko Badakshan, his influence is considerable. As
governor he is remembered as the best of t h e
last generation. The exactions of his uncle,
Paiz Mahorned, are still the highest contrast
t o the moderation of Abderrahman. As soldiers
the Usbegs took a personal interest in his successes, and sy~npathisadwith him in his defeats,
for it was they who fought and bled under
him. Since his flight, too, an additional motive
has been given for their affection by his marriage mith the daughter of Jehandir Shah, exc h i d of Baclakshan. For these reasons Abderrallman could, no doubt, collect a considerable
force in this region, and probably establish
his authority in Afghan Turkestan. The
first step has already bcen taken in such an
enterprise by the success of his mife's near
relation, Mir Baba, who has ousted Shere Ali's
nominee f-rom Fa,izabsd, and is now the de
facto ruler of Badakshan. I n this fact lies
Abderrahmaa's importance, and his value to
Russia depends on the same circumstance.
More than that, the man who can, without
foreign aid, firmly establish his power in any
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one portion of what is known as Afghanistan,
is one who must be taken into serious account,
for his influence might in a short time become
lconsiderable in the other portions of the state.
H e might even aspire to play the part of a
national champion ; and certainly, ~ 4 t Abderh
rahman in possession of Balkh and his close
.ally installed at Faizabad, there moula be no
peace of mind for the chief of Gab~zl, even
khough he were under the shadow of British
protection.*

* Since the preceding pages were mritten, the descrip-&ionof General Eaufmam's entry (17th November) into
Tashkent on his return from Europe has reached us.
Prominent among those waiting to receive him mas Abderrahman Khan, who is represented as looking aged and
obese.
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KHUDAYAR KHAN.

'

OF all the states of Central Asia, none has
been more unfortunate in modern times than
the state of Khokand. It was unfortunate in
its internal affairs before the Russians had begun
that career of conquest, in and beyond the
country of the Kirghiz, which was ultimately
to carry their banners in triumph t o the banks
of the Oxus and the slopes of the Hindoo
Koosh. Civil feud and foreign aggression had
both left their mark upon the history of a country that was youngest among the independent
states of Turkestan. I t s borders had expanded
or shrunk in accordance with the character of
the ruler, and although independence had generally been the right of the hardy hillmen of
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Khokand, Namaagan, and Andijan, it had sometimes happened that even a wise ruler had
been unable to maintain those positions on the
Syr Darya, which gave him a secure frontier
towarcis Bokhara, and which sufficed to maintain
his reputation sufficiently to enable him to rejoice in his rights as suzerain over the people
of Karategin, Shahr-i-sebz, and Kitab. With
the rulers of Khiva and Bokhara, the Russians
had not been too proud in times past to maintain a n intercourse, which might have justified
the belief in their eyes that they were tho
equals of the Czar, but with Khokand there
had been no such condescension. When Goneral
Peroff sky found his victorious campaigns over
the Kirghiz consummated, but had, through untoward circumstances, to leave the crowning
of his successes to those who came after him,
Russia was brought face to face with the new
power of Khokand, whose political existence
had been scarcely less brief or uncertain than
its military fame. The career of the man whose
name is placed at the head of this memoir, includes all this period, which comprises the old
and the new in Central Apian history, the time
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when Russia was not a Central Asian power a t
all, and also that when her word was supreme
in d l things. It is quite true thzt, SO far as
practical politics aye concerned, Khndayar
Khan's influence has passed amay, but his
reign, as embracing a longer period than that
of auy other ruler in Central Asia, is well worth
attention. A sketch of it will certainly repay
perusal.
For some years-those critical ones which
witnessed the first appearance in the Khanates
of British officers-Khokand enjoyed the rule
of a wise and astute prince, Mahomed Ali
Xhnu, not less renowned for his skill in war
than his beneficence in peace.
I n the yeall 1842 Mahomed Ali was taken
prisoner in war and executed by his bitter foe
Nasrullah of Bokhara. I n the confusion which
broke out after his death, his cousin, Shere
Ali Khan, was proclaimed ruler; and he in turn
was succeeded by his younger sou Khudayar.
The real arbiter of the state was, however, the
minister Mussulman Kuli, a Kipchak chief.
During ten years Khudayar tranquilly ruled the
country, mainly through the ability of his
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minister ; but in 1853, the same year that witnessed the appearance of Izzet Kutebar, the
Eirghiz chief, the Khan, chafing--as jealous
despots often chafe at the restraints iinposed
upon their caprices by their wisest advisers-at
his Vizier's expostulations, intrigued against
him. He even availed himsclf of the feud
between Eipchak and Kirghiz to crush more
effectus~llythe man to whom he omed liis throne.
Mussulman Kuli was m~srderedby his orcier.
Prom that year things in Khokand went
from bad to worse. There were fresh intrigues, under the guidance of another chief,
drove
Alim Kuli, who on several o~cr~sions
Khudayar into exile. The only one to survive
these constant changes in the person of the
ruler of the state, these palace brawls, and this
civil strife, was Khudayar himself. Binally,
however, the death of Mussulman Kuli, and
t h e outbreak of the strife for which that
event was the signal, marked the crisis in the
fate of Khokand. Those occurrences paved
the way for an easy Russian triumph, and for
the incorporation of the Khanate in the Russian
empire.
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The Russians followed up their successes
over the E r g h i 5 by making a direct attack
upon the territory of Khokand. They attacked
a n d took in the year 1859 the Khokandian
fortress of Chulak Kurgan, eighty miles southeast of Fort Peroffsky, and two years later
o n they also seized Yany Kurgan, fifty miles
nearer Khokand. After another interval of t h e
same length an advance was made on a larger
scale against the town of Turkestan, near t h e
Syr Darya, and also against Auliata in the Kirghiz country north of tho Karn Tau mo~zntaine.
Both of these operations had to be postponed
until the following year on account of the outbreak of the rising in Poland. In 1864, however,
they were carried out with complete success,
and the t v o towns mentioned fell into the possession of the Russians, while the intermediate
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country with its line of forts shared the same
fate. This was the first important success of
tho Russians in Central Asia. They had remained inactive during ten years; they were
now t o reap the full benefit of the preparations
they had been so diligently preparing. T h e
credit of these successes belongs to Genera13
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Tchernaieff, who completed the task which Peroffsky had commenced. The eventful campaign of 1864 did not, however, close with
these triumphs.
The town of Tchimkent, which forms the
apex of a triangle of which a line drawn from
the city of Turkestan to Auliata would be t h e
base, was the next defence of Khokand on t h e
north ; and no effort was spared in making it
as strong as ciroumstances would permit. A
garrison of ten thousand men was left in it,
and it was also fairly provided with a~.tillery.
Tchernaieff, reoognising the importance of this
place, and the danger whioh might arise from
the presence of so large a hostile force in his
neighbourhood, resolved to attaokit, and, if possible, s e i ~ eit by a coup de main. He delivered
his attack with remarkable skill and boldness,
and despite the courage of the garrison, who
fought with great determination, and were skilfully handled during the earlier part of the day,
the town and fortress were carried at, what may
be called, a rush.
The Khokandians did not sucoumb under t h e
intelligence that Tohimkent had fallen. Their
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national existence was at stake. They resolved
to defend it manfully. The fortifications of Tashkent were repaired. A large army was hurriedly
collected and pushedformrd to that town, and
the regent A i m Kuli and his lieutenants took
every precautian in their power to avert m ovepthrow. Again Tchernaieff thought there was
prudence in audacity, and that by dealing an
equally prompt blow against Tashkent he might
fare as successfully as he had done a t Tchimkent.
According to one version, the one adopted by
Mr. Schuyler, be delivered an assault upon the
oity, which was repulsed with serious loss t o
the Russians-sixteen men killed and sixty -two
wounded. The Ehokandian troops, under the
late Yakoob Beg of Kashgar, attempted t o
follow up their success, but were checked a t
the village of Ikan by the valour of a small
detaohment of Cossacks. Here, again, the
Russians lost severely, and the Cossacks narrowly escaped annihilation. Another version
merely says that there was a battle in the open
field between the Ehokandians and the Russians, in which the latter mere victorious, but
with such heavy loss that they were compelled
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to retreat. This version is derived from
native Khokaadian sources, and is given by Dr.
Bellem in his historical portion of the Report
on Mission to Kashgar." Ia either case the
Russian design against Tashkent failed, and
Tchimkent for some months longer remained the
most advanced post of Russia towards the south.
A t this crisis of their fate the internal feuds
in the country, and the encroachments of their
old rival Bokhara, still further detracted from
the vigour of the resistance of the Khokandians.
While Bokhara wag westing the town of Khodjent from the Khokandians in the south, Tchernaieff was tightening his hold upon Tashkent
in the north. I n April 1865, having cut off
its principal water-supply from the Cherchik
river, he elliered into intrigues with a, party of
the citizens, who had little sympathy for the
government forced upon them by Alim Kuli.
Early in the month of May Alim Kuli arrived
in person with reinforcements, and a battle was
fought outside the walls, in wlzich, of course,
Tchernaieff came off victorious. There is another discrepancy of authorities on this point,
but it ' seems probable that Alim Kuli attacked
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the Russian camp on the 21st of May, and,
although at one moment fortune appeared adverse to the Muscovites, the attack was repulsed
on all points. The victory itself derived most
of its importance from the death of Alim Kuli,
for he was the last defender of the country.
Khudayar had played a very secondary part
in all these troubles.
The further conquests which Russia made on
Khokandian soil were snatched rather from Bokhara than from Khokand. With the capture of
Khodjent in 1866 there followed a peace of nine
years' duration between Khokand and the
Russian generals. Tho rebellion which broke
out in that Khanate in the winter of 1875,
under the auspices of Abderrahman Aftobatcha,
son of Mussulman Kuli, against the authority
of Khudayar, afforded General Kaufmann the
excuse for the absorption of the remaining portion of the Khanate for which he had long been
seeking. The independence of Kholrand completely disappeared in April 1876, when it
was changed into the Russian province of
Ferghana.
Khudayar Khan became a Russian pen-

KHUDAYAR KHAN.

1

i
I

I

>

E
1-

177

sioner, and for some time resided at Orenburg,
where he occupied his time and turned his
money to good account by engaging in business
as a horso-dealer. At last, pining for liberty,
he fled in December 18'77 to the steppe, and
took refuge in Afghanistan, whence it was recently reported 110 had made his way into India.
It is impossible yet to say whether he has seen
the last of his strange vicissitudes. He was an
inclopondent ruler before the Russians had
reached the Jaxartes and their task of Celltral
Asian conquest had begun. He alone among
the eminent of his compatriots has survived
four or five civil marts, which aimed at his destruction above every other object, and the old
feuds of ICirghiz and Kipchak have become a
mere tradition. Ho has escaped assassination
and dcath at the hands of open and concealed
enemies ~vhcnevery other membor of his house
has been less fortunato ; and although neither
he nor any other Khan can hope to mitiless
the fall of Russia's power, ho may yet live long
enough to sco its curtailment.
Of his personal cliai~~cter
it is impossible to
say much in his fnvouy. In his early days
12

1'7s

UENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

he mas a confirmed debauchee, and in his later
he became a tyrant. Ho appears also t o have
been singularly deficient in judgment, and never
t o have profited by experience. He was certainly one of thoso whose conduct served to
bring the native Khans of Central Asia so much
into disrepute in this country. Compared with
the aspirations of the bold people of Khokand,
who are essentially the most freedom-loving of
the populations of Turkestan, the figure of their
ruler must appear to be slight andinsignificant,
but its actual importance is sufficiently obvious
t o justify this brief sketch.

ABDERRAHMAN AFTOBATCHA.

AMONG
the most prominent of the minor characters, who have stood forth within the last
$en years on the platform of Central Asian
affairs, must be placed Abderrahman Eadji,
Aftobatcha, or ewer-bearer, at the court of
Khudayar of Khokand. It is only four years
since he headed the most desperate effort
that has yet been made to free Central Asia
from the thrall of Russia. For a brief space
he figured as the champion of national liberties,
and it was his energy which rendered the conquest of Ferghana one of the moat arduous
campaigns upon which Russia has up to the
present time embarked.
Abderrahman was the son of Mussulman
12

*

180

~ E N T R A LASIAN PORTRAITS.

Euli, the Kipchnk chief and minister, who was
mainly instrumental in placing Khudayar on
the throne. During his earlier days he was t h e
sworn companion of that prince, and stories
are told of how he begged money for the young
Ehan from his father, who was afraid to trust
him with any lest he should set up a rival
party to his own. This boyish friendship between Khudayar and 'his courtier long aontinued, and the connection was rendered t h e
closer by the marriage of the Aftobatcha t o the
Khan's sister. after the murder of Muesull
man KuLi in 1853, the same relations were
maintained between his son and the ruler as of
yore, and shortly after the close of the first war
with Russia A b d e r r a h a n proceeded on a confidential mission t o Constantinople. It was
formally announced that he had only gone on
pilgrimage to Mecca, but the people refused t o
believe this, and it was generally supposed t h a t
Khudayar had freed himself from the presence
of the son in the same way that he had already
got rid of the father. I n the year 1873 t h e
Ehan was obliged by his internal necessities t o
increase the taxes raked from the Ears Kir-

ghiz, but the nomads resented the decision of
the Khokandian authorities. They maltreated
the tax collectors, and when troops were sent
against them they retired into their mountain
fastnesses. A t this moment, when a Kirghiz
war increased the Khan's other difficulties,
Abderrahman Aftobatcha suddenly returned.
He was received with an effusion of popular joy
that may be attributed to the remembrance of
the good services which his father had rendered.
The public mind was in a disturbed state, for
the expedition against Khiva had commenced ;
and the little confideilco felt in Khudayar's
ability added t.o the entl~usiasmof the popular
greeting accorded to Abderrahman.
Khuclayar a t once appointed him to the
command of the force which had been ordered
against the Kirghiz, but the Khan's treachery
defeated both the wise policy and the skilful
measures of his lieutenant. A deputation from
tho Kirghiz proceeded to the town of Khokand
with the object of comiilg to an understasding
about the difficulty that bed a~isen,but no
sooner had it arrived than all its members were
executed, This wanton breach of faith added
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fuel t o the flame, and the Kirghiz combining in all
directions, compelled the Khan's forces to retire
into the plains. So great was the unpopularity
of Khudayar a t this time, that many Kip,
chaks joined the Kirghiz, and tho troubles
a,ssumed all the proportions of a civil war.
Abderrahman was the only prominent personage who remained true to Khuclayar, and after
doing all in the power of a good soldier to retard
the advance of the insurgents, he shut himself
up in a small fort near the town of Namangan,
Winter put an end to military operations, and
the contest was deferred until the following
year, 1814.
During the minter months a plot was formed
for the deposition of Khudayar, and the elevation of his second son to the throne. I t failed,
however, and only a few petty disturbances
marked the year 1874. This comparative
lull did but preface greater troubles in the
following year. Up to this point Abclerrahe
man had remslinecl faithful in his support of
Khudayar ; but now, either disgusted with the
weakness and treachery of that prince, or aca
tuated, as Mr. Schuyler seems inclined to infer,

7
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by a desire to avenge his father's death, he, too,
abandoned his allegiance to the Khan, ancl put
himself at the head of the rebels. They hailed
his arrival in their camp with acclamations,
and Rhudayar, deserted by his army, fled for
safety into Russian territory. This resolution
was come to at a moment whon a Russian
mission, consisting of Colonel Scobeleff and the
late M. Weinberg, was resident in his capital ;
but it was only carried out after great dangers
had been incurred in the flight from Khokand
to Khodjent. The Khan's eldest son Nasrecldin was appointed his successor, but all r e d
power mas vested in tho hands of Abderrallman
Aftobatcha.
It is difficult; to arrive at a definite opinion
with respect to Abderrahman's policy. He, probably, thought; that in aggressioll lay the surest
moans of consolidating what he had obtained
possession of. It vns uot cnougll in his cyes
to hwo cast out the Kllan. I n order to ensure
the stability of his success, it had to Iso followed
up by an attitude of proc1:timed hostility to, if
not of open war against, tho Russixns, who had
boen identified by tlie people, whether rightly
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o r wrongly, with the cause of Khudayar. At
first the new Khan made friendly overtures t o
t h e Russian authorities, and General Kauf
mann promised to recognise Nasreddin, who
was co~lsideredto hold Russian sympathies, on
.the condition that he would adhere to t h e
tr.c!aties already concluded between the two
countries. It is not known whether t h e
amicable expressions of the Russians awoke
a sympathelic echo in the bosom of Nasredd i n ; but these views did not chime in with
t h e intentions of the bolder spirits of the
party at that moment supreme in Kholcand.
Disturbances took place along the border, and
a general proclamation went forth calling upon
all true Mussulmans to rise against the Muscovites. A remarkable document was drawn up,
and presented to the Czar's officials, calling
upon them either to become Mussulmans, o r t o
abandon the territory they had wrongfully acquired. These events, of course, resulted in a
declaration of war.
The leading idea of Abderrahman's plan was
by making a bold display to attract to his
standard all tho disaffected among the subjects
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of tho Czar in Turkestsn. He also hoped t o
obtain direct assistance from the Ameer of
Bokhara, and there are goocl reasons for believing that he had obtained a distinct promiso
from Yakoob Beg, who at the time mas himself
threatened by a large Russian force concentrated in close proximity to his northern frontier.
The Kholcandians, therefore, boldly crossed the
frontier. Much alarm naturally prevailed, and
considerable panic manifested itself, even in
Tashkent itself. It was said that on a certain
day the population of the native .I;omn would
rise, and that an attcmpt mould be mado to
massacre every Russian ill the country. These
exaggerated terrors appear, regarded by tho
light of subsequent events, to have been absurd ;
but at the time they were not wiillout foundation. Tho eneilgy of General Go1ova;l;cheff and
of Golollel Scobeleff sorvod to allay the prowiling anxiety. The danger did not, hornover,
pass away mit'tiout leaving several tokens of its
existence behind, Post-houses were burnt down,
telegraph wires cut, and several officers surprisod and murdered on the high-roncis.
The greatest peril, homovor, lay not in tho
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neighbourhood of Tashkent, but a t Khodjent,
to the capture of which place Abderrahmnn d h
voted his chief efforts. He had evidently decided on this move with the object of influencing
t,he actiou of Bokhara. Prom the night of t h e
20th until the 23rd of August, the Russians
were engaged in defending their post, and it is
doubtful if they mould have succeeded had they
not been joined by the garrison of Ura-tepeh,
which had surrendered to the Khokandians.
On the last of those days the Russians
the offensive, and defeated t.he Khokandians in
the open. Reinforcements arrived from Tashkent a short time afterwards, and all danger
vanished as quickly as it had arisen. On t h e
1st of September a movable colu~nnunder the
commaud of Golovatcheff and Scobeleff, and
accompanied by General Kaufmaau in person,
numbeying nearly five thousaad men, left
Khodjent for the purpose of carrying the war
into the enomy's country. It was understood
that Abclerrahman's forces had taken up a
position at Makhram, a small fortified place o n
the road to Khokand. Considerable skill h a d
been shown in improving the defences of t h e
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place, and the surrounding country had been
flooded by the diversion of the canals used for
the purposes of irrigation. Despite these preparations, the resistance offered by the KhoBandians proved very faint-hearted once the
Russians had turned their position by a skilfully executed flanking movement. The army
of the Aftobatcha melted away at the slightest collision with the Russian troops, only,,
however, to collect agaill as soon as a safe
distance intervened between it and tho advancing enemy. The effect of this success,.
though not so great as was representecl by
the " Tashkent Gazette," was very considerable ; and added to a proclamation that the.
obnoxious Khan Khudayar would not be restoreci, had the beneficial result of inducing s
large number of the people to return to their
homes. A week after the battle of Makhram,
Khokand fell into the hands of General Kaufmann, and the young Khan Nasreddin, if not at
prisoner, was placed s t least under the closest
surveillance.
But if Nasreddin was in his hands, Abderrahman was at large, and it became necessary f o r
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General Kaufmann to take prompt measures
against him, as he was busily occupied i n
raising up fresh elements of hostility in t h e
eastern districts of the country. At this ~ e r i o d
the subject of our sketch showed that h e
possessed great capacity aa a partizan leader.
Partly by compulsion and partly by persuasion, he brought the authorities of MargiIan, Andijan, and other large towns round
to his way of thinking; and at Margilan, a
town due east of Khokand, Abderrshman intended making a final resistance, but his follovers again disbanded on the approach of t h e
Russians. Tlie town surrendered, and the pursuit of Abderrahman was entrusted to Colonel
Scobeleff, who pressed it with. remarkable
vigour. Several towns surrendered, but t h e
principal leader made good his escape. Atfended by a small band of faithful Kipohaks,
he still roamed the hills of Ferghana, cutting
off detached parties, and refusing to reoognis e
the triumph of the Russians.
So far, however, as organised resistance on
the part of the people of Khokand went, it had
'dl been overcome, and General Kaufrnann was

*

.eaisures
pied in
. in tho
s period
that he
leader.
persuaMargi1 round
~gilan, a
man inhis fol;hof t h e
. t h e purColonel
markable
but t h e
bpe. AtCipchaks,
., cutting
recognise
3tance on
nt, it h a d
mann was

ABDERRAHNAN AFTOBATUHA.

189

at liberty to conclude a treaty of peace with
Nasreddin. As this treaty, although drawn
up, and requiring the cession of Namangan to
Russia, was practically inoperative, it is unnecessary t o consider it here. I n the meanwhile
Abderrahman had again succeeded in gathering
a force around him, and had taken up a strong
position at Andijan, where another Khan bed
been set up as a ruler iu the land. A strong
force was sent against this place under General
Troitzky, one of Kaufmann's favourite officers,,
who after overcoming the most desperate
resistance offered during the campaiga, inflicted a defeat upon the enemy, and destroyed
the greater part of the town. But although
checked, the enemy was far from being dispersed. I n fact he was bolder than ever, and,
when General Troitzky withdrem to Namangan,
followed him up with unusual audacity. The
Russians seemed unwilling to admit the partial
nature of their success, and General Kaufmann
evidently persuaded that the chief portion of
his task was accomplished, forthwith returned
to Khodjent. Scarcely had ho left Margilan
before the pnppet ruler Nnsreclcli~~
was deposed,
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and compelled to take refuge in Russian territory. The few advantages obtained by a
treaty that had not yet been ratified were lost
before they had come into effect. The task
which it was thought had been carried out so
well and successfully had to be recommenced
from the beginning, and the troops in the act
of returning to their positions were ordered
back to the territory recently occupied.
The whole of Khokand burst into a flame.
Scobeleff obtained decided successes a t Namangan, Balyktchi, Paita, and Sarkhaba.
He
ravaged the country of the Kipchaks round the
Kara Darya, and obtained a "crowning victory" a t Andijan in January 1876. H e inflicted another defeat on Abderrahman in
person at Assake, in consequence of which
the I(ipchak chief surrendered. With the surrender of the man who had alone given life to
the cause, all resistance ceased. Nasreddin
was deposed and became a Russian pensioner,
other 'royal pretenders were executed, Abderrahrnan being placed in honourable confinement.
Khokand became the Ru~lsian province of
Ferghana, and thus was the historic name
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revived of the country which had been the
home of the wisest and most moderate of the
conquerors of India.
It is not easy to grasp the individuality
of Abderrahman by means of the extremely
meagre evidence which we possess. A11 we know
of him, and indeed it is all that is of any practical importance, has been here narrated. Alone
among Central Asiatics he offered a continuous
resistance during nearly six months to Russian
soldiere. So far as it is possible to judge, the
springs of his conduct were love of country,
and the legitimate pride of a martial race. He
has many claims to be considered a sincere
patriot, and he has certainly afforded an example which other Asiatics should not be slow
to imitate if they still preserve that desire for
independence, which is the first and only true
token of patri~t~ism.

UINTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

MOZAFFUR EDDIN.
A RULER of Bokhara occupies by right of birth
a high position in the eyes of Central Asiatics.
Not only is he held to be a great temporal
chief, but he is also t h e spiritual head of the
Mahomedans of either Turkestan. Shorn as
he has been of many of his most cherished
possessions by Russian violence, and with the
prospect of recovering them growing more and
more visionary every day, it is true that a
Bokharan ruler can find little consolation i n
the circumstances under which he holds the
small amount of power that may still be his.
It is a task scarcely less thankless than d a cult for him to restrain the varioua impulses

MOZAFFUR BDDIN.

which are constantly rising up and urging him
to head the fanaticism of his people in a greab
struggle with the Russians. Each day that
passes away finds these expiring elements of
patl*iotism and fanaticism becoming weaker and
weaker, and the Bokharan prince left more
and more at his own inclination to follow that,
safe policy which he adopted after the cnmpaign that closed with the annexation of Sa-marcand. The remembrance of the former
greatness of Bokhara is becoming a tradition ;
and it may be confidently cxpected that this
process of natural decay will continue until it
has passed away from the public mind, unless
some exterior influence should be introduced,.
by a complication in the Central Asian Question, to quicken the "still" life of theso.
gradually expiring rulers.
Mozaffur Eddiu Khan succeeded his father
Nasrullah as Ameer of Bokhara in the year
1860. The earlier events of his reign comprised chiefly his relations with hk neighbours
of Kkiokand. He w m apparently 'desirous of
emulating the achievements of his father, who.
had not only over-run Khokand, but had cap-
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tured and, beheaded its Khan. Although his
sown authority was not as widely recognised as
a strong ruler would have desired, he set himself up as the arbiter of dl questions connected
with Turkestan. He had designs on Balkh,
whence. Dost Mahomed had expelled him; h e
loolced with a coveting eye towards Merv,
which had once been won by a Bokharan
mler; and he boldly set himself up as tho
jndge on all questions of dispute in the internal affairs of Tashkent and Khokand. F o r
a few years he waa able to play with some
dignity and effect the part to which he aspired. But in 1864 the situation underwent
a complete change. He, who aimed a t playing
in Central Asia the part that Louis XI. hacl
played in France, and who affected to regard
B i v a and Khokaud as that monarch did Burgundy and Brittany, saw the prey which he
held as peculiarly his due slipping from his
grasp. The Russians had in that year entered
Turkestan, and were laying close siege t o Tashkent. If the game was not to be lost, t h a t
event compelled him to bestir himself.
General Tchernaieff, by a prompt advance
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upon the Syr Darya and by the capture of the
ferry a t Chinaz, averted for a moment the
danger from Bokharan intervention. But after
Tashkent had surrendered, this Russian success did not prevent the Ameer unveiling his
hostility. An embassy, coizlposed of Messra.
,Struve, son of the distinguished astronomer,
'Tatarinof, and Glukhoff sky, and other oacera,
was sent by Russia to Bokha~a,with the intention of discovering what were the Amesr's t r u e
feelings towards Russia. His reply was terse
:and emphatic; he ca,st several of the envoys
.into prison. Before Rhokand, therefore, was
more than half conquered, Russia's relations
with Bokhara had changed from those of
friendship to declared hostility.
I n January 1866 Tchernaieff crossed the Syr
Darya, and advanced from Chinaz upon Jizakh.
But his force was very weak, and he found
Jizakh to be stronger than he had expected, and
that the Ameer had assembled a considerable
army for the defence of hi@dominions. Mozaf.fur pretended, notwithstanding, to be disposed
50 yielil to the Russian demands, a pretence
Tihernaisff, either f eigning or being weak enough
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to credit, seized as a n excuse for retreating, and
abandoned the Russian envoys to their fate.
When Mozaffur interfered, in 1864, in the
affairs of Khokand, and placed Khudayar, for a
second or a third time, upon the throne, he retained possession of the important town of
Khodjent, on the banks of the S y r Darya.
The ~uskians coveted this highly important
position, and were little clisposed to recogniss
Bokhara's claim over a town which was clearly
Khokandian, and to which they looked as part
of the spoils of war. General Tchernaieff was
replaced by General Romanoffsky, in consequence of the retreat from Jizakh, and it became his successor's immediate task to repair
that disaster, and effectually to curb the hostile
attitude of Bokhara. I n April 1866 Romanoffsky
moved down upon Khodjent, after having collected at Chinaz a large supply of provision&
etc., which had been sent up the river by water
from Kazala. In that month he routed a considerable body of Bokharan cavalry, and i n
May advanced across the Syr Darya to encounter the main army of the Ameer.
The two armies came face to face oa the

I
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plaiu of Irjar on the 20th of May, and a 11atde
immediately commenced. The Russian army
numbered four thousand men and tmenty guns.
The Bokharan is computed to hayo mustered forty thousalld men, with twenty-one
guns ; but of these barely five thousand mere
regular Bokharan troops. Such confidence
did he fcel at this time in the valour and
efficiency of hi^ army, that the Ameer had
previously announced his intention of retaking
Tashkcnt I The battle began by a skirmish
with the smarms of irregular cavalry tllat
covered the front of the Bokharan intrenchments. These mere slowly but completely
driven in upon the main body. Por some
time after this advantage the battle raged
furiously, and several of the intrenchments
had to be carriecl at the point of the bayonet.
Tho arrival of a fresh Russian detachment with
artillery on the opposite bank of the rivcr proved
t h e decisive turning-point in the day; and
after that illcicle~ltthe Bokharan army broko
and fled in all directions. The Ameer, who
was present, retired with a small detachment
t o Jixakh, leaving in tlio hands of the Russians
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his artillery, his treasure, and untold stores of
marlike munitions and provisions. No official
statement was published of the loss on either.
side; but i t has been computed that the Bokharans lost over one thousand men-a
total
which seems moderate consiclerillg the bitter-.
ness of the figlzt-and that the Russians suffered
a loss of only tmeuty or thirty wounded. But.
although the price paid for this victory is n o t
exactly known, its results were so great and so,
important that it would not have been dearly
purchased a t a much more serious cost. T h e
prestige of Bokhara was annihilated, and Russia,
secure in her own atrength, became doubly
secure through the panic that unnerved all
Asiatics after the signal overthrow at Irjar,
The practical results of the battle were immediate, and the most important being the c a p t u r ~
of the fortress of Nau, which stands half-way
between Khodjent and Ura-tepeh. An advance
was then made upon Khodjent., and on the
29th of May this city was surrounded and attacked from two sides. It surrendered a t
discretion after a heavy bombardment of
five days, the Russians admitting a loss of
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eleven killed and one hundred and twenty-two,
wounded.
a f t e r his defeat at Irjar, Mozaffur sent.
back the Russian envoys to Tashkent laden
with presents. But th.e Ameer did not yet
give up the game as lost. He had been
beaten in the field, several of his fortresses
had been wrested from him, but there still remained to the reputed head of Islam in Central
Asia other armies and other fortresses wherewith to carry on a war. After the fall of
Khodjent a truce of some months' duration.
ensued, but in the early winter of the same,
year the attitude of Bokhara was held to 'be so.
equivocal that a further aclvance was determined upon as necessary. Ura-tepeh and Ji-.
zakh were the two principal outposts remaining,
t o the Ameer after Chinaz and Khodjent had.
been wrested from him. They each guarded a.
road to Samarcand, the former, one from the:
east, and the latter, one from the north-east.
The Russians closely besieged Ura-tepeh on the
6th of October, and on the 14th it fell into
their hands. The greater part of the garrison
appears to have escaped, and the Russians
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euffered a loss of two hundred killed and
wounded, according t o their own admi~sion.
Allnost on the same clay Jizakh shared the
g.a,me fate, being carried by assault, after a
short bombardment, despite its natural strength
a n d the number of its garrison. The latter
fought bravely-particularly
its leaders, who
were neaTly all killed on the walls-but appal~elltlywith little shill. The result of these
triumphs, complete, and obtained with little loss,
was that Bokhara, saw itself compelled to sue for
peace. Mozaffur Eddin himself recognised the
impossibility of cdntinuing the struggle alone.
He made overtures at this time t o the
Ameer of Aghanistan for an alliance, and as
affairs happened to be in a very troubled state
in Cabul, he entered into particularly close relations with Faiz Mahomod Khan, Governor of
Balkh and one of the sons of Dost Mahomed.
H e even made propositions to our Government,
which politely snubbed him ; but although he
could find no allies in his extremity, the trrrbu1.ence and fanaticism of his people urged him to
again draw the sword which had been scarcely
sheathed.
a

,
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After the fall of Jizakh the Russian generals,
who had been continually reprimanded for their
activity, took so sanguine a view of the conclition of things in Turkestan that the following
official announcemeut was sent home. " Perfect tranquillity reigns throughout the count,ry
of Turkestan. The war with Bokliara, as far
as regards Russia, is a t an end. The GovernorGeneral (Orenburg) hopes for a long continuance of trauquillity, provided the Ameer of
Bolrhara abstains from a renemal of hostilities.
Amicable relations with Ichokand are confirmed, and commerce is everywhere re-ostablished. Many caravans come from Bolchara,
and go thither. Even the West Siberian corps,
ordered to the territory of Turkestan, returns
home again." But notwithstanding this lull
in the strife, it was uncertain how long it
would continue. Six months after the capture of Jizakh the " Illvtllide Russe " declared
that Russia had entertained no negotiations
or diplomatic relations with the Ameer Mozaff ur.
I n September 1867 Kaufmann became Governor-General of the newly-constituted pro'
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vince of Turkestan, and he at once pursued
the negotiation of a treaty which had been
drawn up by his predecessor, General Krjihanoffsky. The draft of this treaty was sent t o
the Arneer for approval, but instead of replying
t o the proposals made to him he began to discuss other matters and to correspond with
Kaufmann upon various minor topics. Mozaffur's procrastination assumed a still more
dubious aspect when he refused to surrender a,
Russian officer and three soldiers who had been
carried off by robbers on the Jizakh road. T h e
officer-Slushenko by name-mas tortured a n d
compelled to adopt the Mahornedan religion.
The immediate consequence of that act w a s
that Kaufmann began to mass troops for an
advance on Xamarcand, and the b e e r to raise
levies from amollgst his subjects.
Unfortunately for the latter, heno longer ruled!
a united people. His internal foes were not less.
formidable to him than his external. If h i s
own inclinations alone had been consulted, it is.
probable that he would not have gone to w a r
with Russia under any pretext whatever. He
had already tasted enough of the pleasures of
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such warfare. But he mas no longer a fres
agent. The ulemas of Bokhara and Samwcend were urging him on to resume the " holy
war." His eldest son, Katti Torah, was intriguing against his authority, while his.
nephew, Seyyid Khan, stood in open defiance
a t Shahr-i-sebz. The latter soon obtained the.
position of an independent prince, but Shshri-sebz, having cast off the Bokharan yoke,
recognised the leadership of its own chief
known as Jura Beg. It was at such a mo-.
ment as this, with Bokhara like unto a house.
divided against itself, that Mozaff ur had t o
enter upon his third and final war vith the,
Russians.
Colonel Abramoff, as commandant of Jizakh,.
took the first step towards punishing the assailants of Lieutenant Slushenko by making an
attack upon the village of the robbers. I n ths.
meanwhile Mozaffur hail been deserted by ths.
Afghan prince, Iskander Khan, a sou of Sultan
Jan of Herat, who went over to the Russians;;
yet unable to resist the demands of his people, ho
declared a " holy war " against Russia. G.eneral Kaufmann, who was said to be on the eve
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of setting out for St. Petersburg, but who had
previously, a fact well known, sent a letter to
the Kazi Kdian of Samnrcand, demanding the
surrender of that city, thereupon ordered an
advance to be made into Bokharan territory.
This was decided upon early in the month of
May 1868, and on the 13th the first brush with
the Bokharan army took place on the hill of
Tchnpan-ata, on the banks of the Zerafshan
river. It resulted in an easy triumph for the
Russians, who crossed the river in the face of
a heavy fire and drove the enemy out of their
intrenchments. The surrender of Samarcand
quickly followed this success, for the inhabitants shut their gates of their o m accord
upon the Bokharan army, and voluntarily welcomed the Russians. After the surrender of
$amarcand desultory fighting took place between the Russian army and the irregulars from
Shallr-i-sebz and other cities. I n these encounters the Russians were uniformly victorious,
but to resist the attacks necessitated a scattering
of their forces, which gave new confidence to the
Ameer.
He was collecting a fresh army near Katti

MOZAPPUR EDDIN.

205

Kurgan, a town forty miles west of Samarcand,
which had been garrisoned with a small force
by General Golovatcheff; and his cavalry had
already cut the Russian general's communicat.ions with Jizakh and Tashkent. The neighbourhood of Samarcand also swarmed with
armed men, who, if not very formidable in
the line of battle, were certainly much to be
feared in more irregular warfare. A large
body of cavalry-said to number fifteen thousand men-was
at Chelik threatening Yany
Kurgan and even Jiaakh, and wherever General Kaufmann turned he found a foe to be
elioountered whom it was most difficult t o
reach. I n this emergency General Kaufmann
thought his best plan .to be an adva~iceto the
relief of Katti Kurgan, but the moment he left
Samaroand the Shahr-i-sebz army attacked it;
and although Major Stempel and the small
garrison defended the citadel with the greatest
heroism, it narrowly escaped capture. I n fact,
nothing saved it from surrender but the withdrawal of the troops from Slial~r-i-sebzunder
their leader Jura Beg, who mas misled by a
report that KauImann mas ret~zriiing.
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I n the meanwhile Kaufmann had relieved
the garrison of Katti Kurgan and defeated
the army of the Ameer in a pitched battle at
Zera-bulak. I t was only several days after the
attack upon Samarcand that Kaufmann heard
of what was taking place in his rear, and he
hurried back with all despatch to rescue the
much-reduced garrison. Mozaffur Eddin then
made an unconditional ~ u r r e u d e and
~ , had the
Russian Government granted Kaufmann full
powers on this point, he would have annexed
the whole of the Khanate. The annexation of
Samarcanci was in itself a triumph with which
any governor-general might have rested content, and the practical results of this 1868 campaign were so great as t o be scarcely realisable
a t the time. Mozaffur Eddin was permitted to
retain his personal authority, and received
assistance in putting down the seditious movement which his son, Katti Torah, and several
other chiefs raised up against him. These were
all repressed, and in 1869 Katti Torah became a
fugitive, and his father's authority more firmly
established witbin the territory that remained
to him than it had been during the three pre-

$ous years. His feelings towards the Russians became less inimical after they had
occupied in his name the town of Earshi,
and then restored it t o him. Encouraged by
this and similar friendly acts, a younger son
of the Ameer, Jan Torah, went on an embassy
t o St. Petersburg, where he stayed for some
time. One of the principal objects his mission
had to obtain was the restoration of Hamarcand,
but his diplomacy in this direction, it is scarcely
necessary to say, completely failed.
With the annexation of Sa~narcandthe misunderstandings between Tashkent and Bokhara terminated. Since that year, if we except
the clouds which appeared upon the horizon
during the progress of the Khivan campaign,
the relations of Russia and Bokhara have assumed the cordiality that marked thorn in the
days before the advance of the Muscovites into
the country of the Eirghiz. Tho same b e e r
who threatened Russia so nearly vhen Tchernaieff was besieging Tashkent is now her very
good ally. His old dreams of ambition have
vanished. He is content with his temporal advantages. The army which he i s permitted to

,008

UENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

retain numbers some twenty thousand men:
but it :is of a very nondescript character, an4
quite unadapted for modern warfare. Mozaffur
bears precisely the same relation to Russia that
the Khan of Khelat dici to us after the signature of the Treaty of 1854. The pi.incipd
strategical points within his frontier, such as
Charjui, may be garrisoned whenever Russia
deems fit; and a right of way has been thus
obtained up the Oxus.
The present Ameer has no heir to his dominions
vho mould be absolutely pleasing to the Russians, but he has several relations who lay claim
to the succession who would be positively displeasing to them. His death may, therefore,
be expected to produce the complete dismemberment of the Bolrharan state and its incorporation mith the government of Turkestan.
A t the present moment, and under the conditions that obtain, the Bokharan Government
has no discretionary power over its acts, and
in whatover Russia decides upon it must acquiesce. Tho people themselves are said to be
extremely hostile to Russia, but from what Mr.
Schuyler has told us it is clear that this senti-
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ment is neither EIO bitterly inimical, nor
deeply rooted as has been asserted. Mozneur
Eddin does not possess the power to disobey
t h e orders sent from Tashkent, and it is very
doubtful whether he feels the inclination.
It must
be remembered that there is no
qua~lterwhence the Ameer can expect assistance,
H e appealed to this country in 1867, and he re.
oeived neither sympathy nor encouragement.
He had previously made overtures to the Cabul
Ameor for a defensive alliance against both
Russia and England, aud he has subsequently
t o his reconciliation with Russia inveighed
against this country in his correspondellce with
$here Ali. We have no evidence as to the part
he
in the negotiations which led up t o
the despatch of the Stoletoff mission, but as
all the native emissaries from Tashkent came
through his country, we may be sure tl.lat it ms
not that of a neutral. The long-standing relations between Cabul and Bokhara, the claims
t h a t Bokhars advances over Balkh and the neighbduring districts, forbid the suppositioll that
Mozaffur Eddin would remain an unconcerned
spectator of the dismemberment of Clabul.
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He may remember the part his father played in
the days of Dost Mahomed, and aspire either
to be the protector of the cause of the Barucksyes, or, if that cause be utterly wrecked, t o
extend his dominion up to the slopes of t h e
Hindoo Koosh. In either case he would b e
willing to act as the puppet of the Rusaians and.
to play the game they might sketch out for him..
His ambition and vanity mill urge him to further
General Kaufmann's aggressive designs, and his
hostility to England, thinly veiled through out
his career, will render any enterprise calculated
to injure our interests palatable to him.
Quite recently he has given the clearest
token of his Russian sympakhies by affording
marked facilities t o Russian exploring expeditions, and in a still more unequivocal manner
by the assembling of troops, and the collection.
of supplies at Charjui.
Various opinions have been expressed o n t h e
subject of Mozaffur's personal character. By
one writer he has been described as a mixture
of Louis the Eleventh and Heliogabdus. It itr.
.affirmed that he punished his subjects with.
deatlh for the very same acts of immorality

'
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which he himself committed in <'tho most barefaced manner." If these allegations were true,
he probably reconciled the matter with his
conscience by the old theory that what mas
good for the ruler mould be very hurtful for the
ruled. V$mbBry formed, however, a much
more favourable opinion of his character, and
represents him as <'a well-intentioned man, very
strict, and of irreproachable character as regards
his personal conduct." On the other hand, he
was generally adinitked to be a bigot, and opposed to all reforms that owed their origin in
any way to tho influence of the unbeliever. Ho
strove for many years to govern his people well
according to his lights, ancl ho took as his
motto "Govern by Justice." The period during
which he treated his chief dignitaries with
marked severity represented the most striking
portion of his administration. The slightest
offence in the royal eyes met with the punishment of death. No doubt it wag much owing to
this brutal onergy against his nobles that his
moderation tornards Ilia people nppe~rodin the
public estimation to be cnl~a~icod.It passed at
last into a eaying, " He destroys tho elephants,
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but protects the mice " ; but Mozaffur forgot
that the sources of his strength came from the
elephants and not from the mice. As one of
the consequences of this mistaken policy, many
of his chief vassals fell off from him, so that
when the crisis in his contest with Russia
arrived, he had to head a divided st& against
a great national peril. He owes it to Russian
assistance that his authority has been preserved
in the highlands of his territory, and during
the last ten years, as his independence has been
becoming more and more a thing of the past, he
has had greater opportunity for indulging in the
moroseness which formed part of his character.
It is probable that he is nothing lotli to reconcile himself to the duties of his new position,
and to ~linlcthe independence of the native ruler
in the secnrity of a, Russian vassal."

* A very interesting account of an intci-viem with this
prince mill be found in Ms. Eugene Schuyler's Turkistan," vol, ii. p. 82 et sey.

GENERAL KOLPAKOPFSKY.

OF all the Russian generals who have won their
way t o fame iu the campaigns which have made.
C e n t r a l Asia an appendage of the Czar, none
deserves to stand higher than Generd Kolpakoffsky, a t the present time officiating as Governor-General of the province of Semiretohinsk.
If the next Governor-General of
Turkestan should be selected either for his
military attainments or for his intimate acquaintance with the peoples and political circumstances of Contra1 Asia, there can be no.
d o u b t that Raufmann's successor should be the.
subject of Ghis memoir. Not only does he oxcel
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every other officer in the service in the qualifications specified, but lie has litterallyspeaking no
rival in them. Nor are these the sole recornmendations to render him eligible for the post.
He has already exercised supreme power at
Tashkent as Kaufmann's deputy on three
occasions, and he can therefore plead pra'ctical
acquaintance with the duties of the post as
a n additional reason in favour of his being
selected to fill it.
Kolpakoffsky was born at Kherson in the
yeay 1819. His father was a subaltern officer
in that district. H e entered the army as a
commo-n soldier in the .Lublin infantry regiment at the age of sixteen, and :received his
commission in 1841, when he was twenty-two
years of age. He served for many years in
the Caucasus, and took .part in the operations
i n Trltnsglvania against the Hungarians in
1848. I n 1852 he went to Siberia, .at that
time the most promising field in Oentral Asia
for the energy and ability of Russian soldiers,
and he has remained there ever since, for Semiretchinsk is quite as much a portion of Siberia
as .it is of Turkestan. At first he was stationed

at the great penal settlement of Berezof, and
,during six years little opportunity offered for
sthe display of any exceptional talent.
I n 1858 he was transferred to the district of
Ala-tau, and with this change his public career
may be said to have fairly commenced. Rus:sia was on the eve of commencing her second
period of activity in Asia. The solicl achievements of Peroffsky had paved the way for
brilliant triumphs by more fortnnate generals,
and Colonel Kolpa~offsbyas commandant of
t h e fort at Uzun-Agatch-a
place north of
Lake Issik ICul and west of Vernoe-was in a
favourable position for reaping a fair share in
,;the dangers and prizes that are to be met and
won at a time when each annexation is but the
prelude to another. I n October 1860, when
.feverish excitement prevailed among the Rhokandians a t the rumoured preparations on the
.aide of the Russians for a fresh advance, Kolpakoffsky had under his command at the fort
-above named :a force of eight hundred men and
s i x guns. A generd league was formed between
the Khokandians and the Kirghia tribes for the
purpose of expelling the Russians from the pro-
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vince of Semiretchinsk. They intended to sack
Vernoe and to lay the Russian forts level with the
ground. The best of the Khokandian generals,
Khanayat Shah, placing himself a t the head
of a force computed at thirty thousand men,
advanced upon Uzun Agatch, in the full expectation of obtaining a decided triumph.
Khanayat Shah entrusted the attack to one of
his subordinates, but the Khokandian, either
awed by the bold demeanour of the Russians, or
being at heart a coward, delivered the assault
i n a half-hearted manner and was beaten off.
Messengers were sent after Kolpakoffsky who
happened t o be absent a t Kastek, where the
attack had been expected, telling him of the
danger of the garrison. By a forced march he
gained the rear of the Ehokandian army, and
attacking it without hesitation, succeeded in
inflicting a severe defeat upon it. Khanayat
Shah retreated precipitately into Khokand, and
this brilliant victory greatly enhanced the reputation of the Russian soldier. It is impossible t o say what disastrous results might have
accrued if the Russians had not been successful,
and that they were successful was altogether

due t o the energy, courage, and skill of Colonel
Kolpakoffsky.
T e n years passed away before Kolpakoffsky
found another occasion for appearing prominently in public, a t the time when the anarchy
i n K d d j a afforded a pretext for Russian interference. Kolpakoffsky had then become s
general, and risen high in the service, holding the
same appointment that he does at the present
time, via. Governor-General of the province of
Semiretchinsk (the country of tho seven rivers).
After the expulsion of the Chinese from the
region of the Ili by the Tungan-Tarantchi insurgents a period of confusion ensued in the
affairs of that once prosperous territory. Despot
succeeded to despot, and the inhabitants derived
n o benefit from the frequent c h ~ n g e .As many
of them as could do so fled over the border
into %ussian territory, and were placed in
settlements round Vernoe and Kopal. Of
these refugees a, large proportion was of the
$olon tribe, which enjoyed special privileges
from the Chinese. Kolpakoffslcy took a prominent part in alleviating the distress amongst
theso exiles, and for his good servicea in this
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respect the Emperor of China conferred upon
him " the dignity of Mandarin of the first
class, with a robe of honour embroidered with
dragons, which, being placed on the same
footing with a decoration, he received the special permission of his own Emperor to wear on
atate occasions."* It is true that in 1870 it
,appeared as if Abul Oghlan, the actual ruler of
Kuldja, was disposed to live on friendly terms
with his Russian neighbours, but frontier &isputes occurred frequently. These, added t o
t h e apprehensions caused by the growing power
*of Yalroob Beg in Eastern Turkestan, snpplied
t h e Russian authorities with an adequate excuse for occupying Kuldja. Orders were issued
to the Russian general t o carry out the design,
and Ko~pakoffslqcrossed the frontier into the
country held by the rebellious subjects of t h e
Emperor of China.
The campaign mas of the briefest. On the 28th
4of June the first encounter took place, on the 3rd
!of July Abul Oghlan surrendered, and on the
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* ~Suhuyler's" TurlriAan," vol. ii, p. 184.
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4th his capital fell into the hands of the Russians. This almost bloodless campaign marked
&heyear 1871, and the credit for it rested exclusively with Rolpakoffsky. He found himself
.not able, howevey, to prevent a barlsal-ous massacre of a lmge number of Tungaili and Chinese by the Tarautchis. I n every other respect
the operation was carried out with remarkable
(success, but it did not enjoy great favour at St.
.Petersburg. The Foreign Office saw clearly
that it might entail a t some future time a cornplication with China, and the Russian authori,ties have always deprecated and st,riven to
:avoid such a contingency. They could not in
%he face of General Kolpakoffsky's decided acts
.!;order a withdrawal from the occnpied province, butthey officially informed the Chinese
\Government that, whenever it sent a sufficient
.force, Euldja ahould be restored.* Rolpaikoffsky received the Cross of St. George, not,
Ihomever, by the pleasure of 'the ,Czar, but by

* A treaty has recently boen signed between Russia
la;n'tlChina, by the terms of which Euldja i s to be restored
t o China.
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the voluntary decree of the Chapter of the
Order.
In 18'73, during the Khivan expedition, 1301pnkoffsky acted as Kaufmam's deputy a t Tashkent, and while holding this post he endeavour-ed
to persuade the St. Petersburg Government t o
approve of the occupatlion of Khokand. The
moment was particularly auspicious in one
sense, and not less inauspicious in another. Had
the undertaking been sanctioned, the Russians
would probably have encountered little or n o
opposition,' as the Khan was at the moment
Yery unpopular with his subjects. If this had
been done, in accordance with Kolpakoffsky's
advice, events would have been anticipated by
three years, and the bitter campaign of t h e
winter of 1875 might have been avoided. But,
on the other hand, the Russians were actively
engaged in inflicting punishment upon Khiva,
and it was felt to be inadvisable to take the
settlement of the fate of Khokand in hand
a t the same time. Not only was the larger
portion of the Russian troops available in
Turkestan engaged a t a remote spot, but the
Russian statesmen had found it sufficiently dif-
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ficult to allay the suspicions of England with
regard to Khiva without raising fresh ones by
acts of aggression in Khokand. For these
reasons Kolpakoff sky's suggestion was not acted
upon.
In 1875, when the war in Khokand broke
out in earnest, Kolpakoffsky was for a second
time acting as Kadmann's deputy, and it became his duty to announce the determination
of the Russian Government to annex the remaining portion of that Ehanate. As the
official proclamation put it, the Czar had been
induced to listen to the prayer of the inhabitants to become Russian subjects. Under
General Kolpakoffsky's direction the final arrangements were made for the administration
of the new provillce of Ferghana, and General
Scobelef was appointed its first governor.
In 1873, while the Khivan war was still in
progress, Kolpakoffsky entered into direct
communication with Shers Ali, and to him
belongs much of the credit for having reminded the Ameer in delicate but sufficiently
distinct language that Russia was a great
Power, and one moreover rapidly drawing
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nearer and nearer to the northern frontier of'
that potentate's dominions. It is asserted
that Kolpakoff sky is more amicably disposed
towards England than either. Kaufmann o r
any other of the Central Asian generals; but
it is difficult to find in his public acts any
proof of this confident assertion. When Kaufmann left Tashkent for St. Petersburg in
the spring of the year 1879 Kolpakoffsky
took his place for a third time as governor-.
general.
Notwithstanding the intimate practical ex-.
perience which he has acquired with the working of the supreme administration in Turkestan,
it was well known that had Kaufrnann's resignation taken place this autumn-as it cer-,
tainly would have but for the rising at Cabul-Kolpakoffsky would not haye been his successor. The prine, for it is now regarded in
that light, and not as "a banishment to the outer.
confines" as it used to be termed, was to be reierved for either Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff or.
some other favoured European counsellor. Yet,
no one has higher claims to the post, and cer-.
tainly there are few Russian officers who mould
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fill it with greater advantage to the state, than
the Governor of Semiretclzinsk.
The remarkable difierence bekween Kolpstkoffsky and every other Russian officer of note
is that he has always striven to understand the
people whom he governs. Not only has he
acted upon this principle for the purpose of'
being the better able to perform his duties,
but, if we take the evidence, as we well may,
of those who b o w him best, 'he has also done
this with the laudable objoct of putting himself in accord with the subject populations.
It is sufficient to contrast this conscientious
method of performing his duty with the very
opposite plan that has been followed by the
present Governor-General to show how fay
superior as a man and a public servant Kolpakoffsky is to Eaufmann. It is true that he
is most intimately acquainted with the great
Kirghiz people, but he has also devoted close
attention to, and playedj a large part in the
direction of, affairs in the other parts of Central Asia.
About the Eirghiz and everything that concerns them there is no one competent to speak
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with a tithe of his authority. He has lived
among them, he speaks their language, and he
is known and trusted by them. His energy,
his untiring horsemanship, have earned for him
among these primitive people the soubriq~~et
of
"the Iron Seat." I n addition to dl these
recommendations, he is a good soldier, an excellent administrator, a, practised diplomatist,
versed in the secrets of the Chinese, as well
as of the Central Asian, policy of the Russian
Government. ' His private virtues are, by all
accounts, not less estimable than his public
qualities are worthy of laudation. Not only
does he eclipse his comrades as a soldier and
an administrator, but he is equally pre-eminent
for the purity of his life and the spotlessness
of his honour.

GENERAL TCHERNAIEFF,

A L T H O many
U ~ ~years have elapsed since Tchernaieff played an active part in deciding the
progreas of events in Central Asia, his name
is connected with so many of the most remarkable Ruseian achievements that it would be
impossible to ignore his career, even if the
marked intereat which he has taken in Central
Asian matters, since his dsparture from Turkestan, had not served to keep his nnme prominently before the Russian people. On his
recall Tchernaieff, disappointed of what he
considered to be his legitimate prize, constituted himself tho critic of the Central Asian
administration. With his practical knowledge
15
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of the subject, he has been able to say much of
great weight, if it must be alloved that he has
also often permitted his personal feelings to get
the better of his judgment.
He began his military service in the Gnards,
served on the Danube in the campaign against
the Turks in '185.3,and was afterwards one
of the defenders of Sebastopol. When the
war in the Crimea closed, the Russian Government turned its chief attention to crushing the people of the Caucasus. I n those
operations Tchernaieff played a considerable
part. . When the Caucasus was thoroughly
pacified he left for Orenburg, where he was
appointed Chief of the Staff to Katenin, Peroffsky's successor. He had the good fortune t o
arrive at a critical, and also a most opportune
moment. Russia was about to resume her
operations on the Syr Darye.
Tchernaieff -at the time a colonel- was
placed at the head of two thousand five hundred
men, and Colonel Verefkin-an able officer who
played a prominent part in the attack on Khiva
in 1813-had the command of another force
about half the strength. This occurred in the
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year 1864. The ostensible object before these
officers was to establish a fortified line of
oommunication between Orenburg and Westeru
Siberia. They practically accomplished it in
J u n e of that year, when Auliata and the town
of Turkestan were captured. The more important cihy of Tchimkent, which lies at the
southern apex of hhe triangle and equi-distant
f r o m those places, fell into his hands in
October. The place was carried by assault,
almost a t a rush; and its fall caused a great
panic throughout the Khanate of Khokand,
for it was the strongest fort on the north,
and the Russians had taken it without any
apparent difficulty. The fate of the rest of
Khokand might be inferred from the fall of
Tchimkent.
Elushed with hia success, Tchernaieff followed up this advantage by marching on Tashkent. He thought it one of those occasions
when boldness became prudence, but he was mistaken in his surmise. On the 15th of October
he erected a battery in front of the waU~of
T e ~ h k e n t ,and after a short bombardment the
engineers declared the breach to be practicable.

15
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The assault was delivered, but the Khokandians repulsed it, inflicting upon the Russians
a loss of sixteen killed and sixty-two wounded.
TchernaiefE felt himself obliged to retreat
to Tchimkent, and the Khokandians did not
leave him undisturbed throughout the ensuing
winter. The recapture of Turkestan represented
the main object before Alim Kuli, the Regent,
who failed to realise his object. A graphic
incident in this winter campaign was the defence of Ikan by a small band of Cossacks,
who, after losing more than half their number,
cut their way though the Ehokandian army,
and succeeded in reaching Turkestan in safety.
I n the spring of the year 1865 Tchernaieff
took measures for the renewal of the attack on
Tashkent. Ho began by seizing the small fort
of Niazbek, which commanded the water-supply
of Tashkent. He then took up a position close
to the city, and made reconnaissances in force
around the suburbs. The garrison was at this
point reinforced by Alim Kuli and a small
army, and the Khokandian general, either
(distrusting the fidelity of the townspeople, or
aonfident in his superior numbers, resolved
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u p o n attacking the Russian camp. The attack
was repulsed, although at one moment it almost
s e e m e d as if success would have attended it,
and Alim Kuli fell in the attempt. With him
e x p i r e d the last of the great king-makers of
C e n t r a l Asia. The city still held out, although
each day found the hearts of its defenders
g r o w i n g fainter and fainter. As a precautiona r y measure Tchernaieff occupied Chinaz and the
f e r r y across the Syr Darya. That move eff ectud l y shut out all prospect of help from Bokhara.
P a r t i z a n s from Bokhara succeeded, however, in
m a k i n g their way into the city, and took a
prominent part in the later stages of its def e n c e . Tashkent finally surrendered after an
a s s a u l t on the 27th of June, and a %st quantity of spoil fell into the hands of the victors.
T h i s result was most creditable to Tchernaieff,
for he had captured, with only two thousand
men and twelve guns, a large and strongly
fortified place held by thirty thousand men
with more than sixty guns.
B u t if his military dispositions reflected
c r e d i t upon him as a general, his arrangem e n t s with the local authorities after the eur
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render of the town were certainly not less admirable. His simple habits appeared not less
prominent than his courage. On the very evening of the formal surrender he rode through
the streets attended by a few Cossacks. He
attracted general sympathy by taking a n at'ive
bath. W e are told that no sooner had he
finished his ablutions than one of the crowd
offered him a bowl of tea, which he accepted
without any signs of hesitation. It was by such
conduct as these incidents are a sample of, t h a t
Tchernaieff endeared himself more than any
other Russian officer to the people of the
Khanates, and he is still known amongst
them a s Shir Naib, the Lion Viceroy.
I n t h e campaign which ensued with Bokhara
after the fall of Tashkent, Tchernaieff's preliminary operations were not attended with
good fortune. He sent envoys to Bokhara,
who were cast into prison. H e marched a
certain digtance into Bokharan territory, and
then, deceived by the specious representations
of the Ameer, he retreated. H e showed himself too trustful in his dealings with a deceitful
court, and he had in consequence to accept t h e
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responsibility for a check, which his enemies
magnified into a reverse. He was recalled
from Central Asia, and replaced by Romanoffsky, the victor of Irjar.
On his return t o Europe he left the army
and established himself in Moscow as a notary.
I n November 1867 he passed the necessary examination, and it is asserted on good authority
that a kind-hearted capitalist advanced the
,caution-money necessary for him to obtain the
right to practise as a notary public. I n this
capacity he does not appear to have been very
fortunate, as he was subsequently concerned
i n several commercial projects, none of which
had any remarkable success. A t the same
time he became coallected with the Moscow
presg, and contributed a series of important
articles on the affairs of Central Asia to the
columns of the Russki Mir."
One of the most remarkable of these apeared in that journal on February 2nd (14th)
1875. It was upon the gubject of the part the
Khan of Khiva had played in the Kirghiz
troubles. One of the chief accusations against
that ruler had been that he had instigated tho
((
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Kirghiz to rebellion. Tchernaieff :combated
this view, and concluded a pregnant article
with the following significant passage." "When
we are quiet, our neighbours are quiet, but a s
soon as we excite the discontent of our own
Kirghiz, some of our neighbours are immediately found t o be to blame." But his principal theme has,been the financial maladministration of Turkestan. I n that he has a subject
which he perfectly understands, and one which
constitutes the great blot in Kaufmann's system of government. I n 1872 he drew up a
paper on the subject, which created great
sensation, and the Minister of Finance considered it t o be of sufficient importance t o
bring before the Czar. Kaufmann had to exert
all his influence at Court to overcome the opposition which was steadily rising against him.
He succeeded then, and has since had similar
good fortune. There was much truth in Tchernaieff's criticism, although not altogether free
from a suspicion of malice, but Kaufmann's
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position was too secure to be endangered by
hostile articles in the press, or by the machinations of discontented place-seekers.
In 1876 Tchernaieff reappeared in public life
as commander of the Servian forces. Of this
p a r t of his career nothing need here be said.
It exercised no influence upon the affairs of
Central Asia. The ability he showed in that
campaign has not yet been rewarded, but it is
understood that the Russian Government holds
$hat he has a strbng claim for the service he
t h e n rendered. I n 1878 i t was rumoured that
he was to receive a special command in Central
Asia in the event of war with England. The
war-cloud cleared off, and Tchernaieff remained
at St. Petersburg. He may yet, however, reappear on the scene in which he first won his
w a y t o fame, and there are few Russian generals
who have more solid claims than he has t o
exercise a high command. He is especially
suited for dealing with Asiatics.
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NOOR TBRDI KHAN."

OF the Turcomans as a race much has recently
been heard. Their victory over the Russians
at Geok Tepeh has won for them a wide reno wn. The working-out and decision of their
fate will form the next stage in the Central
Asian Question. It is, therefore, most probable
that during the next few years we shall b e
hearing a great deal about this people, and
%hat all authentic sources of information will be

* I am indebted to Major Francis Butler, 9th Regiment,
t h e well-lmown traveller in, nnd explorer of, the country
of the Turcornaus, for kindly imparting to me most of t h e
particulars of the career of this chief, and d s o of that of
t h e Governor of Kooohan.

eagerly inquired for. But if much has been,
and if more is likely to be, heard of these prim
mitive clans, it is extraordinary to find how
little is known of the individual Turcornan.
No book that has yet been published attempts
to give a biographical description of any of
their chiefs, although these are now called upon
t o taka an active part in a war which must
be of the greatest importance, and probably
pregnant with the moat vital consequences both
to England and to Russia. I t is, therefore,
with the greater satisfaction that I find myself
enabled to sketch some portion of the career
of one of the most influential and able of the
chiefs of the Turcomans.
Noor Vordi Khan of Akhal is described by
acquainted with him as the beau
one
idBa1 of a leader of irregular cavalry. His
qualities are essentially those which fit him
for ruling n, people whose instincts lead them,
Eke true children of the desert, to be extreme
in all things, with a passionate longing for the
excitement of war and the chase, with a not
loss kcen desire for the friendtrhip of others,
and an equally bitter hetrod towards those who

UENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

incur their antipathy. As we expect such a man
t o be, he is an extreme representative of his
class. He possesses the race characteristics in
an exaggerated degree. Its virtues and its vices
are depicted in his person, with superlative force.
There is not a popular sentiment with which he
has not the liveliest sympathy; but as a leader
of men should do, he sees farther into the future
than his followers, and knows better than any
what will be the wiser course for the Turcomans
to pursue. He is fully impressed with the spirit
of the proverb-which
does not always hold
good-that boldness is prudence, and, as will be
seen, he has acted up to his belief in all things.
Nadir Kuli became Nadir Shah by demonstrating qualities such as Noor Verdi has shown
himself to possess. The latter can hardly hope to
emulate the conquests of the greatest of his race,
but, although to aspire t o the crown of Persia
may be forbidden him, he may yet play the part
of champion of the independence of all those
who still rejoice in the name of Turcomans.
Noor Verdi is at the present time about
fifty-five years of age, and his personal appearance is strongly in his favour. He is de-
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scribed as being five feet tan inches in height,
of imposing presence, and with very handsome
features. His long jet-black beard was, two
years ago, unstreaked with a trace of silver,
and his personal vigour showed no sign of
decay or the advance of time. For many
years Noor Verdi ruled over the Akhals from
his fort at the village of Akhal, and nothing
occurred to interfere with the even tenour of
his existence. The Akhals could pursue their
daily course of life without dread of Rnssia,
and the outside world scarcely knew of their
existence. It is true that the northern frontier
01 Khorasan has for generations been the scene
of an internecine war, which rendered it di&cult
for any, even for those most disposed, to cultivate the arts of peace in the valleys and beyond
the ranges of the Kopet and Euren Daghs.
T h e feuds betweon the tyrannical governor and
his mercenary troops on the one side, and the
freedom-loving people on the other, have been
handed down from generation to generation.
T h e loam land of the valleys and mountain
slopes watered by the Atrek and its aHuents,
has been enriched with the blood of those who
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should have made it prolific with their labour,
just as it has been watered by the tears of
human grief and suffering. The child has inherited the wrongs of the father, the antipathy
of races has been perpetuated. The Persian
came, and what was once a smiling paradise
was turned into a region which the children of
the soil scarce dared to cultivate. H e brought
in his train the Kurd and the dregs of the
Turkish race. He built his forts, and he gave
the land at first to successful soldiers, and then
t o unscrupulous governors to fatten on. Yet,
despite all these disadvantages, the Turcomans
held their own in the remoter glens and beyond
the mountain lines. Their villages were small
forts, their cultivated plains were restricted t o
the vicinity of these forts, their horses, as on
the Scotch border in the Middle Agos, stood
saddled in their stalls night and day,-yet the
Turcomans throve. The Persian grew feebler,
the Shah's authority became the shadow of a
name, the Kurd governor more independent, and
in many cases inclined to show indulgence towards the Turcoman,-the Akhal and the Teke
multiplied the more. The prospect of a better
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futm-e TVRS hegi~lningto appeal1 over tho horizon mllon the Russian ilivasion came on the
Akllala liko n, thmidcr-cloud-but me anticipate
tlie 11rogrms of events.
Noor Vcrdi h:d soon after his accession to
tho cllicftnin,gllil~strivcn to coma to torms with
tho l'arsians. Ho pcrcoivad that thc intcrmittent yet novor-consing W~LL' W ~ E aI source of
wc:ikncus to 110th sitlos, and he tliouglit tillat it
moult1 rcclouncl inoro to his credit to arrange
tho clifficulty by nn ~inilerstanding~ ~ 4 the
th
noighl~ouringPersia11governor of Koochan than
by czttcml~tingto do fio 11y forco of arms. This
governor* had nmrricd a relation of Noor Verdi,
a lady of rornnl-khlo ~ t ~ c n g of
t hchr~l'act;or,and
perhaps through lior influonce, but certainly by
eolno means, tho Turcoman chief and the
Persian govornor came to the arrangement
that; thoPo mas to be peace between them, and
that dl raids were to cease. This arrangement was strictly adhered to until about six

* For tho mroer of thin governor seo tho following
rkotch.
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years ago. - On that particular portion of the
Khorasan frontier an unusual tranquillity prevailed for years, and then by an act of
treachery on the part of the Persian this
brief period of peace was dispelled, and the old
state of confusion revived. It came to pass in
this wise.
The Governor of Bujnoord, another Persian
town on this bordei- lying west of Koochan, had
accumulated in his hands a large .number of
Turcoman prisoners, taken during a succession
of raids into Akhal territory. Noor Verdi, following up the policy of amicable arrangement
which he had already carried out with the success we have seen in the case of Koochan,
made overtures to the Governor of Bujnoord
for the redemption of these prisoners." The
preliminaries were agreed upon, and Noor

* It is quito an usual occurrence on the Khorasan frontier for Turcoman prisoners to be bought back by their
friends and relations. There is a fixed value set upon them.
An ordinary Turcoman fetches sixty tomans, a chief's son
Inope in proportion to his rank. A Turcoman woman sells
f o r five hundred tomans, some ae high ae a thouskd.
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Verdi sent a long caravan with horses, sheep,
carpets, &c., towards Bujnoord for the purpose of effecting the release of his imprisoned
kinsmen. That caravan represented much of
the wealth of the small Akhal community. It
had taken, no doubt, much labour to collect,
and the savings of many a thrifty peasant mere
willingly expended upon it in order that the
greed of a Persian governor might be satisfied.
I t carricd with it the hopes and the longings of
families-doomed, alas ! to a bitter disappointment.
The tidings of this rich train sped to Koochan.
We have seen that the governor of that town
had bound himself by an agreement with Noor
Verdi I<han neither to molest the Akhals nor
to seize their property. But promises sit
lightly on the conscience of a, governor of the
King of Kings. The prize was so great that
the temptation proved irresistible. Shuja-udDowlah resolved that the caravan should never
reach Bujnoord. He took his measures rapidly and secretly. He confided his intentions
to no one, and hastily collecting such of his
troops as were within reach, intercepted the
16
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caravan en route to Bujnoord, and returned
in triumph with the whole of the booty to
Roochan, The prize was indeed valuable, and
t h e blow to the akhals was the greater inasmuch as the prisoners at Bujnoord remained
uni-ecleemed. Such was the consequence of a
Turcoman reposing confidellce in the honour of
a Persian.
Noor Verdi swore to be avenged upon the
governor for his treachery, and he assembled
his fighting men for the purpose of either recovering something of the loss or of securillg
a n equivalent. The Akhals, not less eager
than their chief, gathered round him to the
number of six thousand men. Every preparation was made for an immediate advance against
Roochan, and a large number of the women,
children, and old men of the clan were hid
away in a glen for sa,fety, while the young men
went out to fight in order to avenge the insult
and the wrong that had been done to the Akha
people. But there was a traitor in their ranks,
a spy in thempayof Shuja-ud-Dowlah. He carried this:inforrnation to his employer, and while
the Akhals were advancing with an easy mind
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i n t o Persian territory, their crafty antagonist
' h a d outflanked them, and carried off their
women, children, and old men at a swoop from
-their place of safety. This second blov was
m o r e t h a n they could bear. The Akhals yotired,
leaving t h e Governor of Koochan a second time
triumphant. As is usual with more civiliscd
peoples, they vented their rage ancl disap~ointm e n t on their leader. They made Noor Verdi
$10 scapegoat for their misfortunes.
Noor Verdi's influence vanished, alicl the
;blame f o r these disasters being laid a t his cloor,
h e was obliged to leave Alchal and flee to 3ilerv.
F o r upwards of three years he remained on the
banks of the Murghab, and then he vel~turoclt o
-pay ,only a visit to Akhal, where he found that
'his b a d fortune had beon almost forgo$ten, and
t h a t t h e y were willing to recognise him again as
their chief. But the danger on the side of Russia
was becoming imminent, and he had resolved on
playing a greater part than he possibly could
d o a s chief of Akhal alone. His son Berdy
' B o u r a d Khan* succeeded to some of his autho-

* This chief is said t o h a ~ ebeen killed at Gaok Tupeh.
16

*
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rity, although the northern Akhals entirely
cast it off. In fact the Akhals split up into a
number of petty chieftainships, and if there
was any central authority generally recognised
during these years, it was not that of the chief of
Akhal, but of Mahomed Shah the saint of Karya.
During the absence of Noor Verdi in exile
among the people of Merv, the Akhals, enfeebled
by their struggle with the Governor of Koochan,
were called upon to encounter a more serious
peril from the direction of Kizil Arvat and
the Atrek in the shape of a Russian invasion.
A t discord with themselves, with faith shattered in the only man competent to lead them,
dispirited by their misfortunes in theil. relations with the Persians, the Akhals saw little
prospect of being able to carry on a defensive
war with General Lomakine. They decided t o
avert that war by a voluntary surrender. In
August 187.5 a deputation of their chiefs
e , tendered
waited upon General ~ ~ o m a k i n and
their submission in the following speech, "We
are surrounded on all sides by the Mervites,
Khivans, Afghans, and Persians. They all
have sought to make-us subject to their autho-

--

.

"

.

,

.

_-

.

<
.

NOOR W R D I KHAN.

+ity. Our independence could not by any possibility continue. Without awaiting, therefore,
a u r enslavement by the force of arms, we have
resolved to submit of our own accord to the most
powerful of our neighbours, who will know how
t o guarantee our security. Prom this day henceforth we are the servants of the White Czar,
and me are ready to fulfil all his desires. We
a r e thoroughly acquainted with warfare. Say
but the word, and we will place five thousand
horsemen at your service. I n return we pray
you to submit to the Whito Czar the humble
prayer of our people that he should graciously
confirm to us the enjoyment of the liberties and
immunities granted by the decrees of Timour
and Nadir Shah." *
I n the meanwhile Noor Verdi had not been
wholly idle at Merv. The death of Kousheed,
the Khan of Merv, in 1877, appeared to offer
him an opportunity for advancing his position
in that place. He took a prominent part in the
selection of that chief's successor, and, indeed,

1

* Correspondence respecting Central Ada, No, 1. (1878),
page 52.
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he seems to have himself aspired to the post.
However that may have been, he was not chosen,
and, with great tact, managed to figure as t h e
supporter of the successful candidate, while he
let it be generally known that if elected he
would not refuse the dignity. As it happened,
Kousheed was succeeded by his son Baba Khan,,
who is the present chief of Merv."
The election of n new chief was followed by
a council of war upon thc policy to be pursued
with regard t'o the Russian invasion of the
Akhal country. At that council peaceful views
did not prevail. No inclination was mahifested
to irnploTe the favourable consideration of tlio
White Czar. I n August 1878 Noor Verdi,
Baba Ehm, and other chiefa bound themselves.
by a solem11 oath to fight. With the Koran

*

Another of Kousheed's sons had visited afghanistanThis visit gave rise to rumours that an alliance hacl been
formed between the chief of Merv and Shcre Ali for t h e
purpose of mesting portions of Khorasan and Seistanfrom
Persia. This son, on his retuin journey horn Herat in
1877, was attacked m d captured by the Sarik clan of
Turcomans, which holds the country sound Penjded,
There is repeated reference to this son in the correspondence presented to ParLiament in the years 1878-79.

NOOR VERDI KHAN.

247

before them, and the sword between the leaves,
t h a n in which way no oath holds good in Turcoman land, they swore that they would not
yield their villages>their honour, and their lives .
t o t h e mercy of the Muscovites. The Akhals
of Beurma and E z i l Arvat might, by a welltimed show of surrender, endeavour to propitiate
t h e Czar and his representatives; but neither the
t r u e Akhals nor the Tekes would imitate their
kinsmen's weakness. Accordingly during the
winter of 1818 the Turcomans worked diligently,
and made their preparations with good cheerNoor Verdi now back among his own people, and
foremost in the patriotic work. A t Geok Tepeh,
Ashkabad, and along the line of the Tejend the
strongest positions were made stronger by art,
and when Lomakine, hastening impetuously
forward, fearful lest Tergoukasoff should win
t h e laurels lze had always coveted for himself,.
reached the first of those places he found t h e
Turcomans in position and prepared to fight.
The Russian regiments rushed madly upon
the earthworks, only to be hurled back. I n
t h e hand-to-hand fighting on what in a regular
fortress would have been the glacis, they were
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crnshed by numbers. I n a short day's battle
they lost more men than in any encouater they
Lave yet fought in Central Asia-more than
they did at the capture of Tashkent 01- Samarcand, more than a t Irjar, or Makhram, more
tLnn in the whole of the campaign against Khiva.
Xoor Verdi cloas not appear to have been present at this battle ; but he arrived immediately
afterwards vith a cavalry force from Ashkabad.
T l ~ emain credit of the success belongs to him.
It was he vho planned it, although it is quite
possible that he was himself indebted for his
inspiration to an ullusual source, and it was he
who, above everyone else, breathed fresh spirit
illto the sinlcing hearts of his followers.
But what he has already accomplished is as
nothing compa~edto what he will be called upon
to do, if the Russiaiis are t o be kept permanently
out of Turooman land. He has prese~vedthe
Akhal villages from the soldiers of the Caucasus
for at least this winter, but they are sure to return in greate~numbers, and with a more prudent general. Noor Verdi will, therefore, have
not onlyto strengthell his earthworks a t Geok
Tepeh and Ashkabad, but also to procure better
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arms for his followers. The nondescript weapons mhich sufficed a t Geok Tepeh will not avail
hereafter. Nor can he close his eyes to the
ever-present danger to'Merv from the side of
Charjui. Noor Verdi knows that the capture of
Merv by the Rus~ianswould strike terror to the
heart of every Turcoman, and that the Akhals
mould then, probably, come to the conclusion
t h a t further resistance would be futile. Against
that danger, which Kaufmann's return to Tashkent mould lead us to regard as the more im~llinent,Noor Verdi must provide quite as much
a s against the return of a larger army from
Urasnovodsk and Chikishlar. The prudence
and valour which he has hitherto displayed
marrant the assumption that his future plans
mill be marked by the exhibition of the same
qualities. Although not the ruling chief of
Merv, Noor Verdi is accepted by the Teke
Turcomalls generally as their leader, and on
his personal character depends more than upon
any other single circumstance the future fate of
his race. It may be the destiny of the Turcomans to share the same doom as the Erghiz,
but if they steadfa~jtlyobey the commands of

250

UENTRBt ASIAN PORTRAITS.

Noor Verdi they may possibly maintain their
independence for many generations. After
their valiant conduct at Geok Tepeh they may
certainly be expected to fight like brave men,
and thus give a fresh exemplification of the
truth of Gibbon's saying that "it , w o ~ ~ lbe
d
su~peduousto praise the valour of a Turk."*

* It,may beinteresting t o state that Berdy Mourad Khan
told Colonel C. M. Macgregor in 1875 that the Turcomanns
of Merv were resolved to resist tho Russians, when they
came, to the bitter death. His boast that the Tekes were
not afraicl of the Russians, and, Inshdla! would ahow
them what a good sword could do," reads less "vainglorious " now by the light of the fight at Geok Tepeh
than it appewed to be when uttered to Colonel Macgregor.

SHUJA-UD-DOWLAR

T E Ameer
~
Hoosein Khan, or, as he is better
known, the Shuja-ud-Dowlah, that is theBravest
of the State, hereditary chief and governor of the
frontier city and district of Koochan, is one of'
the most important personages in Persia. 'His
relation to the Shah is very similar to that of
some of the greater barons to their Sovereign
in the -Middle Ages. He is practically independent, and the only proof of his being a
Persian govelnor and not an independent prince
is furnished by the sums of money and presents
he sends to Teheran. On the northern frontier
of Khorman his word is virtually law, and
most of the smaller governors would follow his
example in any course he might adopt.
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Shuja-ud-Dowlah became Governor of EOOchan on the death of his elder brother some
eighteen or twenty years ago, the office havillg
been hereditary in his family for several generations. He married one of his brother's
ridows, a Turcoman lady, very rich and a relative of Noor Verdi. She became the con$dnnte of all his plans and the favourite among
his four wives. She is still living. At the
present time Shuja-ud-Dowlah is about fifty
years of age. He is a pure Persian by race, and
in personal appearance resembles a Jew or rather
an Afghan. H e is a short-about five feet five
inches-slender man, very dark in complexion,
with a prominent nose. He is passionately attached to sport, and justly considers himself a
first-rate shot. His days are spent away in the
mount;ahs in pursuit of game, and he leads as
active a life as most Europeans. His scholarly attainments are fair, comprising a little French and
English, and he speaks Turkish perfectly. He is
moreover a great reader, taking especial pleasure in Professor Owen's works which have been
translated into Persian. Politics are, of course,
a favourite st'udy with him, and he has very de-
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cided views upon the subject of the Russian
advance into Kara Kum, which will be touched
upon further on. I t may not be rash to say that
he is fully resolved to turn the coming complications to his own profit. H e is very much addicted to European oustoms, priding himself on
his taste in dress, and wearing trousers and a
military frock coat. He has also been infected
by other of our customs, and among them, by a
partiality for wine, of which he considers himself a connoisseur. His district is famed in
Khorasan for its vineyards, and the Governor
has a special white wine made for his own
private use. Added t o all the qualities that
have been either expressed or suggested it must
be stated that he is a good soldier, and possessed
with a more than ordinary allowance of courage
and nerve. As a companion he can be most
amusing, and his bonhomie is infectious. From
all this he would appear to be a very agreeable
and enlighteued man. There is a darker side
to tlze picture, as might be inferred from the
act of treachery described in the sketch of
Noor Verdi Khan.
For several years after the death of his
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brother the Governor carried on the work of
administration without any event of importance
taking place ; but about ten yeam ago the Shah
aummoned him to Teheran. Without any suspicion on his mind he obeyed tLs summons and
went to the capital, where he was at once cast
into prison. The Shah had resolved on placing
his eldest son in charge of the frontier of Khorasan, and it was held to be necessary to get the
Governor of Koochan into his pomer, as it was
ahrewdly suspected that he would not willingly
surrender his rights as a semi-independent chieftain. Shuja-ud-Dowlah lingered in prison : the
Prince Royal went to Meshed. Alter he had
remained in close confinement for one month,
the commander-in-chief, who was a personal
friend of his, came to him one night, and told
liim that his death had been decided upon.
His head was to be placed in a sack, and he mas
t o be smothered between two pillows. Shujaud-Dowlah, seeing no avenue of escape, exclaimed " Kismet ! " and prepared to meet the
mevitable.
The commander-in-chief left him, secretly resolved, however, that he would spare no effort to
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s a x e his friend, and so well did he plead his. cause
before the Shah, that not only was the Governor
released from prison, but he also received per.
mission to return to Koochan. Shuja-ud-Dowlah
was not slow to avail himself of the permission
granted to him, and forthwith set out for his
place of residence. When he reached Koochan
he was astonished to find the gates closed
agai'nat him. His eldest son, Abdul Hassan
K h a n , had taken advantage of his father's misfortunes to set himself up as an independent
r u l e r ; and when the father returned, the son
refused to recognise his superior rights. In
tihis it is very possible that he received indirect
encouragement from the Prince Governor of
Khorasan.
T h e youthful aspirant reckoned, however,
wjkhout his host. Shuja-ud-Dowlah was not
yet in the mood for resigning power and independence. H e summoned round him his old
followers, he proclaimed his return throughout
fihe districts of Koochan and Bujnoord, and he
soon found himself at the head of a sufficiently
numerous force to enable him to take the field
against his rebellious son. He attacked Koocban,
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and expelled Abdul Hassan from the district.
Thus did Shuja re-establish his authority in
Koochan after it had seemed that he woulld
never see the outside of a Persian prison. T h e
vanquished pretender fled t o Teheran, where h e
received a different reception to his father. Instead of being thromn into prison he walshonourably entertained there, and the Shah promised t o
take steps for his advancement. I n a short
time it became evident that Shuja would b e
inattentive to the mandates of the Persian
V ~ C ~ Oand
~ the
,
thought occurred to the Shah
that Abdul would be a useful person to employ as a spy upon his actions. He accordingly
gave him a letter t o his father requiring him
to appoint him his secretary in the admiuistrxtion of Koochan.
Unable to refuse, yet unwilling t o comply
with this direct request upon the part of t h e
Shah, Shuja feigned obedience, but secretly
formed the intention of murdering his son at
the first favourable opportunity. Abdul heard
of this, and fled, on this occasion to the Turcomans.
An episode occurred about this time which

i
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will throw considerable light upon the condition of this frontier. Noor Verdi Khan had a
very beautiful daughter, the fame of whose
beauty penetrated even to the Governor's residence at Koochan, and Shuja-ud-Dowlah resolved to obtain possession of her. With that
view h e made overtures to an adventurer-%
kind of Bertram Risingham-and promised him
a considerable reward if he would oarry off the
maiden from the village of the Akhal ohief.
The offer was accepted, and the ruffian proceeded to Akhal, where he remained for several
days waiting a fwourable opportunity for exeouting his purpose. At last the opportunity
offered itself, and one evening when the maiden
left h e r hut he rushed upon her and stunned
her with a blow. Mounting a horse which he
had ready saddled, he rode off and made good
his escape from the pursuing Turcomans. The
danger on this occasion lay before, and not
behind.
On his way t o Koochan with hi~cprize he
met Shuja's son, who, spying the maiden,
asked him whither he was taking her. The
man replied, To Koochan," " Oh, I will
((
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save you the trouble."
" That cannot be,
because I am taking her to your father."
IL
Never mind my father; I must have her.
Here are three hundred tomans if you will
surrender her without resistance. If you refuse, I must take her by force." The man,
seeing opposition would be futile, consented,,
and pocketed the money. Thus did the Governor of Koochan's son win the daughter of
the Akhal chief; fort~matelyfor him, as the
event turned out, he married her.
Once among the Turcomans Shuja's son
raised the standard of revolt. He did not find
it difficult to assemble a band of followers,
when his declared object was the capture of
Koochan. In this enterprise he fared well,
carrying all before him in the field, and
compelling Shuja to ret,ire into the city. On
one occasion the latter was even driven t o
seek safety in a mosque. Reduced to these
straits, the Governor had recourse to negotiation, in which he was more successful t h m
he had been in arms. By promising to use his
influence to obtain for his son some high posb
in the Persian service, he induced Abdul to

disband the Turcoman army. The son vas
made commander of the troops at >lcshed,
b u t did not hold this post long, for, having
failed in some fresh intrigues, he fled to tllc
Turcomans a second time. His previous conduct, especially the abduction of Noor V e ~ r l i ' ~
daughter, had made him an object of hato
rather than of love to the Turcomans. It was,
therefore, doubtful what would be his reception
among them. Abdul Hassan, equal to tho
occasion, rode into the Akbal encampment nt
night, and went straight to Noor Verdi's ow11
tent. Once inside, the laws of h~spitslit~y
secured him from molestation. The next day
t h e assembled Akhals clamoured for the blood
of the man who bad carried off the daughter
of their chief. Noor Verdi, leading forth
his guest, asked him what he had donu
with his daughter. Abdul replied that 11e
h a d married her. Upon this he was forgiven and treated as an honoured guest.
T h a t marriage saved him. I n January 187s
his name was mentioned among the proposed
delegates from the Persian Government to be
sent t o Merv.

17 *
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With the exception of these disputes with
his son, Shuja-ud-Dowlah has never been disturbed in his authority, and is, practically
speaking, omnipotent in its exercise, save in
cases of life and death. Short of these, he
can do pretty much as he pleases. His punishments are as st rule very severe, and take the
form, in most cases, of mutilation. It is said
there are not a hundred men in Xoocban who
have not had their noses cut off, and many have
also lost their fingers, ears, &c. The bastinado
is also used freely, and is sometimes found to
be as fatal as the noose or the axe.
It has been mentioned that the neighbouring
governors, Allahyar Khan of Dereges, and Yar
Mahomed of Bujnoord, are subordinate to the
Governor of Koochan. They have their omn
individual troubles and difficulties to deal with,
but these do not prevent them from combiniilg
in the annual raid that is carried into Turcoman territory every spring. These chapours or
raids are the event of the year. General preparations are made for them a s soon as the snow
melts on the mountains, and these are usually completed by the month of May. It is
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difficult t o give the amount of spoil which is as
a rule obtained in these annual expeditions, but
an average computation would place it at thirty
thousand pounds. This is the impost raised
upon t h e Turcomans by force of ,arms for the
purpose of satisfying the demands of the Shah.
They of course lead to counter-raids on the
part of t h e Turcomans, and these are the more
frequent and the more daring in proportion
as the number of the prisoners taken by the
Persians is smaller.
Various schemes have been tried for the
purpose of putting a stop to these expeditions,
1

i

but as y e t they have proved in vain. The
Persian governors have limited their chapowrs
only by regard to their power and resources.
Some years ago the Shah sent a general to
investigate the matter on the spot, and he decided that no more raids should be made, and
that e fine should be paid to the Shah. The
fine was paid, but the raids continued-the fine
being paid out of the proceeds of raids organized
for the purpose. These lacts are an expressive
commentary upon the fitful efforts that are made
by the Persian Government to carry out reform.
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A governor possessilig any ordinary amount of
tact can always stave off a searching inquiry
into his acts by paying an extra sum into the
royal exchequer.
I n conclusion, something must be said of the
actual pomer of Shuja-ud-Dowlah. He is the
possessor of a large extent of rich territory,
and with it he acquires control over the largest
number of camels and horses in Khorasan. H e
has an armed force of twenty thousand men,
a nucleus of whom has been well armed and
carefully drilled. His city of Eoochan-naturally strong and surrounded with walls-supplies
him with a centre for his power, and a basis
mhence he can act with effect. He also holds
in it the true key to the whole of the northern
trade of Khorasan. I n a popular cause his
strength would be augmented by that of Bujnoord, perhaps of Dereges as well. It is a
legitimate subject for inquiry what would be a
popular cause.
Persian though he be, Shuja-ud-Dowlah is
bitterly anti-Persian in inclination. He believes
that his country is decaying, and that the days
of the Shahdom are numbered ; nor has he any

....

-

SHUJA-UD-DOWLAH.

faith in the regeneration of Persia as an antonomous state. He may be wrong, or he may be
right ; but such is his belief. E e also dislikes
his countrymen, and owes the Shah a grudge for
his treatment at Teheran years ago. These
views have obtained a strong holcl upoil the
:somewhat morbid nature of this enlightened but
despotic Persian governor. H e has expanded
them by a close consideration of the advance of
Russia from the Caspian and of England from
the Suleiman; his conviction being that Rhor a s a n must become the dependency of the one
empire or the other. He is willing, if not
*anxious,to assist; towards effecting either consummation. He is swayed by no predilections
i n the matter, but is simply intent on supporting
t h e winning side. It is very possible that in
this his imagination has got the better of his
reason, but we cannot be inclifferent to the sentiments of the most powerful man in Khorasau.
His aid might prove invaluable to the Russians
a n the occasion of their next advance from the
Atrek. His active suppo~twould, on the other
hand, be the best weapon in the armoury of
the Turcomans.

,
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YAKOOB KHAN.

MAHOMED
YAKOOB
KHAN,
late Ameer of Cabul,
is a name with which the English reader is by
this time tolerably familiar. Whether for good
or for evil, he will be inseparably connected
in history with some of the most memorable
events in Anglo-Afghan relations ; and now
that his career in his own country has finally
closed, and that he has been compeIled to swell
the list of those unsuccessful chiefs who live
upon the bounty of the Indian Government, it
may be expected that aurmise will be rife upon
the question of what might have been, and that
some little attention will be paid to the st,ory
of a life rich, even among the numerous ad-
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venturers which the soil of Central Asia has
produced so abundantly, in varied incident and
stirring episode.
Mahomed Yakoob is the third son of the late
Arneer Shere Ali. Of his brothers, Mahomed
Ali, the eldest, was killed at the battle of IKujhbaa in 1865, and Ibrahim, the second, is still
alive. Yakoob was born in the year 1849, his
mother being the daughter of the Momund chief
of Lalpura, a village situated on the northern
bank of the Cabul river near Dacca. Of his
early life at the Court of Dost Mahomed we
know nothing. He first appeared upon the scene
after the fall of Herat, whither he had accompanied Shere Bli ill the train of that prince's
father. The capture of that fortress was followed by ihe death of the aged Ameer, and the
latter event led to the proclamation of Shere Ali
as his successor. It soon became evident that
Shere Ali's claims would be disputed, and apprehensive lest his power should slip through his
fingers in the centre of the state while absent
at Herat, he hurried back with the victorious
army to Candahar.
It -is not clear for what reason Shere Ali
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nominated his third son in prefei*ence to his
,elder brothers to the responsible charge of governing Herat. They may have been in some
other part of the kingdom, or Yakoob may have
hatl some special attraction at that time, which
h e afterwards lost, in the eyes of his father.
But whatever the reason, Shere Ali marched
eastward, leaving Yakoob behind him as his
representative in the West. While the fortune
.of mar was veering from one side to the other
round Cabul, Candahar, and Gbizni, the
J3oy Yakoob mas governing Herat, Badghees,
and Perrah in all tranquillity. The western
portion of Afghanistan enjoyed undeT him a
quietude and immunity from disturbance that
made it the one spot of peace and promise
midst the troubled waters of Afghan affahqs.
Yakoob hacl not long been installed at Herat
when the wanderiug dervish, who explored
the count;ries of Central Asia in search of adventure and for the edification of Englishmen,
known now to the world by his writings as
Professor Arminius Vfimb6ry of Pesth, reached
that city. He, like every other traveller, was
received in durbar by the ruler, whom he
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-found engaged in the congenial task of reviewing his troops. Something in the manner
ar the face of tlie wayworn dervish attracted
h i s attention and excited his suspicion. Desirous
af taking him off his guard, Yakoob twned suddenly upon him with the exclamation, "You
a r e an Englishman ! " The sang f~oidof the
European proved equal to the occasion. He
repeated an appropriate text from the Eoran,
a n d the boy-ruler, if not convinced, was at least
%oo abashed to renew his inquiries. This is the
first glimpse we get of the man who is now a,
pensioner of the Indian Government. I n many
respects it is the most vivid we possess of him.
From the time of VBmbBry's visit to the year
1868 is a long stretch of time to pass over
without stopping. We are compelled to do so
for want of materials. I n many ways those four
years were important ones, both for Afghanistan
a n d for Yakoob. The cause of Shere Ali, which
at one moment promised to be triumphant,
had been finally cast down. In the sight of
most men it had been irretrievably ruined. The
principd cities, all the eastern country, were in
tihe hands of his brethren. North, as well aa
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south of the great mountain range, his authority had been repudiated. The chief supporters
of his cause had either been slain in battle or
had abandoned him. His soldiers had been
dispersed to all quarters by frequent disaster,
his artillery captured, his treasure expended.
He had nothing left save his confidence in Allah
and fate.
There remained to him, indeed, the province
of Rerat, over which his son continued to exercise sway as his lieutenant. During those
years of warfare Yakoob had been drilling the
Heratees, and gathering in the resources of
the districts entrusted to his care. All power
was centred in his hands, and although not of
very formidable pl*oportions, it was, a t least,
unquestioned so far as it went. It requires no
stretch of imagination to suppose that when
Shere Ali, sick a t heart and with small hope of
better fortune left, retired to Herat, he was in
the right mood to listen to and approve the
daring and sanguine schemes suggested to him
by his son, who, as yet knowing nothing of
defeat or disappointment, was full only of the
ignorant audacity of youth. Yakoob showed

1
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$bere Ali his trained regiments, he pointed t o
his well-supplied arsenal, he dwelt upon i;he
enthusiasm of his followers. He may also
h a v e observed that their opponents were inf l a t e d with a belief in their invincibility, that
t h e y were certainly at feud with each other,
a n d that much of their armed strength l a y
n o l * t h of the Hindoo Koosh. Whether these
arguments were used, or whether the son p u t
khe father aside and acted upon his o m behoof,
t h e fact is cleas that it was Yakoob Khan who
b e g a n the campaign of 1868 on his own resoLlrces, and with supreme control. Xhere Ali
bad failed. It remained for his son to inaugur a t e ;L more S U C C O S S ~ Uera.
~
While, therefore, Aaim and his son Surwar
were acting the parts of despotic rulers a t
C a b n l and Cstndahar, and whfie Abderrahmm
resided in a very dissatisfied mood at Ballc11,
Yakoob, nzarching from Herat and Ferrah, advanced in the direction of Girishk and the
Helmund. At this nioment Yakoob may be
s a i d t o have been at liis prillle. Ho was only
ninctecn years of ago, but hllo Afglistns, especially those of the ruling family, are then a t
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their best. Dost Mahomed was, perhaps, t h e
sole exception of an Afghan retaining possession
of all his faculties until, past the middlo of life,
Yakoob had been accustomed to exercise command from his boyhood, and his home had been
the camp, his society that of soldiers. He was
also deeply impressed with a sense of his father's
wrongs. He aspired to be his saviour. The
prize of victory would also b e for him a double
one. Not only would it obtain for him a great
military reputation, but it made it morally certain that he mould become his father's heir.
The claims of a man who had saved his cause,
who had restored a lasting tranquillity to the
whole of the country, could not be passed over.
So, doubtless^ thought the young prince as he
marched on Candahar.
Surwar, Azim's son, left Candahar with t h e
garrison and such, of the tribes as he could
gather round him for the purpose of contesting
the fords of the Helmund. His antagonist had
been too quick for him. Girishk, the family
castle of the House of Poyndah, was in Yakoob's
hands mhen Surwar reached the banks of the
Helmund; and with it he had virtually won

of the passage of the river. Still,
to do him justice, Surwar showed himself not
unworthy of the reputation of his father. H e
held his position on the eastern aide of the
river, and did his best to check the advance of the Heratees. His efforts were in
vain. Neither the headlong impetuosity of
t h e levies of Heyat nor the tactical ability
evinced by their leader was to be refused. The
battle of the Helmund was Yakoob's maiden
victory, and the high promise which it held
forth was more than justified on many a later
field.
The victory at Girishk entailed the surrender
of Candahar. Surwar fled northwards, and
the government of Aaim collapsed in the
southern portion of the kingdom. The snow
was on the ground, the timid merchant had not
yet thought of sending his goods through the
passes, the peasant had not begun to sow the
seeds for the harvest in the uplands of Afghanistan ; but it was no part of Yakoob's plan to
rerriain in idle dalliance at Candabas. With
the eye of a true soldier he had hit upon the
fatal blot in the generalship of Bhere Ali and
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his opponents. It was delay, the tardiness of
following up a success, which had lost Shere
Ali the fruits of victory. His son would, above
all things, avoid the repetition of the blunder.
His blows should not only be hard, but they
should be quick. I n that sense he may be said
to have introduced a new and striking feature
into Afghan warfare.
Almost before Aaim had received intelligence
of the fall of Candahar, Yakoob was in full
march for Ehelat-i-Ghiljie. That fortress, the
natural strength of which is so great that it
may, without exaggeration, be styled the
strongest place in Afghanistan, surrendered
without a blow. The rulers of Afghanistan
have always neglected it, partly because of the
apathy which has characterised all their measures for the improvement of the national
defences, and partly because they have been desirous not to arouse the hostility of the Ghiljies.
I n Yakoob's hands it became the advanced
base for a decisive movement against Ghizni
and Cabul. Shere Ali at this juncture arrived
with reinforcements. By this time the snow
mas beginning to disappear in the vaolIeys,and
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there was reasonable promise t h d warlike optr a t i o n s could be carried on in the nortllcll*n
q u a r t e r s of the state. The advance t o Kllelal;
developed into a march on Ghizni. The tolvll
a n d fortress of Ghizni opened its gates.
commandant, with a small body of dcsper a t e men, withdrew into the citadel, but t~l:~t,
f a c t presented no significance. Yakoob felt
that he could ignore the small force holdillg
t h e citadel, as he was in possession of tho
g r e a t e r portion of the fortress. He ma;rchccT
northwards on Cabul, which at once surreiideyed. Azim fled to Balkh, there to join
Abderrahman, who by this time had collectcil
an army, and was on the point of marching
for the purpose of coming to conclusions with his cousin. Abderrahman had
few doubts that the conqueror of Shero Ali
w o - ~ ~ have
l d less success against the son. Alr e a d y in his mind he was, for a second time,
the arbiter of the fate of Afghanistan, and 110
expected that the guerdon of his toil on this
occasiou would be that he, as Afzul'~ sol),
wo-Llld receive the Ameership. I n dl this hc!
was reckoning upon too sanguine premises-
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Rapidity of motion had mads Yakoob's campaign a promenade of triumph after triumph
from the banks of the Helmund to the gates of
the Bala Hissar. He did not fail to employ
the same means now at the crucial point of the
war, and the like fortune attended his measures.
While Abderrahman was engaged in the difficult task of leading his miscellaneous forcespart Usbeg and part Afghan-through
the
defiles of Sighan, Yakoob, with a smaller army,
had taken up a strong position in front of
Bamian, and was in readiness to do battle for
the defence of the road to Cabul. We know not
with which side the action began, but the result
was a complete victory for Yakoob. The Khan
of MaimenB, with whom Yakoob had entered
into relations while ruling at Herat, at this
moment made a hostile demonstration in the
rear of Abderrahman, and compelled him and
his uncle t o retire into Kohistan instead of
upon Balkh. There he gathered round him
t h e nucleus of his army, and strove to seize
Cabul by a coup de maim. Yakoob was again
too quick for him. When Abderrahman reached
the vicinity of the city he found Yakoob and

11
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h i s army drawn up in readiness to receive him.
Foiled in his attempt, he withdrew in the direction of Ghizni, followed by Yakoob. He
managed to effect the relief of the garrison of
the citadel of that place, but the effort cost
h i m dear, for Yakoob attacked him and inflicted
considerable loss upon his rear-guard. Shortly
afterwards, being compelled to give battle a t
Tinah Khan, Yakoob's star again shone in
hhe ascendant, and Abderrahan and Azim
were obliged to flee t o Persia. Tho campaign,
which had been boldly conceived, had been
boldly carried out; and the closing days of the
year 1868 saw the complete success of the plan
which had been formed a t its commencement.
The civil war that had devastated Afghanistan
during five years had finally terminated, and
its close brought; credit to Yakoob Khan above
every one else.
The war had scarcely concluded when Shere
A l i set out from Cabul to visit Lord Mayo. On
that journey Yakoob did not accompany him.
T h e conqueror of the country remained behind
t o be its pacifier. While at Umballa the Ameer
expressed the most friendly sentiments towards

'r
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his son. Yakoob was depicted to the English
officials as a warrior and a hunter-a man of
action. But already in his heart the Ameer
felt desirous of making his youngest son, ,Abdullah Jan, his heir. He was secretly afraid of
Yakoob, and had very little faith in his show
of obedience ; and therefore, although Yakoob
was generally accepted as his successor, no
formal proclamation was made of his being the
heir apparent. For a time Yakoob was Governor of Cabul, and then he held the same
post a t Candahar. But it soon became evident
t o him that Shere Ali had either forgotten or
wilfully ignored the greatness of the obligation
he owed him. The desire to humour a favourite
wife overcame the father's sense of gratitude,
and Yakoob, seeing that his presence a t Candahar would not prevent the nomination of
Abdullah Jan a t the first favourable opportunity, retired to Perrah.
A t that place Yakoob collected a small army,
and with it in 1871 he made himself master
of Herat. For three years he governed Herat,
Ghorian, and their dependencies for himself.
Shere Ali had the prudence to leave him to his

1
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own devices. This mas the period when Captain
Marsh visited Herat, and was very hospitably
entertained by Yakoob.* He found the Heratees
exceedingly well disposed towards England, and
their ruler shared their sentiments. Yakoob
was actively engaged in the task of creating an
army. H e had regular regiments, both of infantry and of cavalry. He had also constructed
si> smooth-bore six-pounder guns, and stored
up a large number of miscellaneous weapons.
Captain Marsh computed that, in all, Yakoob
could bring ten thousand men into the Geld.
He pronounced the young ruler to be a very
rising man and one of whom we should some
day hear a great deal more. Yakoob Khan
appears to have governed Herat with the same

* Captain Marsh gives the following description of
Yakoob Khan at this time in his book (LCA Ride through
Islain," 1877). " He was drcssed in a European military
braided blue coat, with black trousers, socks, the Eeratee
sliecpskin 7culla or hat, a i d a fine cloth choga; and his.
gold-belted sword lay in front at his feet. He is twentysix years old, well bred, has a pleasant intelligent face,
not very fail., middle height (five feet three inches (?)),
small hands and feet, slight moustache, with a slightly
yetreating forehead, good voice."

'

,

2 78

(;

i

+
4

1f t,
1, ,:
u

I

,
I

I

I i

I

(TENTEAL ASIAN POUTRAITS.

ability and success on this second occasion that
he had done upon the first. &though often
reduced to straits for want of money, he does
not seem to have resorted to acts of tyranny
for the purpose of replenishing his coffers.
But the inadequacy of his resources for the.
task of administering the affairs of a large propince compelled him at length to make overtures to his father. He asked that a sum of
money might be given him so that he should
govern Herat as lieutenant for Shere Ali ; and
the result of the communications that took
place with that object in view was that Yakoob left Herat and went to Cabul, trusting
to his father's promise to permit his return
in safety. This was in October 1874. On t h s
30th of the month Yakoob reached Cabul,
where he received a friendly greeting from his
father. Trays of sweetmeats were sent to t h e
different stages where he halted, by the Ameer,
Abdullah Jan, Ibral~imKhan, and others. H s
was accompanied by two or three chosen companions, among them his father-in-law, Yallya,
Khan, and one hundred cavalry. Yakoob met,
as we have said, with a friendly reception from

279-

TAKOOB IIZIAN.

,

1

1

Sbere Ali, whom, "according to the custom
of the country, he tvaited upon, and kissed
His Highness's feot." * no brought with him
numerous presents, hcluding
thirty-six
horses of superior breod and some choice cloth
manufactures of Hcrat, such as ' k~~rlr,'
' Icalruma,' carpets, woolle11 ' clnris,' &c." A11 those
mcro ncccptod, and in rcturn the Ameer scnt
him coolrcd food from the royal lritchcn and
assignccl him a cash siafat, or allowance.
Yakoob stipulated that ho should not bc dotainecl more than ten days, that he should be
excusccl ~vaiitingon or seeing the ]leir apparent,
and Lhat lic shoulcl bc nllo\vccl to take his adherents back with him. All thcsc points vere
agreed to by tho Amec-r's representa;tives, mllo
mere two Ghiljio olziefs. On tho very clay when,
in nccorda~lcowith this arrangement, Yakoob,
shorllcl have beon pormittccl to leave Cabul, he
was by tho Ameer's orders placecl in custody.
Tho 8th of Novcmber fowzcl the young sirdar
not a traveller on his journey back to Herat,
'(
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hut the occupant of a state prison. The
Viceroy of India-Lord
Northbrook-made
representations to Shere Ali upon the subject
of his breach of faith, but he took our intervention in an ill sense and cherished u p
against us a grievance upon that score. I n his
letter to Lord Northbrook he wrote, " Mention
before a father of the evil actions of his son
~mdoubtedly tends to inci-ease the father's
I

i

6-

.shame. Sincere, intelligent friends, owing to
their sound judgment and far-sightedness, do
not like, under any circumstances, t o put their
faithful friends to such shame."
So it came to pass that Yakoob Khan, the man
who had reconquered a lost kingdom for his
sire, and given a settled government t o a large
province for several years, received as his reward a place of confinement instead of honours.
His services had been great, and his ability
admitted; but, whatever the provocation, he
had been a rebel. He had acquired possession
of Herat by main force. It was impossible
that the Ameer or his advisers should show
themselves indifferent to what had happened.
Shere Ali, anxious to have as his successor the
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child Abdullah Jan, knew that his dynastic
schemes would have small chance of succeeding if Yakoob were to consolidate his authority
a s Governor of Herat. His own death - ~ o u l d
be the signal, he could not fail to perceive,
for a civil war in which his favourite son woulci
b e inevitably defeated. When Yakoob enterecl
t h e Bala Hissar his fate was sealed. Not t h e
sacred oath sworn upon the Koran at Herat
by the Ameer's envoys, not the venerat,ed
-privileges of a guest, co~zldsave the man who
h a d been marked as dangero~zsby the king.
Neither the rites of religion nor the unpolluted example of eastern custo~n avail in
Afghan eyes to probect either the stranger
mithin their gates, or the too promineut or
too ambitious vassal whose slaughter the ruler
h a s decided upon.
From November 1874 until December 1878
t h e figure of Yakoob Ehan disappeared from
Afghan politics. It was even uncertain whether
h e had not been summarily disposecl of. His
friends-and
he had many-endeavoured
to
obtain his release.
His father-in-law ancl
several Ghiljie chiefs offered to go bail for

'I
I

him, but aJ1 their efforts were in vain. Y a koob remained a ~risoner, and it was n o t
until the death of Abdullah Jan in August,
1878 that his friends began to have any solidk
hopes of obtaining his pardon. But even
then Shere Ali showed no great eagerness to
release him. Yakoob's name was not mentioned, indeed, until after the war had oommenced, and when brought out of confinement,
the outer line of the afghan defences had
been pierced by the English army, and S h e r e
b l i mas on the point of leaving his capital
for Afghan Turkestan. The suddenness of
this resolution is best shown by the Ameer's
own words upon the subject. Writing on t h e
19th of November to the Viceroy, he speaks
of him as his " undutiful son, the ill-starred
wretch, Ya.koob Khan." I n his &man, dated
22nd of December 1878, appointing Yakoob
his representative, he styles him "our elder
and beloved son." *
It was in December 1878, therefore, that,
I

* Afghan Correspondonce, No.

7. (1879), pages 5 and 8-
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after more than four years imprisonment, P a koob returned to public life. The withdrawal
of Shere Ali to Balkh left him in possession of
most of the attributes of power, but nevertheless he made it clear that he mas only acting in
the place of his father. This is shown in his
letter of the 20th of February 1879, to Major
Cavagnari, in whicli he said that he would
" bring every human effort to bear on my esalted father in the hope that, perhaps, t h e
friendship of this God-granted State with the
illustrious British Government may remain
constant and firm." Within a meek of writing
t h a t letter-on the 26th of February-the news
of the death of Shere Ali reached Cabul, and
Yalcoob at once sent our representative tho
information " out of friendship."
There is no doubt whatever that, in leaving
Yakoob to act for him, it mas the intention of
Shere Ali that he should be his peace-maker
with the English Government. The mcasurcs
which Yakoob adopted show this with sufficient clearness. Prom the very commencement his actions were conciliatory. With the
object of establishing relations of friendship

settling the quarrel between the States, he
carried on a correspondence with Major Cavagnari from February until May. I n all
h e mrote seven letters upon the subject, and
i n each it is possible to detect only the ex-pression of a corclial amity, and an earnest
desire to stand me11 with the Indian Government.
On the 6th of MaT& the terms upon which
peace would be concluded mere sent to him by
order of the Viceroy, and in his reply, dated
the 12th of the same month, Yakoob acquiesced
in them all, save the one relating to the cession
of tlie nominal control exercised by the Arneer
over the passes, and of the districts of Sibi,
Yisheen, and Ichurum. To that he made an emphatic refusal. I t mas " beyond tho strength
aud capacity of the officers of his God-granted
Government." From that date until the end
of April, frequent negotiations took place between the two Governments, and at last, after
it had been arranged that Major Cavagnari
should proceed to Cabul, Yakoob suddenly
came to the determination to irisit the English
camp. On the 11th of April Lord Lytton had
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addressed a letter to him styling him Wali of
Cabul and its dependencies, and this may be
coilsidered to have been the first formal recognition by the Indian Goverament of his accession to the Axneership.
On the 3rd of May Yakoob left Czibul, and on
tho 8th reached the camp of the advancecl British force at Gundamuck. He was accompanied
by several of his chief supporters, and an escort
of between four and five hundred men. Ele
was evidently pleased with tlie friendly and
ho~lourablerecegtiou which a~vaitedhim, and
it is probable that, notwithstanding his apparent coolness, he was inciucecl by the impulses
of the moment to exaggerate the advantages he
might obtain as an ally of the English Government. l3verything was coloured with sang~zina
expectations at Gundamuck, The Ameer had
been summoned originally to power to xnalce
peace. Tho Indian Government mas also
much disposed to arrange the difficulties that
had arisen with Shere Ali. So after less than
three msoks' discussion Yakoob's objections to
tho cession of territo~yJvoro overcome and a
treaty ~nscclon tile cicnlancls fo~mulatcdthree

286

CENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

months before by the Viceroy was drawn up
and signed on the 26th of May.*
The following description of the appearance
of the Ameer at this time is well worth preTimes "
serving. It is taken from the
correspondeat's letter, dated May 9th :" His appearance, I shoulcl. say, is decidedly
aristocratic. He is of middle height, straight,
and well built. His complexion is that of an
Italian, and infinitely fairer than that of many
of the bronzed warriors one sees in the British
camps. His features are of the usual coarsely
aquiline Afghan type. His expression is somewhat stern and careworn, but indicates character and resolution. His beard is short and
crisp, and at his age, thirty-four," (he was only
thirty years of age at this time,) C c is doubtless
of its natural black colour, undisguised by the
cosmotics so freely used by Afghans when gray
hairs appear. The b e e r rode a well-bitted,
light chestnut Turcoman charger, equipped
'(

The articles of the Treaty of Gundamuck will 'be
found enumerated on page 21 of " Afghan Correspondence
(No. 7.), 1879."
@
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with European military saddle and bridle. He
mas dressed in an Afghan cloak of the finest
material of the country, made with evident
attention to a becoming fit, and wore European
trousers fastened under a neat polished-leather
boot by chain straps. His head-dress was a
close-fitting cap of Astrakhan wool. He sat his
horse erect and well, and it was easy to fancy
him the gallant soldier and skilful general
which in his earlier years he so often proved
himself to be."
Yakoob soon became very popular in the
camp. His " dignified and composed demeanour
on public occasions," and "his entire freedom
from either a cringing or a swaggering air,"
were much admired. Wonder was often expressed how one who had so recently arrived
a t kingly state should have acquired so soon
" the correct kingly air."
As a matter of fact
there was nothing to excite wonder in this.
Not only is it notorious that Afghans of good
birth possess great natural dignity, and that
the Barucksyes have always been remarkable for
pride of race ; but Yakoob had from his earliest
youth been accustomed to command. As a boy
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and as a man he had governed Herat ; and he
had led armies in the field when English youths
would be still in the school-room. It would
have given j u t e r cause for wonder and astonishment if the grandson of Dost Mahomed
had shown l~iimself deficient in "the correct
king1y air. "
The negotiations at Gundarnuck closed in
the same harmonious manner as they had
commenced. Writing on the 30th of May to
the Viceroy, Yakoob said that he had hoped to
have had " the unbounded pleasure of a joyful
interview " with His Excellency at Simla, but
that various circumstances, prominent among
which was " the anarchy prevailing in his kiugdom," compelled him to put off his journey.
But the pleasure was still looked forward to,
and "towards the close of the next cold season," that is t o say in March 1880, he anticipated having the pleasure of carrying out his
visit to the Viceroy. In June Yakoob returned
t o Cabnl, and the British army had been withdrawn before the close of the month behind the
western entrailce of the Khyber. Cavagnari,
to whose tact and unflagging energy the success
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of the delicate negotiations with the Ameer
was mainly due, returned to Peshawur to make
arrangements for his early departure for Cabul,
where he was to take up his abode as the
" permaneut British Resident." This was to
be the reward for his great services, and it was
the one which he coveted more than any other
that could have been bestowed upon him.
On the 14th of July Cavagneri, who had
just been knighted, reached Khurum fort, and
ten days afterwards entered Cabul. The follo wing extract from a description* written by
himself of the scene on his entry into the city
gives a graphic account of it :"About four miles from the city, Sirdar Abdoolah
Khan, son of the famous Sultan Jan, of Herat, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and an escort
of cavalry, met the Envoy. Two elephants, with gilt and
silver howdahs, had been sent for the use of the Envoy
and his Staff. Close to the city tho whole of the Cabul
garrison, consisting of two cavalry regiments, two batteries of artillery, and uine infantry regiments, were drawn
up in close column, aud presented arms as the c o ~ t S g o
passed. The bands played what they imagined was
'God save the Queen,' but if the tune and time mere

*

See ('Times," August 30, 1879.
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somewhat faulty, the honour intended for the British
guests by giving them their National Anthem was none
the less appreciated. As the Envoy's elephant entered
the gate of the Bala Hissar, or citadel of Oabul, a salute
of seventeen guns was fired by a heavy battery (the siege
train of 18-pounders which the British Gove~iimenti n
former days gave to the b e e r Shere Ali Khan) posted
on some rising ground i n front of the city. The housetops and shop windows of that part of the city through
~ K i c hthe procession passed were crowded with sight-seeen,
but the conduct of the crowd was orderly and reapectful
in tho extreme. A guard of honour mas drawn up a
short clistance from the gateway of the quarters appointed.
by the h e e r for the residence of the British Embassy,
and as the Envoy alighted from his elephmt the Commander-in-Chief and the Finance Minister waited on him.
and conveyed friendly inquiries from the Ameer. I n the
afternoon Major Sir Louis Cavagnari and Staff paid it
formal visit to the Ameer. The bnilding in which the.
members of the Embassy are loclged is vcry commodious,.
and is considcred one of t l e best clmelling-houses in
Cribul. There are two houses, one four-storied, the other
two-storied, connected by side walls, so that there is a
spacious quadrangle in the centi3e. The superstructure of
these houses is principally of wood, with slndl kiln-baked
bricks Luilt in between frameworks of wood. This is said
to be tho best style of building to withstand earthqualres,
which are very frequent in Cabul. The houses had been
thoroughly cleaned and whitewashed, and are by no means:
uncomfortable. During the whole of the journey the
officers and escort of the Embassy were the guests of t h e
Ameer. Large trays of cooked food of various descrip-
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tions were sent three times a day to the officers, and
rations were served out to the escort and camp-follomer~,
Fruit was supplied in such great profusion that the baggage animals mere seen feasting off tl large heap which
the camp-followers were unable to dispose of."

I n a closing sentence he said that this hon'

ourable and ostentatious reception woulcl. give
a quietus to those pessimists who questioned
the Ameer's power throughout his kingdom.
The result shoved, unfortunately, that there
was solid reason for questioning the stability of
the Ameer's power. For nearly six veeks the
English Embassy remained undisturbed in the
city, and then, after some varnings had been
given, there occurred that outbreak on the 3rd
of September, on the part of the Ameer's troops,
which resulted in the destructioli of Sir Louis
Cava,gnari, his three companions, Mr. Jenkyns,
Lieutenant Hamilton, and Dr. Kelly, aiicl. their
escort -with two or three exceptions - of
seventy-six men of the Corps of Guides. That
terrible event roueed the greatest indignation
in the breasts of all Englishmen, and well it
might, for never in our history had worthier
representatives of the country been done to
so shameful and so unprovoked a death.
19 *
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The policy of Yakoob Khan had for some
weeks before that occurrence become more tortuous than the results attained a t Gundamuck
would have led us t o suppose. Before Sir
Louis Camvagnarihad resided long st Cabul it
mas made apparent by Yakoob's acts that his
mind was in a vacillating state with regard t o
the value of the English alliance. He was evidently beginning to repent of the complaisant
part which he had played. His objections t o
the cession of territory recovered something of
their original force. The reproaches of his
brother Ayoob could not but exercise great
inflnence upon a mind which, whether it had
become unstrung by long confinement or not,
was certainly tuned to the high key of one accustomed to brood over great deeds. Those
reproaches came fast and frequently; and they
acquired fresh weight because they were reciprocated by the soldiers who, in the month of
August, reached Cabul from Herat. In July
the English Envoy was the most welcome of
guests ; in August the Ameer was plainly tired
of his presence. Yakoob has always protested,
and still protests, that he had a sincere personal

1
1
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regard for Cavagnari, and there appears in his
conduct nothing inconsistent with the declarotion. It may be that througllout he was playing
a part, and that his good temper in the negotiations with the English authorities ai-ose
from a sinister purpose. We have no proof,
however, of this ; and certainly he could have
attained the same end with less difficulty by
pursuing a straighter and simpler course.
The probabilities are altogether in favour of
the view that up to May Yakoob earnestly
desired t o come to terms with the English.
With the signature of peace a great weight was
taken off his mind. He knew that dangers and
difficulties surrounded him ; but he thought
that he could overcome them. He believed
that his star would yet prove in the ascendant. On his return to Cabul he found himself
brought face to face with the elements in t,he
coulltry inimical t o England, and in the silent
struggle he fared worse than he anticipated.
Before August ended he had become virtually
powerless to arrest the career of the nation
towards open hostility to England. The question he had then to decide was, whther he

'

I

I

I

294

CENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS.

should float with the stream, or endeavour
t o stem the national i m p l s e by risking his position. The doubt still tormented him, and his
mind was vacillating between the two courses,
when his soldiery took the matter out of his
hands and decided the progress of events by
massacring the British Envoy and his companlons.
There can be little doubt that if Yakoob
had not been in this state of mental uncertainty
he might have done much more than he did
towards saving the lives of our countrymen.
While admitting the extelluating circumstance
of the effect upon a sensitive mind at discovering that the peace which terminated a
disastrous war was far from being popular
with his subjects, it is impossible to refrain
from expressing a decided opinion that both
as an ally and as a host Yakoob's conduct
fell very far short indeed of what was required
of him. The excuses he made for his apahhy
and inaction were, a t the time, palpably insufficient. They have since been conclusively
shown to have been utterly false. Yakoob
Khan did nothing on the 3rd of September, for
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+be siinple and sufficient reason that ho was
not prepared tjo run counter to the desircs of
a large section of his people. Those mishes
w e r e being proclaimecl in an unmistakable
manner, and so far as possible Yakoob de.sired to place himself in harmony with them.
1Je probably never intended to go tho full
length of a rupture with England; but the
acts of his countrymen precipitated the catastrophe.
It mould, perhaps, be unfair to come to an
adverse opinion on the subject of Yakoob's
conduct in leaving his capital for the camp of
General Roberts, and of the incident* which
.occurred on the eve of the battle of Charasiab.
Nor should too much bo made of the chal*ge
.that has been brought against him of having
concealed letters from the Russian authorities
while showing us " dummies." Such collduct
would no doubt be very reprehensible in an
European-it has been known, however, in our
history-but as this is a case of an Afghan it is

* He was visited by one of the Afghan leaders.
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useless to descant upon its iniquity. Yakoob
mould have played a bolder part if he had cast in
his lot with the rebels, but then that wo~~lcl
liavo
been taken as evidence of his participation in
their previous crimes. It was the preclominant
element of weakness in his character that he
wished to stand well with us, and hs was evidently anxious to save his personal reputation
after the t.ragedy of the 3rd of September. For
that reason he came to the camp of Sir Frederic
Roberts, but he could not forget that he was
an Afghan ruler, and, as such, bound to take
care of the interests of his people. He found
the English advancing with rapid and irresistible strides towards Cabul, and in the eye of
each soldier he saw the fixed resolve to exact
a very terrible revenge for the murder of tho
gallant Cavagnari. H e strove to avert the
danger by counselling a delay ; but his argumeizts were unavailing. The march on Clabul
continued.
Then he expressed a desire to leave our camp
and t o return to his capital. Perhaps he had
resolved to place himself at the head of his
troops, perhaps to flee with his treasure t o

T~zrkestaa. His desire was not colnplied with,
however, and he witnessed from tho English
camp t h e flight of his army a t Charasiab and
t h e entry into Cabul. H e saw also the destructiou of the Bnla Hissar, and then, sick of
a titular rank which had brought him neither
t h e attributes of power nor the pleasure of
tr anquillity, he abdicated. That act, which
was taken by Afghans to mean that he was
tired of being an English nominee, served undoubtedly to revive his sinking popularity ;
and his name would infallibly have become
t h e rallying cry for those who were hostile to
this country. It was wisely decided that he
should be conveyed to India, and the resolution, suddenly taken, was speedily acted upon.
W i t h his arrival a t Chunar, the place which
t h e Viceroy has selected for him to reside in,
Yakoob's public life may be considered to have
reached its close, for the present at all events.
It is highly improbable that he will ever return
as ruler t o Cabul. Such an event would be the
stultification of all our recent policy. But Dost
Mahomed returned after two years of apparently hopeless exile, and Yakoob Khan will
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doubtless beguile his time with the hope t h a t he
will have similar good fortune. Taken in its
whole, his cayeer is one of the most picturesque
we have been called upon to consider, and if his
manllood belied the promise of his youth it must
be admitted that there have been few princes
who had better right to comlslain of fortulle.
H e is the chief living representative of a remarkable family, and, if his character showed
many of the faults and weaknesses of Afghan
nature, he at one time possessed in a high degree
the military skill and personal fortitude which
made the House of Poyndah the foremost among
&he families of the Duraai-Abdalis.

NOTE.
-

Since the preceding pages were writtien some
further information has been received from
India; but, until the Report of the Commission
of Inquiry is published, the rumours which are
current on the subject of the b e e r ' s conduct
should be received with diffidence. It is said
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$hat Yalcoob Khan signed t h e o r d e ~for the
a t t a c k on the Residency, and, if proof of such
.anact v e r e in our hands, it was the height of
weakness on the part of our authorities to
refrain from at once inflicting the only punishm e n t adequate t o so heiilous and inexcusable
a crime. The very fact that General Roberts
did not include the Ameer among those who
suffered for their guilt should be the clea~est
t o k e n that he possessed no proof of Yalroob's
criminality. Moreover, it is not to be supposed that the Afghan prince mould have
i,
that he
come into our camp at K ~ ~ s hknowing
w a s leaving behind him at Cab111 the proof of
his having participated in the massacre of the
3 r d of September. His departure from his
capital-which
expressed his repudiation of
t h o crime of his subjects-showed that he was
s t i l l anxious to preserve his good name among
t h e English; i n fact, that his mind was still
oscillating between his double duty as an Afg h a n prince and as a British ally. If he had
signed Cavagnari's death-warrant, if, indeed,
he had done anything more than make himself
a n object for pity by his helplessness, and
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want of resolution, he would have vanquished
the doubts which beset him, and would never
have come illto the British camp at all. The
very peril which, on the supposition of his
l~avingapproved of the attack on the British
Envoy, attached to him, personally, above every
other, would have impelled him into a consistent course of hostility t o the English. He
mould have cast all his treaty obligations to
the minds as useless trammels, and would have
figured as a new Akbar Khan. The balance of
evidence is, therefore, in favour of the view
that, while his irresolution and faint-heartedness
were most culpable, his actions stopped short
of being criminal.
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ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA,
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.
Times, April 14, 1879.-(I Tho valuo of those two volnmo~does
not o o n ~ i ~
iut tho closely-'ensonod but well-worn a r p m e n t s in
favour of a decided forwwd movement, so much us in the lucid
and admirdbly written ohapters descriptive of the history of Ruesian and English conquests and explorations in Central Asia, in tha
olear sum~naries of the military strength of tho two nations in
tho Esst, and in the brief recital of tho relationship existing between tho two great PoweFs, and the Mahomedm Gtates, which,
according to Mr. Boulger, must sooner or later inevitably be abThe chapters devoted
sorbed into the one or the other.
to Afghanistan, to Persia, and to a desoription of our frontier are
worthy of close perusal.
His resum6 of Afghan history
There is much in Lho boolc to
is an admirable summary.
which the advocates of ' masterly inactivity ' will tako exception :
on the other hand, there is muoh that makes i t one of t,he most
valuable works on the Central Asian Question that have yet beoa
published."

. ..

. . .
. . .

Standavd, April 24, 1879.-'I We have had no space t o fio more
than to allude to many of tho mattcrs ombraced in this comprehonsive worlr before us. The comparison of tho fighting strength
which England and Rusaia nre rospeotivoly likely t o be able t o
place upon tho ground should thoso nations moet in, or on tho
frontiers of, Afgliallistan, is worked out with mnoh thought and
detail. Tho question of the nrmies of the native princes of I n c l i ~
i~one in itself meriting an exhaustive oxamination and which wo

can now only recommend for thoughtful perusal and examinatton.
Mr. Boulgcr is rapidly becoming an omoritus in all matters relating to Asiatic politics, and the book before us is one which every
student anxious to forecast the futuro ought to road!'
Blackwaod's Magazilte, May, 187%-If Mr. Boulger's two bulky
volumes contain a quantity of information, which has becn carefully compiled, and what is more to the purpose, thoroughly
digested, and presentea t o the reader in a very interesting manner
for the purpose of vigorously enforcing a policy which apparently
aims a t nothing less than rolling Russia backwards to the Caucasus, and beyond the Oxus ; and as a means to t h t end to soiw
Herat, arm the Turoornm8, and practically administer the empire
of Persia!'

fit. potmsburg aa1os.-Three sopal-ate reviews :of this work appeared in the Bolos during the months of June and July ; and the
description of Mcrv in t h e first volume was quoted in e~tensoin its
issue for August 1st.
Saturday Rouiew, May 3, 1879.-" His literary power is not inconsiderable, and his diligence, method of inquiry, and selootion of
materials, as we have said, are worthy of praise. In the crowd of
recent competitors for t h e oar of the public on Ccntral Asian
matters he is fairly entitled to take a high rank. His remarlrs
on the composition of the native army of India ought to command
attention from military mon; and on minute points of geography
he appears to have spt~rodno exortions t o attain complete accuracy,
and t o bring down tho results of explorations, pursued under trying
circumstances, to tho very latest date. The very vehemence of his
political convictions ought to insure him readers; and if we have
eoleoted paasngos which oxhibit him in the light of an enthmiast,
it is from no wish to detract hom the timely importance of his
publication."
Aeadenty, May 17, 1879.-" His resume of the relations of Russia
with Tnrkestan and Persia end of our own dealings with Persia ancl
Afghanistan w
ill be found especially useful to those who wish to
recall the events in question!'
Guardian, October 15, 1879.-" Enough has probably been said to
recommend EwgLmd and Russia in Central Asia to all who ~ n u h
to thoroughly understand the position of tho Central Asian Qucstion. It has j u ~ tthe information which it is so difficult to know
where to look for, a n d which people want in order to come to a
reasonable conclnsion as t o what should be England's policy in the

&at."

Pall Null :Gazette, May 30, 1879.-"Mr. Boulger's volumes ooutain an i m m ~ n s eamount of valuable information in regard to what
is generally known as the Central Asian Quesdon!'
Emantiaa, April 12,1879.-" It has been our fortune to go over
most of the same ground covered by Mr. Boulger's volnmea, and we
can declare, and especially as regards the Russian portion of tho
book, that a better and more faithful description of Central Asian
politics could scarcely be written. I t is rarely that a writer can
claim to have added two standard works to our literature within a
few short mouths of each other, but Mr. Boulger can oertaiiily take
credit Iui- this; and it will be s, grateful reward for his arduoua
labours to kuow that his ' Yakoob Beg' and hia Central Asia '
will be regarded as the statesman's text-books for many years to
come."

Globe, May 10, 1879.-"At
last we have the Central Asiatio
Question dealt with on broad lines as a whole, and although many
will probably disagree from the author's oonolusiona, i t lnust bo
allowed to him that he has done his work in veiy thorough
fashion, with an amplitudo of detail leaving nobhing to be desired,"
Morn,ing AdtJertiser, April 16, 18'79.-" Ransacking every possible
source of information, leaving undealt with no single subject whioh
hae any bearing on his theme, Mr. Bonlger has prodnced a work on
the most interesting topic of the day whioh is at once exhauative
and up to dato. Possessed previously of an intimate acquaintanoe
with Contra1 Asian matters, he has now stamped himself as one of
the greatest living authorities upon them. The policy whioh he
advocates will probably not h d favour with many, for i t is bold
and comprehensive, but the instructed few will realiae the fact t h a t
he has supported his views with cogent arguments. I t is diffioult
to review the book before us, so fnll and varied are its contents, so
wide its soope!'
Whitekall Review, April 5, 1879.-" This is the most exhaustive
work on the greatest question of the day whioh has been published
i n any language. It is also brought down to &to, for even the
death of Shere Ali is mentioned. The author has evidently gone to
eve1.y possible source for information-British and foreign books,
newspapers, and the proceedings of scientXc societies. He also
brings to bear on his subject the fruits of years of previous patient
study and an impartin1 though bold and comprehonsive miud."
Graphic, May 3, 1879.-"Among
chapters of solid worth we
might instance those on the military value of our native army,
having regard espeoially to its officering ; on the forces Russia can
bring into tho field on her two main lines of advance-lines, by the

k a y , not always sufficiently kept distinct by English readers-from
Tnshlrcncl, the hcad-quartors of General Kaufmaun, and from TransCaspiana, tho commancl oP Lomakine ; on tho schemes for ahorteni n g tho rlistances betwcon the Caucasus and the frontier either by
n railway from tho Ca~piunt o tlle Aral or by restoring the Osaa to
of
i t s pre-historic bod ; and on thc doLail8 at' Lomalcii~o'sopor~~tior~s
last :~utumnon the 11llo from Chikisblar to Kizil Arvot f o ~Merv.
Altogether a 1v01.k t o bo taken in some respocts czcnb gyano, but
as a cornpilstion, perhaps, t h e best that could bo named for
roadors clcsirous of being woll and qnicl;ly posted up-with
the
further ail1 of fat-sin5ilus or the ltuss~anofficial maps-in all the
chief points, ~nilltaryor goographical, of the frontier quesLion in
Central Asia."
IlZust~.ated L o n d o n Netus, Api*il 26, 1879.-'I Wo find mu011 recoadito information upon this subject in the lesrned work of Mr.
Domctrius Uoulger just publishocl."
Hol15o NCIUY,
May 9, 1879.-"Tho
chapters on tho Anglo-1udis11
army, on yccont English explorations i n Ccrltral Asia, on tho various
routes loading from Russian territory into India, ai~clon the Amou
Dnrya, or Oxus, tare all of the highest intcrost, but our limits forbid
ua from sttompling to indicate their contents. Whilst Lhe opinions
which Mr. Boulger ~nunciateswith 60 much energy and ability will
b e vory f a r from commnnding univer8al assent, no one, wo think,
can hositate to conaidor his book ono of the most vnlnable contributions to the literatwo of the Central Asian Question which has yeb
been pivon to the world."
Bhqfiiipld Daily Telcgvn2~h,Third Notice, Nay 22, 18'79.-" T o close
with
these voluu~eswith r e p o t , for we have found them abou~~ding
information and containing muoh that interested us docply. With
a l l Mr. Ronlger's views wo ci~nnolagree, but even whorc me differ
from him we feel that ~ v o11avo learnt much from his cltntemcnt of
his case, ai~rlwo corclially rccomrnend this work to all who take a n
inlercst in tho CouCral Asian Question, for they will find it a perfect
mine of information."

Alle~z'sI?~diarbiUaiZ, April 26, 1879.-" The soveral questions relating to our Asiatic Empire aro clealt with succossively in a mannor
which, oven by oppone~~ls,
must be admitted to bc t h a t of a master
of his ~ u b j e c t ;theso i+oquil'esepbrato a t t e ~ ~ t i oon
n oui8 part, and
will, wo hopo, roccive carofnl pcrusalfrom our rendci-a. I t ia nut too
rnucl~to sny that t o bo nnacquai~~tcd
with Mr. Boulger's work is t o
bo deficic~~t
i n tho Imowledyo wliich is essentinl to enable an exact
jndgme~ltto bo forrned oP Jlussia and England in Contra1 Asis."

UnitrcZ Scrvico Gazclte, May 17, 1879.-" Sinco the publication of
8 i r Bowy lla~rlinson'sinvalnablo work ' Englancl and Russia in the

xmst,' no boolc has appeared which in any way pretends to review t h e
position of the two great Northern powors in Asia; such a want
bas been long felt. To follow the devious windiugs of Central Asian
politics, t h e student or t11e soldier has hnd to turn from Elphiustone
t o Yasson, from' Knyo to Eellwsld, to wade through innumerable
B l u e Books, nnd theu to feel that he ia as far as ever from the solution of tho quostion which one clay must bo settled by force of arms.
T o 31r. Boulgor has fallen the happy lot of gathelillg the tanglod
s k e i n s togethol; skilfully umwiutliug them, and presenting t o tho
g e n e r a l rearler n worlc fitly dedicatod t o the great champion of t h e
onuse, Sii*Henry Rmlinaon."
Weslc, April 10, 1879.-"In mauy respects this iil amork of exoepfional merit. The author has erected n, monument to hia own
ancl industry."
Punity T a i ~ April
,
12, 1879.-" This work presents a t once a n
historical compilation and a system of policy. Nr. Boulger displays
v e r y gFeat iilidust~yand i.ese;lrch, and his boolc will be extremely
valuable a s a work of reforonce to those who aim imperfeutly acquainted with the History of &airs in Central Asia."
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THE LIFE OF YAKOOB BEG,
ATHBlrIII: GHAZI, AND BADAULET, AMEER
OF IIBSHGAR.
OPINIONS 01 T H 1 PRESS.
Times,Leading Article, 15th November 18'78.-"A

1

.

very interesting
a n d instructive volumo."
Times, Review (nearly three colnmns), 26th December 18'78." Undor the title of a ' Life of Yukoob Beg, the late Amecr of
Kashgar,' Mr. Boulger has given us a systematic hiatory of t h e
k i n g d o m ancl people of Kashgm: nncl it is well that he has done so.
Tho publicatibn of Mr. Bonlger's volumo is, indeed, lnost
-opportune.
I n Sir Bartle Frere's letter public opinion for
t h e first time found firm grounrl on which to base a national policy

. . .

. . .

i n rolation to tho Russian advance in Central Asia; and now tho
puhlication of Mr. Boulger's exhaustive volume supplies the most
dotailed information as to the significance of that advitnce, and
the errors we have to avoid in meeting it!'
Sta~~dard,
Review, 25th December 1878.-" Mr. Boulger has rendered a service equally to history, the public, snd the Government,
in writing the hook before us.
Wo have only been able to
deal with a portion of this able and exhaustive hook, hut we would
earnestly advise all those who take an intorost in Central Asim
poIitics to read the work before us from beginning to end. Not a
chapter, not even a single page, ought to be ornitbed!'

. . .

Daily Teleg~aplb,Leading Article, 7th November 1818.-" Tho
answer is furnished by Yr. Boulger, in his remarkable and recently
published work on ' Yakoob Beg and Kashgar!
Here, then,
me have not merely o drematio ovent in contemporary history, but
mhnt is virtually the advonl; of a new foroe, mhich Mr. Boulgor
correctly defines as 'the Chhoso fnotor i n the Central Asian Question.' "

...

St. Potwsbu~gGO~OS,
re vie^^, 23rd Fehruary (7th Maroh) 1879.-" A
very important and interesting work.
Bhould bo studied
by all Russian offioials in Turkestan."

.. .

Daily Neurs, Roview, 26th November 1878.-"

Mr. Boulger's 'Life

of Ynkoob Bog' appeare opportunelp at n, time when it is desirable

that no matters bearing upon the affairs of Central Asia should be
mis~~ndorstood
or imperfectly conceived.
While exhibiting
something of the biographer's enthuaiasm for tho military and adluinistrative capacity of his hero, Mr. Boulger is so far from underrating his enemies, that his guiclingp~~'pose
is to direot tho attention
of his couutrylnon to the singular merits of tho Chineso as a military and a governing people!'

...

Ulobe, Review, 8th January 1879.-" The arrival of the Ohine~e
Envoy a t St. Petersburg to discuss tho Kulja quo~tionwill oocasion
n general desire to become acquainted with the relative position of
Russia and Chine in Central Asia; and no recent book, we believe,
will throm better light upon the subject than Mr. Boulger's excellent
biography of the late Athalik Ghazi.
For some considerable time to come the volume will, in all probability, remnin the
standard mork of reference on matters oonnected with Eashgaria
and Kulja!'

...

La Republipue F~anpaise, Roview, 6th February 18'79.-" Le
tableau que nouB fait N. Boulgor do l'administration Chinoise en
Kashgarie est des plus ourieux; c'ost uno v6iitable r6vklation.
Y. Boulger a eu le talent do r6agir contre ces influences

..

..

envahissantoa, ot nous lui en adreasone nos bion sincere8 compliments."
Satn~rdayReuiew, 11th January 1879.-"Mr. Boulger has made a
praiseworthy attempt to treat a aubject which lies under peculiar
diaadvantagos.
Any book vhich attempts to throw light
on the Central Asian problem is entitled to a henring, and the author
.
desorves credit for research, pdns, and general accuracy. .
We repoat, in oonclusion, that the author desorves credit for his
compilation, aud think that readers may dorive p l ~ a from
~ ~ tho
e
laborious career of the principal figure in the book, who, to borrow
Mr. Tcnnysan's diction, roso suddenly through u little arc of heaven,
and, without having wandored far, shot quite as fluddenly into darkness."

...

.

Spectata~., 21st Docember 1878.-" This is a valuable book, and
one which it would be hardly fair to critici~ein the ordinary way.
The writer is evidently one of those mon who, having taken up en
out-OF-the-waysubject of study, become possessed by it, and gradually accumulate more information than they quite lmow what to
do wit,h. He states tho evidence of Chinese ruthlessness as fairly
Impartiality,
as the evidences of Chinese business-wisdom.
indeed, is his strong point; the very objeot of his book being to
dissolve the great mytht~swith which Englishmen have surrounded
Lis 110~0.''

...

Academy, 14th December 1878.-" The author, aftor alluding to
the revival of the Chi~iesopower as shown in the euppression of the
Tae Ping and the Panthay movements, describes with some of the
enthusiasm of sympathy the westward advance, steady and resistless, of the great oxmy, disciplined and armed on the p e a t European
model, htllting at times to sow and reap f i e coin needed for its future
anpplies, and encountering with oqnal skill and dotoinination the
vast distanoes and other diEoulties of the march, and tho rosista~ice
of the enemy. Mr. Boulger has a high opinion of the administrative skill of the Chinese, and its advantages to tho people uudei*
their sway. Their tldministration of 'Kashgar was certainly, t o dl
appearance, a rema~kable instance of liberal treatmenij of an
alien rnce and creed!'

Tho Times af India, 20th January 1879.-'I
The Life of Yakoob
Beg,' late Anleor of IZashgar, is an important addition t o our
knowledge of a trans-frontier state, till recently a tewa iqrcognita.
Mr. Boulger's work, moreover, has appen'ecl most opporbunely ;
for at no previous period of tho history of British India is information regarding tho bulwarks of the lndian Enlpiro lilroly
to ercito a n equal amount of attention in England. Wo commond
this work to all readers who take an interest in tho foreign policy of
the Government of India!'

OUGHT WE TO HOLD GAIUDAHARI'
OPINIONB OF THE PRESS.

Eman~incr,May 31, 18'79.-"In a pamphlet of some thirty pages,.
Mr. Demetlius Boulgor discusses the question of our permanent
footing in Southern Afghanistan. Ho aslcs on his title-page, 'Ought
we t o hold Candahar ? ' and the tenor of his reply is an attinnative.
There is much common sense in his views, and much t m t h in his
estimate of t h e dangers to be apprehended north and w a ~ tof
Afghanistan!'

Allen's Indian Xail, May 19, 18'79.-" The question vhich MI!.
33oulgor asks is alike pertiilent and opport~~ne..
If we do
not make the move now, we shall bo forced to make it, perhaps
under circumstances far less favotwable, a few years hence."

..

